Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF POWER

Methane

Mr. Fitch: asked the Minister of Power, in giving his approval to the Gas Council's proposals for the import of methane from North Africa, what conditions he laid down regarding the total amount of town gas from that source in relation to total supplies.

Mr. Neal: asked the Minister of Power whether he has given any general directions to the Gas Council regarding the maximum amount of liquid methane to be imported.

The Minister of Power (Mr. Richard Wood): I have not issued conditions or directions of this kind, but under the scheme I have authorised town gas derived from methane will be only about one-tenth of total gas supplies.

Mr. Fitch: Is the Minister aware that this 10 per cent. importation of methane

is from a politically unstable area? Will he give an assurance that at least for the next ten years there will be no increase in the figure of 10 per cent.?

Mr. Wood: I cannot give such an assurance, because that would commit us too rigidly in the future. I can, however, assure the hon. Member that before I gave my approval to the scheme, I made sure, and I satisfied myself, that gas supplies in this country could be provided even if the worst should happen in the area of the source of this methane.

Mr. Neal: Is the Minister telling the House that the Gas Council has plenary power to import as much methane as it likes? How long will the Minister be without a plan for the fuel industry? When he has finished with this charade of open competition and consumer choice, where will he find the customers for the coal that is displaced by liquid methane?

Mr. Wood: The Gas Council does not have my sanction to import as much methane as it likes. It has my sanction under the scheme to import methane from which about one-tenth of our existing total of town gas supplies will be produced. That is all the sanction that the Gas Council has.

Mr Mason: asked the Minister of Power what representations he has received from the National Union of Mineworkers regarding his decision to allow the importation of liquid methane


from North Africa; and what reply he has sent.

Mr. Wood: None, Sir. The Executive Committee of the National Union of Mineworkers explained their views on this subject to me at a meeting last June, but I have received no representations from the National Union since the decision was announced.

Mr. Mason: Is the Minister not aware that during the course of that meeting they objected most strongly to the importation of liquid methane? Has he not had time yet to assess what will be the effects on the mining industry of his decision, that confidence in the mining industry is rapidly on the wane, that the voluntary wastage of manpower is increasing, and that in the past 12 months 60 per cent. of the people who have voluntarily left the industry have been under 31 years of age? Is it not time that the Minister reviewed the situation before he kills the industry with imports of gas and oil, even before it is due naturally to die?

Mr. Wood: I think that the hon. Member's supplementary question was intended more to give than to elicit information, but whether or not that is true, I have explained on many occasions the part which I believe methane will play in meeting the fuel needs of this country, and I approved the scheme because of the urgent need of the gas industry to reduce its costs. If it does not reduce its costs pretty quickly, the future for the consumption of coal by the gas industry will not be very bright.

Mr. Brockway: How final is this agreement? In view of the fact that the future of the supply of methane from the Sahara is very much in doubt and is dependent on negotiations between the French Government and the provisional Government of Algeria, would it not be better to postpone any final signing of the agreement until these problems are settled?

Mr. Wood: I do not think so. I have given permission to the Gas Council to sign an agreement with the authorities in North Africa. As I have explained on several occasions to the House, I did not give that permission without making it perfectly clear and satisfying myself completely that alternative supplies could

be provided in this country if supplies from North Africa broke down.

Mr. Emery: asked the Minister of Power whether, in his consideration of the scheme to import liquid methane, he took account of the possibility of producing town gas more cheaply by the use of products offered at lower prices than methane.

Mr. Wood: Yes, Sir. The Gas Council took the view, with which I agree, that the technical advantages of methane more than offset the somewhat lower landed cost at which petroleum products were offered by certain oil companies.

Mr. Emery: Does my right hon. Friend not think that the possibility of being able to produce town gas sold to the consumer at between 7d. and 7½d. a therm rather than the 8½d. which it is suggested methane might be produced at would bring a 12½ per cent. saving to the consumer? Is not this something which ought to be more fully considered?

Mr. Wood: I should like to make clear to my hon. Friend that it was the methane scheme that was put to me by the Gas Council. It suggested that it was important and of technical benefit to the industry to have this gas. I am quite convinced that my decision will strengthen the competitive position of the Gas Council, but I have always stressed in conversation with the Gas Council, in public, and in the House, that there is no single road to the production of cheaper gas, whether it comes from methane or oil-based products like propane, butane or naphtha.

Mr. Emery: Does this mean that my right hon. Friend would consider favourably the importation of propane in addition to methane if it can reduce the price?

Mr. Wood: I will certainly consider very carefully any proposals put to me.

Mr. Albu: asked the Minister of Power whether he will make it a condition of the tender for the two proposed methane carriers that they should include alternative methods of propulsion.

Mr. Wood: No, Sir. The design of these ships is not a matter for me, but I understand that propulsion will be


conventional and subject to no exceptional risk or difficulty.

Mr. Albu: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that one of the only two firms asked to tender for these ships is prepared to offer alternative propulsive machinery to that of their own manufacture, but that the other firm is not prepared to do so? Is he aware that this firm was referred to in the recent report by Messrs. Peat, Marwick and Mitchell on orders for ships placed abroad, when the reason given for its losing these orders was that it was not able to make such an offer? Will he refer this to his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport?

Mr. Wood: It is a matter for the Gas Council to decide how it wants its ships propelled. I understand that these firms put in tenders for certain methods of propulsion and that both Lloyds and the Port of London Authority are perfectly satisfied from the point of view of safety.

Electricity Supplies (Rural Areas)

Mr. Thorpe: asked the Minister of Power whether he will now seek to amend Section 13 of the Electricity Act, 1957, so as to accelerate electrification in the rural areas.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power (Mr. J. C. George): No, Sir. The allocation of financial responsibility to individual Boards under Section 13 of the 1957 Act remains the policy of the Government.

Mr. Thorpe: Although it may remain the policy of the Government, is the hon. Member aware that it has resulted in the South-West in the fact that not only 60 per cent. of rural dwellings have no mains connection, but that in Barnstaple today only 45 per cent. of the total farms have a mains connection? Does he not think that in this day and age it is an outrage that there are still villages and hamlets—in 1961—without electricity or drainage, or water or any other facility? Does he not think that there is a case for making a direction under Section 8 of the Act that there will be within a certain time 95 per cent. of rural electrification in this country? Is he aware that America and most other European countries have been able to carry out rural electrification

but that we are steadily lagging behind?

Mr. George: Progress in rural electrification in the South-West has been relatively greater than in other areas in England and Wales. The percentage of farms connected is far higher than 60: it is 71 per cent. The boards have a dual responsibility, first, to further rural electrification, and secondly, at the same time to make ends meet one year with another. It is up to the boards in their financial wisdom to decide how far and how swiftly they can carry out rural electrification.

Mr. Thorpe: Is the hon. Member aware that that is precisely what Section 13 is about? Is he aware that the boards can carry out such rural electrification only with subsidies out of urban profits, and that because the South-West is substantially rural there are few urban profits, which is why the rural areas are at the bottom of the queue? Does he not think, therefore, that this Section 13 should be amended?

Mr. George: The 1957 Act aimed to foster each board's independence and a sense of financial responsibility. This still remains the Government's policy.

Scrap Iron

Mr. Peter Emery: asked the Minister of Power what action he is taking to allow scrap iron to be exported from the United Kingdom.

Mr. Wood: I have agreed with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade to allow the poorer grades of iron and steel scrap to be exported, and an open general licence for this purpose was issued last month.

Mr. Emery: While thanking, my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him whether he does not realise that this is only a very small percentage of iron and steel scrap? Does he realise that the scrap holders at the moment are completely burdened by an excess of scrap and that the credit restrictions stop them holding any more? What is more necessary for the time being is an open general licence for all grades of scrap iron, particularly grades No. 1 and No. 2 steel scrap? Would he consider that with his right hon. Friend?

Mr. Wood: I will certainly consider what my hon. Friend says. The difficulty and danger is, of course, that if we export now, at relatively low prices to a weak market, we may later have to replace scrap sent abroad with high-priced imports when the market hardens. Therefore, what I should like to do is to see how the relaxation which my right hon. Friends and I have adopted works out in practice; but I will consider what my hon. Friend has said.

Mr. Emery: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind the fact that the trade wishes these export licences only till the steel works begin normal operation again, and that therefore very short-term licences will be completely acceptable?

Mr. Wood: I will take into consideration what my hon. Friend has said.

Fuel and Power Resources

Mr. Mason: asked the Minister of Power if, in view of the Economic Planning Council proposed by Her Majesty's Government, he will consider setting up a fuel and power council composed of representatives of all fuel and power industries with a view to a more efficient use of indigenous fuels allied with controlled imports of additional fuel requirements.

Mr. Wainwright: asked the Minister of Power if, in view of imports of oil and the future imports of methane gas, he will now consider setting up a board of all fuel and power representatives with a view to planning more effectively the use of British fuel and power resources.

Mr. Finch: asked the Minister of Power if, having regard to the effect on the home market for coal of the importation of gas and oil, he will now consider formulating a national plan for the more effective use of indigenous fuels.

Mr. Wood: It is my statutory duty to promote the efficient use of all types of fuel. This is a subject which will also play an important part in the work of the proposed National Economic Development Council, with which I shall be in close touch. I see no need for additional machinery of the kind suggested.

Mr. Mason: Why not? Why does not the Minister introduce some national sense of purpose into the planned use of our own fuels, first of all? Secondly, is

it not possible that this national economic development council may itself in due course be prepared to look at our fuel and power situation and, possibly, give to those who work therein a larger share of the cake?

Mr. Wood: The Minister of Power was given the function under the Act of co-ordinating the various fuel industries. The hon. Gentleman and others of his hon. Friends do not think I do that very well, but I think that I am the best co-ordinator there is, and I do not intend to set up a co-ordinating committee to help to do my job.

Mr. Wainwright: Would the Minister be more explicit about not setting up the committee? Will he not take some note of what the Chancellor of the Exchequer says about future planning in this country? Does he not think it is time to end the attacks made by many of his hon. and right hon. Friends on the nationalised industries and to end these attempts to belittle this very important nationalised industry?

Mr. Wood: I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and, I think, most of his Friends, that co-ordination is very important indeed—[An HON. MEMBER: "What do you mean by it?"] That is exactly it. If by co-ordination the hon. Member and his hon. Friends mean dictation to the consumer of exactly what fuel he or she should use, I cannot agree that that is the right course to adopt.

Mr. Finch: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that his reply today is going to add to the feelings of insecurity amongst the men in the industry and is bound to give rise to further loss of manpower which, in South Wales, is becoming a very serious matter for the industry and for our economy?

Mr. Wood: No, if the hon. Member is referring to the coal industry, as I think he is—

Mr. Finch: Yes.

Mr. Wood: —the best hope for the coal industry, as I think he will agree, is to continue the increase in productivity which has encouraged us in recent weeks and to improve its own competitive power against other fuels. I think that that is the best answer I can give.

Mr. Peyton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that those of us behind him will take great encouragement from what he has said—his refusal to dictate to the consumer and user, and that this aim, which is constantly advocated by the party opposite, is a thoroughly bad one?

Mr. Mason: On a point of order. In view of the very unsatisfactory nature of these replies, I give notice that I shall raise the matter again on the Adjournment at the earliest possible moment.

Ministerial Responsibility

Mr. A. Roberts: asked the Minister of Power if, for the avoidance of doubt, he will introduce clarifying legislation to establish Ministerial responsibility for all the operations of the gas, electricity and mining industries, so as to enable Ministers to be questioned more fully in the House of Commons.

Mr. Wood: No, Sir. The hon. Member's suggestion would reduce the National Coal Board and other boards to complete cyphers.

Mr. Roberts: Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that we ought to reduce some of them? Does he not agree that the present position is wholly inadequate, because when some of these points are raised in debate the Minister invariably refuses to reply or does not refer to them?

Mr. Wood: But the difficulty is that the hon. Member's suggestion would give me literally total control over three important industries. Although I have reasonable self-confidence, the House might think that that was going a little too far.

Mr. Lipton: Does the right hon. Gentleman's reply mean that he and Her Majesty's Government continue to have complete faith in the sound financial judgment of the boards of the three nationalised industries referred to in the Question?

Mr. Wood: It does not mean anything apart from what I have said in answer to the Question.

Power Stations (Atmospheric Pollution)

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: asked the Minister of Power if he will give a general direction to the Central Electricity

Generating Board that they should secure the elimination of obnoxious fumes from power stations.

Mr. George: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend sees no need of such a direction. Control over the emission of fumes from power stations is primarily a matter for the Alkali Inspectorate under my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the hon Gentleman make representation to his right hon. Friends that in many parts of the country power stations are causing great public nuisance? Is he aware that there has been a serious nuisance in my constituency at Derby and that Battersea Power Station has been making Battersea Park almost unusable?

Mr. George: Neither of my right hon. Friends has received any complaint about nuisance from Battersea Power Station recently. The Electricity Board has redesigned and modified the gas washing plant at the station, and the periods when it is out of operation should in future be less frequent and shorter. The first part of the right hon Gentleman's supplementary question is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing. I understand that inspectors make regular inspections to ensure that the best practical means of controlling emissions are used and that they receive ready co-operation from the Central Electricity Generating Board.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman pay a visit to Battersea Park when the wind is in the east?

Oral Answers to Questions — COAL

Pit Closures

Mr. Snow: asked the Minister of Power what information he has received from the National Coal Board regarding its proposals for the closure of Lea Hall Pit, Rugeley, Staffordshire.

Mr. Slater: asked the Minister of Power what information he has regarding the future of the combined mine at Dean and Chapter, Ferry Hill.

Mr. Shinwell: asked the Minister of Power what information he has received from the National Coal Board


as to its plan for closing pits in the Parliamentary Division of Easington in 1961, 1962 and 1963.

Mr. Wood: Decisions on the closure of individual pits are a matter of day-to-day management by the National Coal Board and hon. Members should ask the chairman for this information. I expect that the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) has seen the Board's announcement on 23rd November which showed that there is no question of closing the Lea Hall Colliery. The Board has made no announcement about Dean and Chapter Colliery, and the only information that the Board has given about closures in the constituency of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) is that Wingate Colliery may be closed in 1962.

Mr. Snow: Is the Minister aware that I have not seen the notice by the National Coal Board and that it has not been notified to me? Secondly, is he aware that the Question was put down with a view to scotching rumours and uncertainty which have been created largely as a result of what happened recently in Scotland, where another pit which had been the subject of substantial capital investment has been closed, apparently prematurely? Thirdly, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are many local authorities in mining areas who are becoming increasingly apprehensive at the substantial financial investment which they are being forced to make in the provision of houses, an investment which carries with it a high interest rate liability and which worries them considerably?

Mr. Wood: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman did not see the announcement by the Coal Board, but I think he will now be satisfied that the rumours relating to this pit have been effectively scotched.

Mr. Slater: In view of his reply to my Question No. 11, does the Minister appreciate that meetings have been held in the district concerning the future of the mine and possible redundancies, which have been greatly publicised by the local Press? What consultations take place between the right hon. Gentleman's Department, the Board of

Trade and the Ministry of Labour when redundancies are pending as a result of the closure of collieries?

Mr. Wood: I think I made clear in previous Answers to Questions that there is consultation, naturally, between the National Coal Board, on the one side, and my Department and the Board of Trade and other Departments, on the other, so that we can try to think ahead about this matter, but I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Member, as he asks me in this Question, definite information. I think that this must be information for the chairman of the Board to give.

Mr. Shinwell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that if Wingate Pit closes, as he says—it will be next year, will it not?—that place will become completely derelict, and that there is no other industry available for those who will be displaced from employment? Does he not agree that surely a matter of this sort is not the exclusive property of the National Coal Board, but also a matter for the Government?

Mr. Wood: I do not think that the Board has made out that it is its exclusive property. I think it has already discussed it with the unions, and it has given me certain information about the possibility of closure, in order to enable me and my right hon. Friends to think ahead in the sense I was describing to the hon. Member just now.

Mr. Shinwell: asked the Minister of Power how many pits were closed in the county of Durham in the last five years; to what extent he was informed of consultations held under Section 46 of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946, with the Durham Miners' Association on those closures; and what is the number of pits to be closed in the next five years in this area.

Mr. Wood: Sixteen since the beginning of 1957. The Board consults the unions and keeps me informed of what it has decided. It does not tell me of the details of its consultations with the unions. The number of pits to be closed in the next five years will depend on the circumstances of individual colleries and on the demand for coal.

Mr. Shinwell: If the right hon. Gentleman is suggesting that before any pits


are closed the National Coal Board consults the National Union of Mineworkers and other organisations representing workers in the industry and that the views of the workers' representatives are taken into account, is the right hon. Gentleman never informed of what happens? Is he aware that Section 46 of the Act provided that the National Coal Board is compelled to consult representatives of workers and that the implication was that the Ministry was fully informed?

Mr. Wood: The right hon. Gentleman is, of course, quite right. The Act requires the Board to set up arrangements in the industry for these discussions. The arrangements exist and discussions take place. I am informed of the results of these discussions. What I am not informed of is exactly what detailed course the discussions take, and I do not see any reason why I should be informed of the details.

Mr. Shinwell: If the right hon. Gentleman is informed at any time by representatives of workers in the industry that they strongly object to the closing of certain pits, what action does he take?

Mr. Wood: In that case I would no doubt have conversations with the National Coal Board on the matter, but such representations have not been made to me.

Mr. Finch: asked the Minister of Power what information he has of the number of colliery closures which will take place due to shortage of manpower.

Mr. George: The Board has not so far had to close collieries because of shortage of labour and is not expecting to have to do so in future.

Mr. Finch: Does not the hon. Gentleman realise that there are to be pit closures because of the shortage of manpower? Ought he not to be informed of the position so that he can at least consult the Ministry of Labour before collieries are closed?

Mr. George: I must repeat the answer which I have already given—"The Board has not so far had to close collieries because of shortage of labour". The shortage of labour is only one aspect of the conditions at a colliery which are considered when a colliery

is closed. Many other factors are considered. No pit has been closed for that reason alone.

Mr. J. Griffiths: While I agree that no pits have yet been closed owing to shortage of manpower, is the hon. Gentleman aware that in many areas there is considerable concern that this situation may be reached in the near future? Was it reported to him last week that in the South Western Division of the National Coal Board, which includes South Wales, during the past 17 weeks 777 men have left the industry and not been replaced? Does he realise that if that sort of thing goes on for very long pits will have to close because there will be no men left to work them?

Mr. George: Perhaps I might repeat the second half of my first answer—"The Board is not expecting to have to do so in the future". It is true that there is a serious manpower problem, but it is also true that if the men in the industry were properly distributed the problem would be a great deal less than it is. We are particularly conscious of the difficulties in Wales, and this is having, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the serious attention of the National Coal Board.

Mr. Ness Edwards: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his view is quite contrary to that generally held in South Wales, and that the redeployment of manpower from one pit to another is also in contemplation? Will he and the right hon. Gentleman try to instil some confidence into the industry and persuade some of their colleagues on the Government benches to refrain from sending round rumours which are causing men to leave the industry?

Mr. George: The best way for the industry to regain that confidence is for it to show itself to be self-supporting and on the way up in productivity. That is happening. The productivity of the industry is higher now than the target for 1965. We believe that confidence will return to the industry when it is shown to be able to stand upon its own feet against all competition.

Mr Neal: asked the Minister of Power what information he has received from the National Coal Board about the


number of pits which will be closed in the English and Welsh divisions of the National Coal Board during 1962.

Mr. Wood: The National Coal Board has given me the information which it is now discussing with the unions concerned. It is for the Board and not for me to disclose this information.

Mr. Neal: How long does it take information from the National Coal Board to percolate to the House of Commons? There appears to be poor liaison in this matter, and I am not surprised by hon. Members' feelings about it. The right hon. Gentleman was boasting a moment ago of his skill as a co-ordinator. Is he co-ordinating with his Ministerial colleagues with a view to settling new industries in the areas which are becoming derelict in order to provide work for redundant miners?

Mr. Wood: I think that I am co-ordinating in almost every direction. The hon. Gentleman asked me how long it takes for information from the National Coal Board to percolate to the House of Commons If it is information which only the Board can give, then the percolation takes as long as it takes for individual members of this House to ask the chairman, when he will give the information, if he can.

Smokeless Fuel Supplies

Mr. D. Griffiths: asked the Minister of Power if, in view of the recent agreements which allow coalminers smokeless fuel in place of raw coal, he will give a general direction to the National Coal Board to ensure adequate supplies in the regions concerned from the operative date of 1st January, 1962.

Mr. George: No, Sir. This is a matter for the National Coal Board.

Mr. Griffiths: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that already in the existing smokeless zones there are difficulties in procuring smokeless fuels? As local authorities are now creating more smokeless zones, is it not apparent to the Minister himself that something ought to be done at once to ensure supplies of smokeless fuels in those areas?

Mr. George: Supplies of smokeless fuels are generally adequate throughout the country, and no such difficulty is

being encountered on a wide scale, though there are local shortages. In complying with the agreement to which the Question refers, the National Coal Board intends that where coal is replaced it should be wherever possible by coke from its own ovens.

Mr. Owen: asked the Minister of Power what steps he is taking to ensure adequate supplies of smokeless fuel in areas in which the Clean Air Act is in operation.

Mr. George: Supplies are adequate both generally and in the North-East, where the Northern Gas Board's revised plans for supplying Gloco should permit a considerable expansion of smoke control. A National Advisory Committee, including producers and distributors, of which I am chairman, keeps the prospects under review.

Mr. Owen: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that when a local authority elects to proceed with the operation of the Clean Air Act, considerable frustration is engenderd by the lack of adequate supplies of smokeless fuel? Is it not possible for his Ministry to co-operate more closely with the local authorities and the National Coal Board?

Mr. George: There is continuous co-operation between the local authorities and the Ministry through the regional advisory committees on smokeless fuels. They are always consulted before any proposal for a smoke control area is approved. In this way we ensure that the establishment of areas does not go ahead faster than fuel supplies become available, and so far no proposal has been rejected.

Mr. R. W. Elliott: When my hon. Friend suggests that supplies in the North-East are adequate, may I ask whether he recalls the recommendation of the Peach Committee that closed stoves should be installed in that area to burn locally produced hard coke, and whether he realises that there is strong aversion to the installation of these closed stoves in the area? Is my hon. Friend further aware that the Smokeless Fuels Federation mobile exhibition quite reasonably suggested that there should be greater use of smokeless fuel, but Warmco as produced by the National Coal Board was hardly available in the North-East?

Mr. George: As to the use of closed stoves buring hard coke, the Ministry of Housing has recently made these types of fires available for grants with a view to encouraging their use. The National Coal Board had high hopes of Warmco at one time, but these have been disappointed through technical difficulties.

Opencast Mining, Lancashire

Mr. Fitch: asked the Minister of Power what applications he has received from the National Coal Board for increasing opencast coal production in Lancashire.

Mr. George: None, Sir.

Mr. Fitch: I am very pleased to hear that. However, is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that certain farmers in the Goose Green area of Wigan have been told by the National Coal Board that their land will be requisitioned for opencast coal? Would he look into this?

Mr. George: The Board is negotiating for rights to prospect for possible sites. The Minister's agreement to this is required only when compulsory powers to prospect are sought, but the Board hopes to obtain the rights it requires by voluntary agreement.

Manpower

Mr. Swain: asked the Minister of Power what has been the recruitment of juveniles into the coal mining industry over the last 12 months, and what has been the total wastage of all ages from the industry during the same period.

Mr. George: In the 52 weeks ended 11th November, recruitment of juveniles totalled 13,000 and wastage of all ages was 76,200.

Mr. Swain: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his and his right hon. Friend's complacency at the Dispatch Box when dealing with matters pertaining to the mining industry almost equals the smugness and complacency of the Prime Minister on the other major affairs of State? Is he also aware that the inability of the mining industry to encourage juveniles and young men to volunteer for service is causing great concern to everybody in it, both in the trade unions and on the managerial

side? What is he or his right hon. Friend prepared to do to assist the industry in its recruitment campaign?

Mr. George: Far from our being complacent about the coal mining industry, the position in the industry is the cause of daily concern and consultation on our part. We are most anxious that the industry should go ahead vigorously, and everything towards that end is being done.

Mr. Swain: Then cancel the wage pause.

Mr. George: With regard to the recruitment of juveniles, the figures which I have given are higher than those for 1959 and 1960, though lower than those for the previous eight years. The number of men re-entering the industry has, however, shown a big increase, being higher than in any year since 1955, and total recruitment is better.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that last year I tried to do my very best to help the National Coal Board and the Ministry by going to Eton and delivering an earnest and eloquent plea to the students under the heading "Coal Mining as a Career"? I have had no results. Can the hon. Gentleman explain why?

Mr. George: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman's eloquence was not as successful as it normally is.

Mr. Rankin: Perhaps the career was not sufficiently attractive.

Mr. Swain: asked the Minister of Power what information he has about the loss in production of coal from the East Midlands division of the National Coal Board owing to a shortage of manpower.

Mr. D. Griffiths: asked the Minister of Power what information he has about the loss in production of coal from the North Eastern division of the National Coal Board owing to a shortage of manpower.

Mr. George: The National Coal Board advises me that it is difficult to assess the tonnage involved, but there is a shortage of several thousand men in each division.

Mr. Swain: Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that the shortage of men in the East Midlands is attributable to the acute shortage of houses in the mining areas? What are he and the Government prepared to do to assist local authorities to overcome this great difficulty so that we in the East Midlands can encourage people from other parts of the country to come to the area and live there by building houses for them at the same time as we provide them with jobs?

Mr. George: The National Coal Board is anxious to increase production in these profitable coalfields. It is actively recruiting men, and it is encouraging the transference of men from declining coalfields. It is also negotiating with local authorities for the building of several thousand houses. As the hon. Gentleman is probably aware, the Board is paying special subsidies where local authorities have agreed to build such houses. In addition, it is itself building several thousand houses in these divisions through the Coal Industry Housing Association.

Mr. Griffiths: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that we have here two of the most prolific coalmining areas in the world, let alone in this country, which are suffering a loss of output through the acute shortage of manpower? Is he further aware that the inroads being made into stocks are creating a perilous position, and that if those inroads continue it will become more serious?

Mr. George: We are well aware of the shortage of manpower in these productive areas. As I have said, the Board is taking active steps to recruit men. It is worth noting, however, that the output for both divisions during recent weeks has been running above the level of a year ago.

Mr. Stones: asked the Minister of Power if he will give a general direction to the National Coal Board to recruit more men to the coalmining industry.

Mr. George: No, Sir. The Board is already making every effort to recruit the men it needs.

Mr. Stones: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the present drift of manpower from the industry and the difficulty of recruitment are generally recognised as

being due in no small measure to the deep feeling of insecurity among miners about the future of the industry, which has been brought about, in my opinion, by the failure of the Government to plan the nation's economy in such a manner as to safeguard the industry against unwarrantable imports of alternative fuels from foreign sources? If we are to attract additional men, is it not time the Government changed their policy from a free-for-all to the more sensible one of safeguarding the welfare and the economy of the nation, particularly with regard to our fuel requirements, which can be met adequately from our indigenous sources?

Mr. George: The men in the industry need have no fear about its future. For a year or two output has been less than consumption, and so it is at the moment. What the country needs is more coal from the industry, not less.

Mr. Ainsley: asked the Minister of Power to what extent he is making a fresh reappraisal of the coalmining industry in relation to its output, manpower and economic production.

Mr. Wood: The National Coal Board and I have these matters under constant review, but I have nothing further to tell the House at present.

Mr. Ainsley: Is the Minister aware that the free-for-all policy now being pursued by the Government owing to back bench pressure is bringing chaos into the mining industry and undermining its morale? How can the chairman of the National Coal Board say that he is planning for 200 million tons of coal this year with declining manpower, and how can the Chancellor of the Exchequer control the national economy when he is subjected to pressure from outside the country?

Mr. Wood: The chairman of the National Coal Board realises that he will only attain his targets of output for next year and the years after with the fewer men he has in the mines by increasing output from each man. That is why he is pressing forward as quickly as possible with the mechanisation programme. I think that the hon. Gentleman will agree that recently it has been very successful.

Production

Mr. Wainwright: asked the Minister of Power, in view of the fact that it is estimated that the power used in this country in 1965 will be 300 million tons of coal equivalent, what is the estimated tonnage that the coalmining industry is expected to produce for the years 1962, 1963, 1964, and 1965.

Mr. Wood: I cannot at present add to the information I gave the hon. Member on 17th July.

Mr. Wainwright: Will the hon. Gentleman make certain that any amount of coal produced for years ahead will not be put into stock? In the event of pressure from hon. Members on his side of the House to import coal, will he remind them that the National Coal Board was responsible for subsidising a difference in the price of imported coal of £3 or £4 a ton several years ago? Will he also remind hon. Members opposite that when this country was producing coal at 30s. a ton cheaper than on the Continent private industry never even said "thank you" to the National Coal Board?

Mr. Wood: I have no doubt that notice will be taken of what the hon. Gentleman has said, but that goes a little beyond his asking me for an estimate of the tonnage which the coal industry can produce. I was not clear where it was that he wanted this coal put. Was it in stock? If coal produced is not immediately consumed, there is little alternative to stocking it.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF AVIATION

Vernons Industries, Ltd., Kirkby

Mr. H. Wilson: asked the Minister of Aviation if he has completed his inquiries into the fulfilment of the contracts awarded by his Department to Vernons Industries Ltd. of Kirkby; and if he will state the address in Kirkby at which Messrs. Vernons are completing the contracts.

The Minister of Aviation (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): The contracts were to have been completed for Vernons Industries Ltd at the Petbow Limited factory (formerly Vernons) at Kirkby; but Vernons Industries now informs me that,

as Petbow has decided to close the Kirkby factory, the contracts will be completed by Petbow at Sandwich.

Mr. Wilson: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that, no doubt in all good faith, he gave misleading information to the House in his previous answer? In this case, Petbow took over Vernon's factory on 1st July and only four or five weeks later closed it down, despite all assurances, and transferred all the work on the Ministry of Aviation contracts—on which it had been given preference in order to give employment to Merseyside—to the South-East, and that this was done without the right hon. Gentleman's permission? Is he further aware that it was only after I took this up with him that he caught up with events and agreed retrospectively to allow the contracts to be transferred? In these circumstances, will he now direct an inquiry to be held, as I asked him to do in September?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I can assure the right hon. Gentleman—and I think he knows this—that I have not knowingly given misleading information. I have kept him fully informed of all the information in my possession. I understand the situation to be simply that once it was known that the factory was to be closed the workers very properly started to seek other employment. There were about 250 of them. By last week 115 had left to take up other employment, and since then 55 more have left. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the contracts could have been carried out.

Mr. Wilson: Is it not clear that, apart from the problem of unemployment, which I have taken up with the Ministry of Labour, my information was several weeks ahead of the right hon. Gentleman's even though, when I gave him that information, he did not believe me? Is he now satisfied that the motive for the purchase of this factory was to get these contracts and the means of fulfilling them, and that they have now been transferred from the area in which they were awarded to another area? Will he now accept the suggestion I put to him many weeks ago, that in view of the rather dubious transactions that have taken place, he should have a full inquiry made? As I have already said,


I entirely acquit him of knowingly misleading the House, but I do not acquit those concerned of having misled him.

Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not think that there was anything dubious about this. I believe that there was an honest intention to carry out the work until the end of the year, but as the workers were leaving the work could not be done. I am happy to say that the workers are finding fresh employment.

Airport Authority

Mr. Chetwynd: asked the Minister of Aviation when he proposes to bring in legislation to establish an airport authority, as proposed in Command Paper No. 1457 of August, 1961.

Mr. Thorneycroft: It is unlikely that there will be the necessary Parliamentary time for a Bill to establish an Airport Authority before the next Session.

Mr. Chetwynd: As there is general agreement on the desirability of this move, is that a sufficient answer to give? Cannot the right hon. Gentleman go ahead with this straight away?

Mr. Thorneycroft: There is general agreement about the desirability of many moves, but it is not possible to put them all in the programme for one Session.

Sir A. V. Harvey: Will my right hon. Friend consult the Leader of the House to see if time could be found for this Measure? It is generally agreed by both sides [Interruption.]—let me finish—that the sooner London Airport is handed over to an independent authority the more efficient it will be. To think that it will not be handed over for another two years is the end.

Mr. Thorneycroft: I have no doubt that this exchange will reach the notice of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, but I can give no undertaking.

Mr. G. Brown: In view of the right hon. Gentleman's explanation of why this apparently genuine desire cannot be met in this Session, will he make it plain to the Leader of the House that if the Government were to stop the Immigration Bill they would surely have time for this Measure?

Buccaneer Aircraft (Order)

Mr. A. Roberts: asked the Minister of Aviation how many Buccaneer strike aircraft have been ordered by the Federal German Government.

Mr. Thorneycroft: None, Sir.

Mr. Roberts: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Federal German Government were keenly interested in the Buccaneer? Is it true that to some extent the United States of America put pressure on the German Federal Republic to prevent it from buying the Buccaneer?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I have no such evidence.

Scotland

Mr. Rankin: asked the Minister of Aviation (1) if he has noted the recommendation of the Toothill Report that the case for a Scottish Airport authority should be examined; and if he will make a statement;

(2) if he will make a statement on Recommendation No. 19 of the Toothill Report with regard to the importance of air services in developing the economy of Scotland.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation (Mr. C. M. Woodhouse): This interesting and important Report has only just reached me. I shall, of course, study it most carefully, but the hon. Member will not expect me to make any statement until I have finished doing so.

Mr. Rankin: In view of that comprehensive but unsatisfactory reply—because the Report was issued last Wednesday—[Laughter.] I thought that the Parliamentary Secretary would be smart off the mark, being fresh—may I ask him what evidence, written, oral, or both, his Ministry was asked to give to the Toothill Committee?

Mr. Woodhouse: I assure the hon. Member that I have been smart and fresh enough at least to read the relevant sections of the Report, but as it has been published only in the last few days, I am sure that he would agree that I have not had enough time to study the matter in detail. I cannot add anything now to my Answer, but I hope


that it will be possible to make a statement on the Report before long.

Mr. Rankin: On a point of order. Surely it is competent to ask the hon. Member what evidence—[HON. MEMBERS: "That is not a point of order."]—his Department was asked—

Mr. Speaker: Would the hon. Member be good enough to indicate to me what he thinks is the point of order involved in that?

Mr. Rankin: Surely if it is not exactly a point of order—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—I might ask the hon. Gentleman to answer that part of my question.

Mr. Speaker: It may be that the hon. Member can do that, but not by rising with the words "On a point of order" when it is not a point of order.

Mr. Rankin: Can I ask the hon. Member if he will say what evidence his Department was asked to supply to the Toothill Committee?

Mr. Woodhouse: I cannot give an answer on specific evidence, but I can assure the hon. Member that we are constantly in touch with Mr. Toothill, who is the chairman of our Scottish Advisory Committee.

Newcastle Airport

Mr. Short: asked the Minister of Aviation if he has now reached a decision on the application of Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corporation for financial assistance in the development of Newcastle Airport.

Mr. Chetwynd: asked the Minister of Aviation what decision he has reached on the future of Newcastle Airport to serve the North-East.

Mr. Woodhouse: My right hon. Friend hopes to be able to reach a decision in the near future on the application made by the corporation of Newcastle-upon-Tyne for financial aid for its airport.

Mr. Short: That is not good enough. How much longer is this delay to continue? Is not the hon. Gentleman aware that his Ministry has been putting us off with one excuse after another for ten years? Is he aware that Manchester Airport, for example, has received £1½ million since the war, while our airport

has not received a single penny of public funds and has been developed by the ratepayers of Newcastle? Is he not aware that it fulfils a very important link in the national system of airways? Is it not about time that he did something to help us in the North-East?

Mr. Woodhouse: I am aware that it has taken a long time, because it is a difficult and complex question. Traffic at Newcastle is considerably less than that at Manchester, but the reasons why it has taken such a long time are partly that, in consultation with the local authority, some modifications were introduced into the plan put to the Ministry, partly because the policy which was defined in the White Paper was finally formulated only in the course of this year, and partly because there are several local authorities with whom this matter has to be negotiated.

Mr. Chetwynd: Is the Parliamentary Secretary judging this airport on its own merits or waiting until he has reached general decisions on other airports? Will he bear in mind that until this airport is brought up to the standard of a modern, efficient aerodrome, the traffic is not likely to increase as greatly as has that in Manchester?

Mr. Woodhouse: Yes, Sir. Like every application of this kind, it is being judged entirely on its own merits in relation to the two criteria laid down in the White Paper.

Mr. Montgomery: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind how long these negotiations have been taking place, and will he ask his right hon. Friend to get a move on, as it is vital to the industrial development of the North-East?

Mr. Woodhouse: I am aware that it has taken a long time, and I will convey my hon. Friend's remarks to my right hon. Friend.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOSPITALS

New Hospital, Slough

Mr. Brockway: asked the Minister of Health what are the reasons for the delay in the construction of the new hospital at Wexham, Slough.

The Minister of Health (Mr. Enoch Powell): Work on the site has begun. I am not aware of any delay.

Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he may have come into office too recently to know of the long delay? In view of the urgency of this hospital, will he do his utmost to expedite its completion? Who is to bear the cost of the tremendous increase in expenditure which is due to the delay over several years?

Mr. Powell: Each year's expenditure has to be fitted into each year's programme, but I am anxious to see rapid progress made with this hospital.

Children's Wards

Mr. Albu: asked the Minister of Health if he will state the numbers of plans for new or reconstructed children's wards in hospital which have received his approval during the last two years or are now under consideration; and what proportion of them have included provision for the accommodation of mothers with children under five years of age.

Mr. Powell: Seventy-five schemes for 131 new or reconstructed wards have been approved and 27 schemes for 44 wards are under consideration. Forty-four schemes make specific provision for mothers of children under five.

Mr. Albu: What steps has the right hon. Gentleman taken to ensure that in all future plans such provision is made, and what action has he taken, when approving the plans for those hospitals which did not make such provision, to try to get them to change their plans?

Mr. Powell: This provision will not be required in every case, because some of these wards are not specifically for the youngest children. Indeed, I consider this proportion quite reasonable.

Mr. K. Robinson: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the response to this recommendation of the Platt Report has been disappointing? Can he not at least tell hospital authorities that he will not approve schemes involving wards for younger children where no provision is made for a certain number of mothers to attend as well?

Mr. Powell: I do not think that there can be an absolute rule on this matter. If the hon. Gentleman studies the figures,

I think he will see that considerable provision is being made in the current proposals.

Oral Answers to Questions — MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Polomyelitis (Vaccine Supplies)

Mr. Awbery: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that several local authorities have experienced a shortage of polio vaccine during the past month, with consequent delays in vaccinations; and what steps are being taken to provide an adequate supply.

Mr. Ainsley: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that a sufficient supply of anti-polio vaccine is not available throughout the whole of the county of Durham; what action he is taking to increase supplies; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Grey: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that anti-polio vaccine stocks in Durham are very low and that fresh supplies are not expected till January; and if he will take immediate steps to see that the present stocks are increased.

Mr. Montgomery: asked the Minister of Health whether he is aware that the city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne has insufficient stocks of poliomyelitis vaccine to meet requirements; and if he will take steps to ensure that further supplies of this vaccine are made available.

Mr. R. W. Elliott: asked the Minister of Health if he is aware that supplies of poliomyelitis vaccine are insufficient to carry out vaccinations required in Newcastle-upon-Tyne; and if he will ensure adequacy of supplies throughout the country.

Mr. Powell: I am aware that supplies to authorities have been less than the amounts requested. All available sources are being drawn on and a material improvement is expected in the next few weeks. Meanwhile if a local authority has particular difficulty I will see if I can help.

Mr. Awbery: Will the Minister say what preparations have been made to get a reserve of this vaccine in certain areas so that when an epidemic occurs


an area can be supplied immediately instead of having to wait for a supply?

Mr. Powell: The primary use of this vaccine is as routine immunisation. I do not think that it would have much immediate relevance to an epidemic, Orders have been placed, and I expect the supply position to be reasonably satisfactory in the fairly near future.

Mr. Ainsley: Is the Minister aware that there were two recent notified cases quite near my own home and that the parents were much concerned when they were informed that no vaccine was available, and that it was found on inquiry that none was available throughout the whole of the country? Is that the way to treat our young people when these infections are prevalent in an area?

Mr. Powell: That is not in accordance with my information. Several consignments have recently been sent to County Durham.

Mr. Grey: Why do people have to be frightened to death before anything is done? Do not the people deserve better treatment and better protection? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is a general feeling in the country that be has fallen down on his job and is responsible for the present position? Will he clearly tell the House whether he expects any more vaccine so that there may be supplies available for the whole country?

Mr. Powell: There will be further supplies next month, and I expect the position to be relatively normal in January. Meanwhile, wherever any local authority has a particular difficulty, I should be glad to learn of it, for I may be able to help.

COMMON MARKET NEGOTIATIONS (LORD PRIVY SEAL'S SPEECH)

Mr. Gaitskell: Mr. Gaitskell (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement about the Government's decision to release the full text of the statement: which he made on 10th October regarding Britain's negotiations with the Common Market countries.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath): I have been asked to reply. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman and the House will forgive me if the Answer is rather long, as I promised that it should be a full one.
It was agreed late in September that negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Governments of the European Economic Community would open in Paris on 10th October, 1961. Before the negotiations began I held a number of discussions with individual representatives of the Governments of the Community and the Commission about a variety of administrative arrangements, including those governing the security of the proceedings throughout the negotiations.
It is in accordance with international practice for the proceedings and the working documents in negotiations of this kind between Governments to be confidential to those taking part in the negotiations. This was the first example of a negotiation between the member Governments of the European Economic Community and another Government, and I was anxious to establish the procedures to be followed and the manner in which they would be carried out.
The view of Her Majesty's Government was that it was essential that the customary international procedure should be followed. In particular, the range and complexity of the negotiations, the number and variety of interests involved, and the need for flexibility in finding solutions, all made it necessary to try to ensure proper security if the negotiations were to be brought to a successful conclusion.
Moreover, it was apparent that, at various stages of the negotiations, there would be detailed discussions affecting particular commodities and individual industries. Furthermore, information given to Her Majesty's Government by an individual Commonwealth Government is sometimes confidential between the two Governments and cannot be made known to others.
These arrangements are, therefore, equally in the interests of those who are involved directly in the negotiations and those who may be affected by them. I put this view to the members of the other six Governments and the Commission, who accepted it. At the same time,


I pointed out to them and the Commission that Her Majesty's Government intended to carry out full consultation with members of Commonwealth Governments and those of the E.F.T.A. throughout the course of the negotiations and that this would be done by both Ministers and officials in a variety of ways.
The individual Governments and the Commission agreed that the proceedings and the documents should be confidential and entirely accepted that full consultation would be maintained with the Commonwealth and with the E.F.T.A. Governments. A statement to this effect was made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the opening meeting.
When the negotiations began in Paris, on 10th October, I made a statement on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. At the conclusion of this a verbatim text was made available in five languages to the six member Governments and the Commission of the European Economic Community. This document was marked "Secret".
In accordance with the arrangements agreed with those taking part in the negotiations and in order to take account of the differing interests covered by different sections of the statement, the following procedure was followed. A substantial portion of the statement dealt with United Kingdom domestic affairs. A detailed written summary of the parts affecting the Commonwealth was communicated to Commonwealth Governments shortly before I made my speech.
At the same time, a detailed written summary of the parts affecting members of E.F.T.A. was communicated to their Governments. The normal method which we have developed of informing Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. Governments on European matters was then followed. At the conclusion of the meeting in Paris I gave orally an account of the contents of my whole speech to both the Commonwealth and the E.F.T.A. Ambassadors in Paris, and on my return to London to the High Commissioners in London, on a confidential basis. In addition, officials gave an account to officials in the Commonwealth Missions in London.
At the end of last week there were persistent reports that the full text of my

statement had come into the possession of some Governments which are not parties to the negotiations. Her Majesty's Government passed no copies of the text of the statement to Governments other than those taking part in the negotiations.
It was, therefore, decided on Saturday, after consultation with representatives of the six Governments and the Commission in Brussels that, as an exception to the arrangement that working documents should be confidential to the seven Governments taking part in the negotiations and the Commission of the E.E.C., a verbatim text of my statement should be made available in confidence to members of Commonwealth countries and to members of E.F.T.A. Copies have accordingly been sent today to the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London and to the Ambassadors in London of E.F.T.A. countries.
Late this morning an agency tape started publication of what appears to be the full text of my speech in Paris, which, it stated, became available today through private sources in Brussels The full text will, therefore, become public knowledge. In these circumstances, the House will no doubt wish the statement to be published as a White Paper and I am informing Governments of the E.E.C. and the Commission accordingly.
I deeply deplore the breach which has occurred in the security arrangements for these negotiations. There has at no time been any indication or suggestion that British sources are responsible. I have every confidence in the discretion and integrity of the members of the United Kingdom Delegation in Brussels and those who have handled this document in this country. Nevertheless, I am having careful inquiries made. I shall also ask those taking part in the negotiations to re-emphasise the need to preserve their confidential nature. This action was, in fact, taken recently at the conclusion of the round of discussions at the official level which has just ended.
I wish now to deal with the question of consultation during these negotiations. In their communiqué, published at the end of their meeting in Geneva last Tuesday, the E.F.T.A. countries expressed satisfaction with the way in


which member Governments were keeping each other informed As far as the Commonwealth is concerned, it has been alleged that because of the confidential nature of these negotiations Commonwealth countries have not been fully consulted.
There is no justification whatever for this allegation. Since August, 1960, when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister visited Bonn and arranged with Dr. Adenauer for informal and exploratory talks to take place between British and German officials on possible arrangements between the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. Governments have been kept fully informed at every stage, first, during the informal talks and later when negotiations proper began in Paris and Brussels.
This matter was raised and fully discussed at the meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London in September, 1960. At that meeting the problems were explained in detail and Commonwealth Governments were asked to prepare their views on a variety of points put to them. There was a full discussion between United Kingdom and Commonwealth officials in London in May, 1961, at another meeting of the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council.
During the Prime Ministers' Conference in London later that month a meeting was arranged with my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and other Ministers concerned and myself for members of all Governments of the Commonwealth who wished to take advantage of it.
These matters were discussed fully with individual members of the Commonwealth by my right hon. Friends and myself who visited the countries of the Commonwealth in July, and they were further discussed at the meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Accra, in September. In the second half of September officials from seven Commonwealth countries assembled in London to discuss the forthcoming negotiations in preparation for the statement I was to make in Paris.
These talks between officials lasted for a fortnight. Some Governments were unable to send officials to London and

preferred that consultations should be carried on in their own capitals. In addition to these full and formal discussions over fifteen months, detailed reports have always been made to Commonwealth Ambassadors and High Commissioners after each meeting between myself and Governments of European countries. In addition, officials have discussed these visits with their opposite numbers at varying levels and our own High Commissioners in Commonwealth capitals have been instructed to keep Commonwealth Governments informed.
Since August, 1960, I have paid visits and eight lots of talks have been held between our officials and those of European Governments. Full reports have been made on each occasion. There have also been constant interchanges of messages between Ministers and officials in Whitehall and in Commonwealth countries.
I have already described the full consultation which took place in Paris after the opening meeting. Following the first meeting in Brussels, I saw the Commonwealth Ambassadors there and on my return to London the Commonwealth High Commissioners. In addition, the Commonwealth Relations Office representative in the Delegation saw Commonwealth officials. During the official talks during the past week in Brussels there has been almost daily contact between members of the Delegation and Commonwealth representatives. There has been similar consultation with representatives of the E.F.T.A. Governments. Her Majesty's Government intend to maintain this full consultation.

Mr. Gaitskell: I suppose that it is some solace to us that we shall be able to read the speech which the right hon. Gentleman made in Paris, but will he agree that this would not have been possible, nor would it have been shown to the Commonwealth Governments, had it not been for the leakage to the United States Government? Is not this a profoundly unsatisfactory state of affairs? Would he not agree, in all the circumstances, that the best way of handling these negotiations is to tell the Commonwealth Governments exactly what is happening, and what is said at every stage? Will he tell us what is the difficulty in the way of doing this, and why


he continues to say, on the one hand, that the Commonwealth Governments are kept informed, and, on the other, that the proceedings of the negotiations must be kept secret?

Mr. Heath: I do not see anything to give satisfaction to anybody in this House, that the security of negotiations of this kind, which are of the greatest importance to this country, to the Commonwealth, and to E.F.T.A. countries, as well as to many industries and individuals, should have been breached and, therefore, shown not to be confidential. This, surely, is most unsatisfactory in any negotiation. I would have thought that we could have agreed about that, and would do everything to try to make them more confidential.
I hoped that I had explained at the end of my statement the extent to which we had carried Commonwealth consultation on these matters. The right hon. Gentleman asked why I cannot explain why the Commonwealth should not be told everything. This matter has arisen over the verbatim text of the opening speech. I have explained why these documents and working papers are kept confidential to those taking part in the negotiations. We have given the fullest information to the Commonwealth, and I believe in so doing. When they read the full verbatim account of my speech they will find that they have learnt everything in it affecting the Commonwealth.
There are other sections in the speech which are not the direct concern of the Commonwealth and which, in the course of these negotiations, will also not be the direct concern of all Commonwealth countries, and will from time to time be the direct concern only of particular Commonwealth countries. It is not, therefore, possible to establish a precedent that the whole of every document should be given to the Commonwealth. What we have done is to carry out the fullest consultation with them.

Mr. Gaitskell: Will the right hon. Gentleman simply explain this? What is wrong with informing the Commonwealth Governments of what is going on? [HON. MEMBERS: "That is what he is doing."] That is exactly what he is refusing to do. Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that if he refuses

to inform the Commonwealth Governments, on whose behalf he is negotiating, of the text of his own speech he is bound to create the impression that he does not trust the Commonwealth to keep these things secret? Does not he realise that if he is really hoping to carry the Commonwealth with him in these negotiations it is far better to trust them?

Mr. Heath: I trust the Commonwealth, and we have been giving them the fullest information, and the whole delegation is working to its utmost in the interests of the Commonwealth. Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that if information affecting other countries is given to bodies outside themselves, they have a perfect right to ask why that should be done? In exactly the same way, the Commonwealth would not expect me to pass information concerning them to E.F.T.A. countries, nor particular individual Commonwealth countries seeking a particular arrangement to other Commonwealth countries. Therefore, we are doing our utmost to maintain the trust of the Commonwealth and to give them all the information we can.

Mr. Gaitskell: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that he is in a very special—[Interruption.] Hon. Gentlemen opposite may not care about the Commonwealth, but we do. Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that in these negotiations he is not merely negotiating about Commonwealth trade, but on behalf of the Commonwealth as a whole, and that in those circumstances it is essential that he should carry the Commonwealth with him? Will he deny that one important Commonwealth country at least, namely, Canada, is profundly dissatisfied with these arrangements? Why does not he tell the Commonwealth everything that is going on in these negotiations?

Mr. Heath: I can only repeat what the greater part of the House accepts, that we are telling the Commonwealth everything.

Mr. Birch: Will my right hon. Friend agree that the words used by the Leader of the Opposition are mischievous, dishonest and—

Hon. Members: Oh.

Mr. Healey: Will the right hon. Gentleman also publish a summary of his


remarks he circulated to the Commonwealth countries earlier, so that the House may have a chance to judge for itself of its adequacy and completeness?

Mr. C. Pannell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Will you please rule whether "mischievous" and "dishonest" are words which are banned from use in the House?

Mr. Speaker: "Mischievous", for this purpose in this context, I think innocuous. "Dishonest", wrong if applied in the personal sense, but not in a political sense, to some description of a political activity. I think that that is right.

Mr. Pannell: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. As only the Leader of the Opposition had replied to the statement at that stage, the word "dishonest" was directed at him, and I ask for a withdrawal.

Mr. Speaker: I do not think that I was drawing wrongly on that distinction then. It goes to the political occupation of asking that question. As far as I remember, the right hon. Member used an expression like "words".

Mr. V. Yates: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. The right hon. Gentleman said that the remarks of my right hon. Friend were dishonest. Is not that a personal accusation, and not a political one?

Mr. Speaker: I think that the right way to deal with the situation is this. We are still, in theory, at Question Time and that kind of introduction of an adjectival imputation at Question Time is out of order at that moment, and on that ground I call on the right hon. Member to withdraw the word "dishonest".

Hon. Members: Withdraw.

Mr. Speaker: It may well be that the right hon. Member did, or did not, withdraw, but I could not hear.

Mr. Birch: Does the word "dishonest"—[HON. MEMBERS: "Withdraw."] I have heard it used in the House before, but if you rule it out of order, Mr. Speaker, I withdraw it.

Mr. Ridsdale: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I suggest that for "dishonest" one should substitute "hypocritical".

Mr. Speaker: The point on which I required withdrawal was that it was at this time. I was not bothering about the quality of the word.

Mr. Biggs-Davison: Will not some good come out of this miserable affair if it be established once and for all that our kinsmen and partners in the Commonwealth are not to be less trusted with British secrets than the foreign Governments on the Continent of Europe? Will not my right hon. Friend agree that, whatever the niceties of the procedure, the fullest understanding with the Commonwealth is essential if the right arrangements between the nations of the Commonwealth and the nations of Europe are to be established?

Mr. Heath: I thoroughly agree. I hope that the understanding may be extended from both sides.

Mr. Bowles: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that the way in which the Government are treating the Governments of the Commonwealth is the way in which Lord Curzon treated Elinor Glyn?

Mr. Heath: I have to confess my ignorance of what Lord Curzon did to Elinor Glyn.

Mr. Jennings: On a point of order. Is it in order to ask you, Mr. Speaker, how Lord Curzon treated Elinor Glyn?

Mr. Speaker: What is most emphatically a nuisance—and I ask the House to remember it—is the practice, which is, unfortunately, growing, of rising to points of order which it is difficult to believe the hon. Members rising believe to be points of order. One of the previous occupants of the Chair, with extreme accuracy, referred to the practice as cheating—and cheating it is, because the Chair cannot protect the House against an abuse in such circumstances, because it must listen to what is said before it can decide whether or not a point of order is involved. I do not wish to pounce upon any hon. Member or right hon. Member, because many have sinned in this direction lately, but I ask the House to help me put a stop to the practice.

Mr. Jennings: I apologise to you, Mr. Speaker, for seeming to be facetious.

Mr. Turton: Will my right hon. Friend remember that many people in


this country are worried about the danger of strained relations with the Commonwealth during this period of negotiations? Will he bear in mind that on 31st July the Prime Minister, speaking about the procedure for consultation after the negotiations, offered to accept any procedure that was generally agreed to by the Commonwealth? Will he take steps with his right hon. Friend to work out a system of consultation on this matter of working documents with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at this time, so that we may not have a repetition of the strained relations that we have had lately with the Canadian Government?

Mr. Heath: We have done our utmost to avoid strained relations with the countries of the Commonwealth. We have at Brussels representatives of the Commonwealth countries, with whom our delegation is dealing almost daily, as I said, and this is working, as we understand, to the satisfaction of Commonwealth countries.

Mr. Wade: Speaking as one who is in favour of Britain's negotiating entry into the Common Market, may I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he agrees that it is of the utmost importance that Britain should not create the impression that she is endeavouring to enter the Common Market for her own economic interests, and is prepared to sacrifice the Commonwealth in the process? Has it been the Minister's policy to decide what shall be disclosed to Commonwealth countries and what shall not be disclosed? Is it still his intention to disclose parts and not other parts? If so, will not that inevitably create some feeling of distress in Commonwealth countries?

Mr. Heath: Everything which is of concern to the Commonwealth will be told and is being told to Commonwealth Governments. If the hon. Member had an opportunity of consulting the member Governments of the Community they would be able to tell him the full extent to which this country is defending the interests of the Commonwealth.

Mr. Paget: Is not the right hon. Gentleman's trouble really that unless he assures the Six that it is Britain's intention to join a United States of

Europe they will not have him in and that unless he assures the Conservative Party that it is not our intention to join a United States of Europe it will not let him go in, and that poor security in Belgium and in the 1922 Committee has enabled people to compare statements?

Mr. Heath: There is no truth whatever in that statement, nor is it the position of the Six that we should join a United States of Europe.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Have not the Government accepted the principle, from the start, that they would withdraw from the negotiations or not conclude treaties with the European Economic Community if the interests of the Commonwealth were damaged? Does not that mean, in fact, that the Commonwealth is sitting on the right hon. Gentleman's shoulder while he is negotiating? In those circumstances, will not he at least concede that those working documents which affect individual members of the Commonwealth should be declared to them in full?

Mr. Heath: We have already made the necessary arrangements for individual Commonwealth Governments to be informed about their individual affairs in full.

Mr. Dugdale: Since the Government obviously mistrust the sense of security of Commonwealth countries, will he state whether similar leakages have ever occurred from conferences of Commonwealth Prime Ministers? If the answer is "No", will not he give the Commonwealth all the information necessary to it at this conference, in respect of which its own interests are so vitally affected?

Mr. Heath: In the negotiations I have refrained entirely from making any comment about the behaviour of any other Commonwealth countries and I intend to go on doing so.

Mr. Kershaw: Is it not clear that the leakage has damaged the negotiations? Has my right hon. Friend been able to make any inquiries in Brussels as to how it came about? If so, what assurances for the future has he received?

Mr. Heath: There has not been time to do that. I had consultations


late on Friday with the other Governments on the question of handing this to the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. Governments on a confidential basis. There has not yet been time to discuss the other matter with them.

Mr. Jay: Will not the right hon. Gentleman now admit frankly that it was not at the request of the Six that these documents were withheld from the Commonwealth, but by his own decision?

Mr. Heath: It has never been said that it was at the request of the Six. I explained in the opening part of my statement that we discussed with them these security matters, in my opinion quite rightly, because I think that the confidential nature of the negotiations is important. I have explained my point of view to them and my reasons for it, and they accepted them at the meeting.

Mr. Gaitskell: Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that this is a profoundly unsatisfactory situation? Does he not further agree that the discontent of Canada is perfectly evident, and that these leakages are extremely disturbing? Will not he consider calling the Commonwealth representatives together and discussing with them some way by which they can feel they are fully taken into consultation on this matter, and then agree that procedure subsequently with the Common Market countries.

Mr. Heath: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman now agrees that breaches of security are unsatisfactory. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That was not the tone of his opening question. Of course we shall do everything possible to see that security is improved, and we shall consider the situation which thus faces us. As for consultations with the Commonwealth, my right hon. Friend and I are prepared to consider at all times ways and means of doing that, but I cannot disguise the fact that many Commonwealth countries have expressed themselves as satisfied with the means of keeping them informed.

Mr. Gaitskell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I was trying to reach a satisfactory conclusion on this extremely important matter? Is he further aware that it is perfectly obvious that the present arrangements are not satisfactory to all Commonwealth countries?

They have made their position perfectly clear. In these circumstances, would not it be better to reopen the discussions with the Common Market about the question of who should obtain information about these negotiations, and arrange for the Commonwealth to be kept informed of everything that is going on?

Mr. Heath: I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman wants to try to find a solution to this matter, because it is a most important one. We have been anxious from the beginning to do this. That is why we have taken so much trouble about it. As for consultation with the Commonwealth, the complaint has been about this one document, which was my opening speech. I know of no complaints other than that. We are certainly prepared to discuss with the Commonwealth representatives in London, and through them, their Governments, any ways of improving consultation. I hope that that meets the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Gaitskell: It meets it up to a point, but does not the Lord Privy Seal agree that it is extremely important to secure the agreement of the Commonwealth countries on the methods of consultation? He has not done that so far. Will he now do it?

Mr. Heath: As I understand it, we have agreement with the Commonwealth about the methods of consultation. [HON. MEMBERS: "Canada."] Canada has a representative in Brussels who carries on consultations on her behalf. That is the system that we are operating with the delegation and with the Canadian officials. In London, there is the High Commissioner and his office, and consultations are carried on through that. That is the machinery by which it is carried out.
The request of Canada was for a copy of the opening speech. That is a matter with which I have dealt. If the machinery needs to be changed, we are quite prepared to change it, but we have discussed it with them on a number of occasions. We have always understood from the Commonwealth countries that the double system of representation in Brussels in contact with the delegation, the High Commissioners themselves and the High Commissioners'


officials in London, working through the machinery we have always had, is the proper means of consultation, and we shall exercise that to the full.

Several Hon. Members: Several Hon. Members rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot continue this discussion now.

Mr. Fell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I do not in any way wish to question your right to call whoever you like at any stage. To that, I bow completely. But I have risen on every possible occasion during the questions on this statement, and I have, as you know, put down four Questions on this subject during the past fortnight. I had a Question down this morning on this very subject. I think that my interest is known. I do not see that the Leader of the Opposition is seven times the man I am, or that he should have seven supplementary questions to my none.

Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Member desires to criticise my selection, he must take the appropriate steps.

OLLERTON COLLIERY (ACCIDENT)

Mr. Deer: Mr. Deer (by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Power if he has any statement to make on the accident last Thursday at Ollerton Colliery.

The Minister of Power (Mr. Richard Wood): At 11.30 on the morning of Thursday, 23rd November, four men at Ollerton Colliery in Nottinghamshire, were trapped by a fall of roof. Rescue operations began almost immediately, but two of the men could not be released until early the following morning, when they were already dead. Each of the other two men released earlier has had a leg amputated. They are in hospital. Investigations are now taking place.
I would like to express my deep sympathy for the relatives and friends of the men.

Mr. Deer: I am sure that all hon. Members will wish to associate themselves with the sentiments expressed by the Minister. May I also—again I am sure on behalf of hon. Members on both sides of the House—ask that a tribute should be paid to the magnificent work of the team which laboured so long during the rescue work?

Mr. Gunter: May I, on behalf of the Opposition, express our deep sense of sympathy with the Government on what has occurred and also emphasise what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Mr. Deer) about the remarkable heroism of the rescue team?

MR. ALBERTO PORTULEZ (DETENTION)

Mr. Stonehouse: Mr. Stonehouse (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will grant political asylum to Alberto Portulez, a Portuguese citizen, now detained at London Airport.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. R. A. Butler): I am considering this case in the light of the investigations which are being made, and of representations on his behalf. I will communicate my decision to the hon. Member in due course.

Mr. Stonehouse: May I ask the Home Secretary whether he will give an assurance that the statement will be made to the House before this man is returned to Portugal if such a decision is made? Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman give consideration to allowing Mr. Portulez to go to some other country rather than be returned to Portugal, where almost certainly he will be gaoled?

Mr. Butler: I dare say that the investigations will prove it impossible to grant this request. I have only just had it drawn to my attention. I will certainly give the House an assurance in the terms which the hon. Member requested and I will certainly also consider the latter part of his supplementary question.

Orders of the Day — ARMY RESERVE BILL

Order for Second Reading read.

4.4 p.m.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Profumo): I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I think that it would be well were I to start by reminding the House of the course of events which have led to the decision of the Government to introduce this Measure. When we came to the conclusion that it would be in the best interest of the nation to cease to rely on a conscript Army and go back to our traditional system of all-Regular voluntary forces, it was well understood by both sides of the House, and by informed opinion throughout the country, that there would be an unavoidable trough period when we should be rather short of manpower during the transition from conscript to all-Regular forces.
I might say, in passing, that when we took this decision in 1957 the Opposition did not dissent, nor do I believe that the Labour Party as such has altered its view today. Indeed, the Opposition Amendment seems to confirm this. At all events, Her Majesty's Government are still convinced that the course which we have adopted is the right one.
Conscription is extremely expensive in manpower as well as in money. It is disruptive to the economy, and although I daresay that the discipline to which all these young men have been subjected will always stand them in good stead, and although the nation owes a great debt of gratitude to all of them, there is no getting away from it that an Army diluted with young men to whom it is only an incident in their lives is not conducive to the cohesion and traditional spirit of the Army. Having taken this decision, we do not intend to be deflected from our course of action if it be humanly possible.
The Berlin crisis and the subsequent mounting international tension have, of course, caused the Government much anxious concern and the threat to Berlin sets us a very difficult problem at a time when the part-conscript Army is running

down towards the minimum all-regular strength of 165,000. We have to find a way, without materially reducing our other world-wide commitments, of taking action with our allies to maintain the strength of our contribution to N.A.T.O. and to improve its effectiveness in the face of Soviet threats to West Berlin.
Further conscription of untrained men would obviously not meet this need, for it would be many months before a renewed National Service scheme produced trained men. It would have been possible to call up some of the reserves, but to do this with the powers we have at present would mean declaring a formal state of emergency, because to call up pre-Proclamation reserves requires a situation when war is actually in the offing. The declaration of an emergency would inevitably raise tension in Europe still further just at a moment when we are trying to reduce it.
This Bill, therefore, is designed to meet a definite short-term requirement as well as to provide a reserve of trained men in the long-term, especially during the difficult times which seem likely to lie ahead of us. I readily acknowledge that any solution of a problem of this sort is bound to bear more hardly on some than on others, and I do not conceal the fact that the retention of National Service men or, for that matter, the recall of part-time Service men would bear harshly on those concerned.

Mr. Frank Allaun: Then why not drop the idea?

Mr. Profumo: But so, of course, in a different way, would the reintroduction of National Service. The requirement is for trained men readily available with the minimum disruption to all concerned and to the national economy. In these circumstances, I do not believe that any other scheme would do the job.
Some people have suggested that these measures are required because of the collapse of our recruiting campaign. This is far from the truth. At present, the target looks well within reach. So far, recruiting in 1961 is 23 per cent. up on the same period in 1960. In September and October the increases were 45 per cent. and 56 per cent. respectively, and over these two months the Regular strength of the Army increased


by 2,500. This is the largest increase for nearly ten years, and what is encouraging is not just the rise in the number of new recruits, but the fact that, for the moment, at any rate, we have succeeded in halting the rise in wastage.
Perhaps the most encouraging feature of all is that the preliminary figures for November which, as the House will remember, is always a bad month, show a rise of about 40 per cent over last year. As I have already told the House, I still hope that we shall reach the minimum target on time, but this in itself is not good enough, even for a short time, under conditions of acute tension. Either we must be in a position to reinforce a smallish all-Regular Army at times of need, or we have permanently to carry large numbers of men in the forces against the contingency of possible crises.
The Bill is is divided into three parts. The first part gives the Secretary of State for War permissive powers to retain National Service men now on whole-time service with the Army for a period up to six months. Clause 1 gives this power. There are at present about 50,000 National Service men still serving with the Army all of whom are I know living in a state of great anxiety about their future. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Let me take this first opportunity, therefore, of putting at least half of these young men out of their suspense and uncertainty by saying that, provided international tension does not mount further in the meantime, I shall not have to retain any National Service man who is due to be released before 1st April next year.
I recognise that the powers in the Bill are permissive, but, unless things improve, we shall need to use these powers after April next As it is the situation in Europe that has made this legislation necessary, it is obviously B.A.O.R. that we have to stiffen. I have already said that we shall keep back men only for strictly military reasons. So, after April we shall need to hold virtually all National Service men serving in B.A.O.R. In the early release groups after April we should be able to let those serving in other theatres go at their normal times. Later in the year,

when there are fewer National Service men available, we shall probably have to keep back the majority of men wherever they are serving and transfer them to B.A.O.R.
At first sight, this may seem a rather arbitrary way of dealing with the problem, but the only way of being fair all round would have been to retain everybody, as the Labour Government did in 1950. The theory of equal misery for all does not help anybody. I am sure that no one would suggest keeping a man who was not strictly needed just because another man, called up at the same time, was actually required. I therefore propose that the basis of retention should be that only those essential on military grounds shall be retained and even of that number those with serious hardship claims would be released.
In due course each man will receive a separate communication telling him whether or not he will have to soldier on. I intend to give as much advance notice as possible. In the majority of cases this will be well over two months, and often a good deal more. I recognise that there will be a number of applications for premature release on genuine compassionate grounds and that because of the unexpected nature of this extra commitment there may well be, in addition, quite a number of appeals on grounds of real hardship. We must see that we do everything possible to do justice in such cases.
As the House will know, we have in the War Office what is now a well-established system for dealing with these sort of requests from National Servicemen. This system will be continued. A soldier with a claim must first satisfy his commanding officer and then it will come to the War Office for consideration in the normal way, but, because of the new and exceptional circumstances which now arise, I propose to set up an impartial hardship committee to advise me on borderline cases or appeals of special complexity. I intend to invite a distinguished and disinterested figure—I do not mean two figures, but one figure who is both distinguished and disinterested—to be chairman of this committee, but I must emphasise that the body will be advisory. The final decision in all cases must continue to rest with me. I believe that this system can be made to work with justice and equity.
Incidentally, concerning the Regular Army, with the exception of recruits who have a statutory right to buy themselves out during their third month of service, no Regular soldier will be permitted to purchase his release except in the most exceptional cases during the period for which we are having to retain conscripted men.
There will be pay increases for all those who have to be retained for a further period of National Service, and more for their wives as well. From the date when they would have been released they will receive the increased rates of pay laid down for men on three-year Regular engagements together with the rates of marriage allowance at the highest rate drawn by Regulars. This means that, after deducting what he has to provide for his wife, the soldier will have 40 per cent. more in his pocket than he has at present. In addition, the families will remain eligible for National Service grants appropriate to their new circumstances.
Any man who has to serve the extra six months will, of course, have six months knocked off his normal part time National Service liability against general mobilisation and he will escape any liability for recall under Clause 2 of the Bill. The only further assurance I can give at this stage is that we will not retain more men than is necessary in the circumstances which prevail at the time.

Mrs. Barbara Castle: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves Clause 1, in view of the hardship which will undoubtedly be caused by this system of retention, would he not consider allowing appeals to an independent appeal tribunal, to give the soldiers who are retained at least the satisfaction of knowing that they have had a completely fair and independent hearing?

Mr. Profumo: It was for the reason which the hon. Lady has in mind that I have decided to set up an independent advisory committee. I quite recognise what she has in mind, but we are dealing only with a certain number, not a very large number, for a period of six months. If we went through all the procedures we have had up to now it would not be possible for this to work out. I have to deal with strictly military matters. Within that, I think that this will be made to work. No doubt the hon. Lady will

develop what she has in mind if she is successful in catching Mr. Speaker's eye.

Mr. George Wigg: Can the right hon. Gentleman give a figure to enable us to assess the value of what he is saying? Will he say what the planned strength will be on 1st December, 1962—that is, male adults? If the figure is 182,000, as I suspect, that explains all we want to know about the Bill.

Mr. Profumo: I think that it would be better if the hon. Member and other hon. Members were to catch your eye later, Sir. If they would now allow me, I shall deal with the rest of the Bill. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will try to answer questions at the end of the debate.
I proceed to the second object of the Bill, which is set out in Clause 2 and gives permissive powers to the Secretary of State to recall any ex-National Serviceman during his statutory period of three-and-a-half years' part-time service. The effect of Clause 1 of the Bill, as the House will appreciate, does not add to the strength of the Army. It will merely reduce the speed of the rundown until the end of 1962, or thereabouts. After that, we shall hope to be building the strength of our Regular Army to the minimum figure of about 180,000, but bouts of tension during that time might still require the services of additional trained men for short periods, both to swell the numbers and to correct balances. This is the object of Clause 2.
While it is possible, in certain circumstances, that we might have to use the power under this Clause to call certain National Service men back next year, it seems that that situation, if it were to arise, would probably mean that we would have to declare a state of emergency and call out reserves generally. I do not therefore think it likely that we should need to use the powers under Clause 2 until 1963. By that time there will be rather more than 100,000 part-time National Service men eligible for recall, but in the sort of circumstances we envisage we should only need to call on a fraction of this total.
The Clause gives the Secretary of State power to bring them back for a period not exceeding six months. If we had to do this we should select individuals to fill vacancies in corps and by the categories of which the Army was short at the time.


The sort of tension we must plan for often builds up suddenly, as it did last summer. It follows that it might well be impossible to give advance notice to those who would then have to be recalled. In past emergencies prior warning and notice have not been practicable. Those concerned might, therefore, have to leave home at short notice after receiving their call-up papers. None the less, and in spite of this, we would intend to continue provisions for the consideration of compassionate and hardship cases.
The authorities concerned would have power to grant immediate postponement in exceptional circumstances and other cases would be dealt with in a way similar to that which I have described for the retained men. This category of National Service man, like the "retained" category, would if they were recalled receive Regular rates of pay and marriage allowance. In addition, they would receive a tax-free gratuity of £20 on call-out, and would be eligible for National Service grants should their particular circumstances warrant such additional help.
It is possible that we shall never have to operate this second measure, which is solely designed as an insurance against national need during the period of transition from conscription while the Regular Army will be at a low strength. I have good reason for saying this, because of the provisions of Clause 3, which is designed to create a new form of volunteer Reserve within the Territorial Army.
We are currently engaged in a detailed examination of the effectiveness of our present system of reserves against the background of the requirements of today. I do not think that they are properly suited to modern conditions. There are large numbers of what are known as post-proclamation reserves, but these men can be called out only after all the paraphernalia of a formal declaration of a state of emergency, to which I have already referred. Even the conditions under which pre-Proclamation reserves can be recalled are not matched to all conditions. They can be recalled only if warlike operations are in preparation or in progress. While the detailed examination of our reserves is bound to take a long time, because it is a very complicated affair, I am satisfied that we should take a first step towards

what will be a new and long-term conception of our reserves.
The primary object, therefore, of Clause 3 is to provide a trained reserve ready to supplement the Regular Army at short notice and increase the deterrent power of the conventional Army in times of serious tension short of actual hostilities. This is a long-term plan, but, in so far as the scheme meets with success, it will obviously help to reduce the possible need to recall part-time National Service men, since this voluntary force would be called upon first. We have decided to establish this new reserve within the structure of the Territorial Army, which seems the obvious parent to embrace this young child. I have consulted the Territorial Army Advisory Council at all stages. The Council has assured me that it believes that the plan can work and is prepared to give every possible assistance.
How will the scheme operate? Let me say at once that I think it is essential that the quality of this force shall be of the highest calibre, so we must select our volunteers carefully. To qualify, a man will have had to serve for a minimum period of one year in the Territorial Army and have attended one annual camp. Even so, it will still be necessary for his commanding officer to judge his suitability, and if we have, as I hope we will, large numbers of volunteers, there will follow a process of selection.
It will also be possible for any part-time National Service man who wishes to volunteer for this course. He will have to join a Territorial Army unit. If the commanding officer judges him to be sufficiently well-trained, and if there is a vacancy in his category, he can become a member of the new force without having to qualify with a year's service. He would then not be liable for recall under Clause 2. This may well be a popular and sensible decision for numbers of part-time National Service men, who would, by taking such a step, know exactly what their commitments would be. So much for eligibility.
The establishment of this reserve will be based on the requirements of the Regular Army at the time. Men will be called up as individuals and not, in the main, as formed bodies, though it may be possible in some cases to form


sub-units. The intention is that these volunteers should be round pegs to fill round holes. The present ratio of categories will be about half "teeth" arm to half administrative troops. A volunteer will sign on for a period of one year, renewable thereafter as he wishes, and he will be in a position to give three months' notice if, for any personal or business reason, he wishes to resign.
Those who join this new force will be performing a most valuable duty to their country and should receive an appropriate reward for so doing. They will have to accept the liability of being called up for a period not exceeding six months during any individual contract. We have, therefore, decided to pay a taxable bounty of £150 a year, together with a tax-free gratuity of £50 on call-out. The bounty means, in effect, that each volunteer would be receiving the equivalent of £3 a week, or, to put it another way, by the end of a year he would have earned enough to buy his wife or family a really handsome present, perhaps without much effort.
If a volunteer was called up, he would receive the appropriate Regular rates of pay and allowances that I have already described. All the foregoing categories will be protected by existing legislation so far as their civil employment and interests are concerned. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence and I have already had most encouraging talks with employers and with representatives of the Trades Union Congress. We have further talks ahead of us, because the creation of the right sort of climate for the would-be volunteer depends on the good will of both sides of industry.
I propose to open recruiting lists for this new force as soon as possible, but because, as I have already stressed, I believe it to be essential to go for high quality, I shall wish to make arrangements for adequate selection of candidates, and, therefore, it will not be just a question of first come, first served. Recruiting may even be staggered over a period of months.

Mr. E. Shinwell: The Minister is on a very important point, as I am sure the House will agree. These volunteers have to join the Territorial Army first, though without necessarily

being National Service or ex-National Service men. They would go in afresh to join the Territorial Army. They then volunteer to go into the new reserve and they will be paid £150 during their twelve months. Suppose they are not called up during the whole of that period, just remaining members of Territorial Army units. Are they then to receive £150—£3 a week—during the whole of that period, after which they will not be called up at all? According to what the right hon. Gentleman has said, they will receive £150.

Mr. Profumo: The right hon. Gentleman is right in part, for in return for the obligation of being called out by the Secretary of State in conditions of tension during that one year and of being called out for a period of six months, they will receive the bounty of £150 at the end of the year, even though they have not been called up. On the other hand, if they are part-time National Service men, they will escape the liability of being called up during their period only if they continue to be members of the reserve, and will not receive the £150 in the second year unless they sign up for a second period. It must be perfectly fair that there should be a quid pro quo. We must pay them. We pay A.E.R. I, and that is what we intend to do with this new service.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: In case the economic conditions of the country have not improved before these arrangements expire, will the pay pause apply to these bonuses?

Mr. Profumo: The hon. Gentleman will have perceived that this will be a very much cheaper way of backing up our Army than by returning to National Service, which costs a great deal more.

Mr. John Hall: I am not quite clear on one point. Am I to understand that if a man signs on for a second year, he will get a further £150? If so, can my right hon. Friend tell me what is the age limit for this?

Mr. Profumo: Certainly; he will go on getting the £150 each year he serves in the voluntary force. The age limits will be the same as those for the Territorial Army. I am sure that my young hon. Friend will be eligible. I will give him the particulars. But he will be subject to selection.

Mr. Christopher Mayhew: Can we have an assurance that while these "Ever-readies" are available, there will be no question of calling back National Service men who have left the forces?

Mr. Profumo: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman did not hear me, but I did explain that in so far as this new force is successful we should call up these people in priority to calling up any part-time National Service men. That is as far as I am able to go, until we see how successful the new force is.
We must also see that the volunteers are, as far as possible, sprinkled all over the country, since by recalling key men like these we must not run the risk seriously of interfering with industry or the vitality of the nation. I do not think that that is at all likely to happen since the numbers concerned will not be great.
We thought carefully about what would be an appropriate name for this force. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Perhaps the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) can think of a better name than the "Ever-readies". We have come to the conclusion that their official designation—and they must have one—should be the Territorial Army Emergency Reserve. We can, of course, continue to call them the "Ever-readies", if that is desired, but I think that they should have an official designation.
I want to say a few words about another reserve which is building up well, the Army Emergency Reserve, Category I. I am most anxious that this shall not suffer because of the creation of the new force. A.E.R.I. has a very special purpose, to reinforce the Strategic Reserve in limited war. I therefore hope that those who already belong to this reserve will continue to serve, but I should add that any part-time National Service man who, for one reason or another, cannot become an "Ever-ready" will be eligible to join A.E.R.I. He would then, of course, become exempt from the liability of recall under Clause 2 of the Bill while serving in such capacity.
I am sorry to have spoken at such length, but I felt that it was right to try to explain the proposals—

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman intends to offer an inducement to

National Service men to join Category I. Will they get the £60 bounty?

Mr. Profumo: If a part-time National Service man who would be liable under Clause 2 joins A.E.R. I., while he is a member of A.E.R. I. he will receive the bounty, and he will receive a gratuity if he is called out. During his service with that voluntary body he would not be liable to be called out under Clause 2. I am obliged to the hon. Member for allowing me to make that clear.
I have spoken for a long time, but I felt that it was necessary to put before the House not only the background, but also the details of the proposals under-lying the Bill. Her Majesty's Government believe that they are right and they believe that they are the only proposals to meet the present requirements. Furthermore, with the creation of this new reserve scheme, it will not only be valuable now, but it will be essential in the years to come when the part-time National Service men are no longer available as such.
Although I do not agree with it, I understand the argument for conscription. What I do not understand is the position of the Opposition. They do not want conscription any more than we do. In fact, if this Bill were designed for that purpose I expect that they would have put down a Motion of censure upon us. But it simply is not enough to cry "Woe". We shall listen with the keen-nest interest to hear which alternative they have in mind in opposing this Measure, because they know perfectly well that to call for an immediate reduction in our world-wide responsibilities is not an acceptable alternative, even if it could be done in time. If the Opposition can counsel nothing other than a dishonourable and unseemly scuttle, no one will take their Amendment very seriously.
For our part, we do not approach an increase in our military manpower at the present time in any apologetic spirit, or with any implication that policy has failed or is failing. The two most powerful nations in the world, one with full conscription, the other with selective service, have both found it necessary to take steps to increase their Armed Forces. No one has said that this means that their previous policy for their forces


has failed. Neither has that of Her Majesty's Government. It is merely that manpower must match tension. There has to be an "escalation" of manpower to equal mounting requirement. Having given this explanation, I hope that the House will feel able to support the Bill.

4.35 p.m.

Mr. George Brown: I beg to move, to leave out from "that" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
this House recognising the need for adequate armed forces, and declaring its belief that these can and should be raised by voluntary means, declines to give a Second Reading to a Bill which fails to deal with the fundamental problems created by the collapse of Her Majesty's Government's defence policy; imposes great uncertainty on all those National Service men liable to be affected; and will inflict serious injustice on those actually selected to serve.
Hon. Members opposite have been a little free with their adjectives today. We have proceeded from "dishonest", a little earlier, to "dishonourable" just now. I will do my best to meet the Minister's request that we should not only try to explain why we think the Bill is wrong, as we do, but should try to suggest ways in which we think the Government could have done the job without having to descend to this kind of unfair and unjust imposition upon a few people.
It is fascinating that every time the Government's defence policy crashes in ruins about their ears, which it does about as often as their economic policy crashes in ruins about the ears of other Ministers, we are met with one question from Ministers: what would the Labour Party do about it? It is as though it were not their responsibility that they have got into this mess and not their responsibility to put it right. Of course it is their responsibility.
I have moved the Amendment because we believe that the whole direction of the Government's policy, if that is not a totally inappropriate use of words, has been wrong for a long time, is wrong and has produced chaos and disorder in the defence arrangements; and that the Government are trying to buy themselves temporarily out of this difficulty by imposing very great hardship on a few people who are least able to look after themselves.
It seemed to me that the Minister was in two completely different minds about the Bill from beginning to end. Every attempt is being made to put the Bill across as an Army Reserve Bill. In fact, it is not. It is a Bill to extend National Service for the next three-and-a-half years, which is as long as the Government can do it in this rather devious way, to extend it in a selective form and to use the form of selectivity which is the least defensible of any. That is what the Bill is, and all the rest is an attempt to give it a rather better gloss.
The air surrounding the Bill is thick, as a Chinese ambassador once said about something else, with chickens coming home to roost. In approaching the Bill I cannot help but remember all the various right hon. Gentlemen who have had a hand at one time or another, since 1957, in cooking the books and in fixing the figures of the numbers who are required in the forces or in the Army. There is the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. There was Lord Head, who played, I suppose, a more honourable part than the others. There is the present Minister of Defence and the Minister of Agriculture. It is fascinating to re-read their speeches. Over the years they have all at different times used different figures about what was wanted.
This is not a day for a broad defence debate. The White Paper is the occasion for that. But I do not think that we can have a sensible debate on the Bill if we do what the Minister did—properly, since he was introducing the Bill—if we discuss only the provisions in the Bill. Certainly if I did that I could not meet the request that we should put forward our alternative methods. We must go much wider and look at the circumstances which have brought the Government to the pass in which they have to introduce a Bill which, as I deduced from the Secretary of State's own manner at the Box, he himself detests.
We have to recognise that the Bill ends all pretence of there having been or of there being a Government defence policy in respect of manpower. In 1957, the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations brought an end to what one might call the Monckton era at the Ministry of Defence. A little later Blue


Streak brought an end to the Sandys period. It is now fairly clear that the present Minister of Defence has brought an end to himself and to his own era. We do not deny—nobody will—that there is a manpower problem facing our defence forces, just as there is an arms problem and an equipment problem. But let us not assume that the presence or absence of a marginal number of men, a few thousand men, in B.A.O.R.—and I say this since the Secretary of State chose to link this specifically with the German crisis—is the real problem facing the British Army or facing our Services generally. There are problems in all these fields. We recognise that, and we admit it, and if we did not do so, practically everybody else would comment on it.
I do not know whether right hon. and hon. Members opposite heard the broadcast after the ten o'clock news the other night by Field Marshal Lord Harding. I have since seen the script. It was a devasting exposure of the weaknesses of, the gaps in, the Government's provision for the forces and a devasting exposure of the fact that there was no policy at all—and, incidentally, a heavily destroying attack upon the Bill. If hon. Members have not seen it, I commend them to look at what Lord Harding had to say.
Over the years, a legend has grown up that the party opposite is good at defence. In fact, the truth is exactly the opposite. The party opposite is congenitally bad at it, and has always been bad. All the periods of great weakness in this country's defence have been periods for which the Tory Party has been responsible. If the Secretary of State for War is disposed to dispute that, I would draw his attention to the book which the Leader of the House has brought out, dealing with one of those very periods, in which he will see what happened in the 1930s.
What happened in the 1930s, under the Ministers then in power in the name of the Tory Party, has now happened again in the 1950s under the various Ministers who have held office. Whether it is because they have too many brigadiers and colonels in the party opposite, or because they are too much the prisoners of tradition and of the past, I do not know, but it is a fact that what the party opposite has produced today in the way

of defence weaknesses its predecessors have regularly produced throughout the years.

Mr. Frank Bowles: May I remind my right hon. Friend—though I am sure he is aware—that during the war there was a Liberal Secretary of State for Air and a Labour First Lord of the Admiralty, and they had to go to the permanent Civil Service for a Secretary of State for War?

Mr. Brown: Before I move to the details of the Bill, let us see where we are at the end of this most expensive decade of Tory maladministration. In the first place, we have commitments that we have undertaken to fulfil and are not fulfilling. Clearly, that is the case in Europe. We have other commitments in apparent fulfilment of which we are tying up a large number of men, and yet many of those commitments make no sense politically or militarily, particularly in the Far East and the Middle East.
We have the most irrational deployment and use of manpower if we think of manpower in the Services as a whole. We are astonishingly top-heavy with "top brass". I have looked at some figures which have been prepared for me of the present situation in the War Office compared with 1938 and 1951, and I have seen the way in which the thing has rocketed up. We are not only top-heavy with "top brass" there; we are top-heavy with command "brass" in some of our theatres.
We go on with segregated Services at a time when combined operations become more and more the inevitable order of the day. We have notable shortages of every kind of armour and equipment. We lack strategic mobility in equipment, if not in men. Sometimes one is apt to forget that whereas under right hon. Gentlemen opposite Suez was a military disaster, Kuwait could easily have been a military disaster in other circumstances for the very lack of the things that I was referring to—particularly of heavy lift capacity.
It is to correct all that that the Government have now come forward with this miserable Bill in direct breach of faith, as I regard it, of their obligations to the men on whom they are going to put this additional service. I exempt the new Territorial Army Reserve, A.F.R.I,


from what I am saying. It sounds to me a very "cocked-up" business. As the Minister described it, he made it sound a lot more peculiar than I thought it was before. It sounds as though it may be expensive. On the other hand, none of us will deny that an additional insurance in the way of volunteer reservists, particularly during this period of what the Minister called the trough, is obviously desirable, and I am not in any sense attacking that at this stage, although there will be a lot of questions to ask about it.
The real objection to the Bill is that it continues compulsory service in a monstrously unfair way. The Minister explained to us what happens. After 1st April everybody who, by accident, is still at that stage in the B.A.O.R. is to held back. A little later in the year all men in other theatres of operations at the date of their proper release will be held back and transferred to Germany. If we really wanted to do it in the harshest way, if the Secretary of State really wanted to make it apparent to the men that he cared very little about them or their problems, he could hardly have put it more clearly in order to get that reaction.
It would be very much more troublesome to have selective service in a defensible way, but at least it would have been the proper, honest and decent thing to do. I have some arguments against selective service which I will place before the Secretary of State, but the right hon. Gentleman cannot say that he has. This is selective service and, as I say, selective in a very cruel way. The whole of the Bill is written so that the Minister has the power to decide that the individual shall stay. The individual's own problems hardly seem to come into the picture at all.
The right hon. Gentleman told us that he is setting up an advisory hardship tribunal. I am not clear why it should be advisory. After all, tribunals that consider hardship in the case of men called up for National Service are not advisory. They make the decision. In those cases men have the right to go before them, whereas the right hon. Gentleman told us that under the machinery which he is setting up to advise him he will decide which cases may go before the tribunal. He used words like "if they raise points

of exceptional difficulty, if they are borderline cases." This is no protection for the men—or, at least, not very much.
If the right hon. Gentleman is to retain this tremendous power, there should be at the very least a right for any man who thinks that his hardship is so great that he ought not to be held back to go before the tribunal and have his case heard. If this Bill goes through today I promise the Minister that there will be a very great fight over this in Committee. As to whether the tribunal should be made advisory, I am not prepared to argue now, but I think that it might be better if it were able to go the whole way.
I wonder whether the Secretary of State appreciates that we are dealing with the very last 20,000, or thereabouts, of National Service men. These are the men who, to a large extent, will have deferred service so as to finish apprenticeships and studentships and to take degrees. Therefore, they are more mature men. They will have greater personal responsibilities, they will have a much greater requirement in civilian life because they are the more skilled, or professional, or highly trained people.
Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that he is placing this commitment on the very people for whom it will easily create the most hardship? When calling back, as he is taking the power to do, over the next three-and-a-half years at intervals, 10,000 or 20,000 men he will increasingly be exercising that power over the more mature men, the family men, the older men. It must be so. If he is to do that, it is not enough just to say, "Because I think that it is a borderline case I will refer it to an advisory tribunal, but the decision must be mine."
If the right hon. Gentleman intends to do it, he really must, I suggest, set up machinery which will examine such cases, because there will be tremendous hardship in many of them, and a very great outcry against the system, related also to something else to which I shall refer in a few minutes.
The Secretary of State hung all this on Germany. Frankly, I do not accept that argument. It seems absolutely impossible to argue that the small number of men required to bring the B.A.O.R. up to standard is the requirement for a Bill which enables the


Government to have an extra 20,000 men in the Forces all the time between now and 1966, in other words, to have power to call up an extra 20,000 from the 140,000, or whatever it is, under a part-time obligation.
It seems to me that this is all much more related to the dispute which has been going on for four or five years about the total number of soldiers there should be in the Army. I do not think that it can be wholly coincidental that the 20,000 the Government suggest should be held back and the capacity they are taking to call them up means that the 165,000 will now become 182,000. It may be pure coincidence, but it is, I think, one of those absolutely remarkable coincidences which hardly ever happen even in fairy tales.
It seems to me that the Government have buried the 165,000 and have now brought out of retirement and dusted off the 182,000, arranging that they will have that figure for the next three-and-a-half years either by their "Ever-readies" or by National Service men whom they will select to be called up or held back. If that is not what the Secretary of State understands, I am fairly sure that is what is understood by his advisers, and I imagine that that is why they are much happier about the situation with these present proposals. I suggest that that is a far more realistic expression of what this is all about.
Before I come to the reasons why that should be so, I have something to say about conscription as such. Having National Service men, conscripts, in any number inside a wholly Regular force of men serving on long-term engagements, with the sort of esprit de corps which grows up in those circumstances, is very disadvantageous. It is the biggest single destroyer of the morale and esprit de corps of Regular forces. The effect is much worse the smaller is the number called up. The smaller the number of men in a unit, with the calender over their beds marking off the days, the greater is the sense of dissatisfaction and unhappiness created. Moreover, if, say, those ten men are there not as willing conscripts but they are there with a very special sense of injustice and unfairness, there will be in the unit a very heavy

discouragement to morale and to other people volunteering to serve in it.
I wonder whether the Secretary of State has taken that effect into account. I have no doubt that we have all received letters of the same kind coming to us from people who are affected. I have a whole bunch of them here. The tenor of those letters, not only from National Service men but from some Regular soldiers also, as a result of the general feeling of how inadvisable and unfair these proposals are, is to suggest that the right hon. Gentleman will be giving a very great jolt not only to morale in the Service, but also to the willingness of other people to volunteer for it.
I want to make quite plain at the outset that we on this side of the House accept the need for the provision of adequate forces. For some years past, we have been trying to induce the Government to examine ways and means of getting them. But we do not believe that the House has any right to use this method to get them. We on this side are opposed to conscription in general both on principle and on grounds of practical reality.
I need not develop the point of principle, but there is just this which should be borne in mind by right hon. and hon. Members opposite who do not reject conscription on principle. We do not apply the same theory to other things of which society may stand in need. When society wants land for building purposes we violently reject the idea of conscription. It is called confiscation, and only wicked people would think of it. If there is any other form of property of which society stands in need, we reject any idea of compulsion.
Indeed, the present Government went to enormous lengths to provide for the property owner and land owner most elaborate protections, not through advisory tribunals after Crichel Down, but through absolutely firm executive tribunals standing between the individual holder of property and the Executive. With great respect, one cannot defend the principle of conscription in any form when it is applied to the most personal service of all and deny it when applied to property, to land, or something like that.
We reject conscription as a matter of practical reality. Those who do not see


the argument of principle ought to look at the practical realities of the situation. Conscription nearly always has been rejected in this country outside periods of actual hostilities. One of the reasons—history has been on our side in this—is that it did not seem to produce for us a better Army, a more appropriate kind of force, for our purpose as an island nation that we could get through Regular, smaller, but long-term forces. Regular forces met our requirements very much better.
Secondly, as those who have experience of these matters know and will, no doubt, make clear in the debate, the existence of conscripts in large numbers does not, parodoxically enough, make it easier to raise an effective force quickly at any given moment. Thirdly, the Continental pattern of conscription becomes less and less valid in this nuclear age than it even might have been. It is no use talking about planning for forces in the nuclear age unless one takes into account the effect one's system may have on the raising of reserves, mobilising them, getting them away, and so on.
It is also, as the Secretary of State recognises, very much more expensive in both money and manpower. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons why Conservative Governments during the past ten years have spent so inadequately on arms and equipment development and production has been that so much money has gone in looking after the manpower, moving it about, feeding it, clothing it and so on.
Furthermore, any form of National Service distorts the pattern and purpose of the Regular forces. It takes them away from their own job of training themselves to the constant business of training birds of passage who are going in and out, and the fewer the number of conscripts, and the shorter the period for which they are there, the worse this becomes because one is concerned more with them than with the Regulars' real Army job. For all those practical reasons, we think that National Service should be out as the way of doing the job at this time.
Hon. and right hon. Members may then say that we must, in that case, face the question, can we get the adequate forces to which we refer in our Amendment by voluntary methods? It is

incumbent on me to spend a few minutes on this. Like so many questions of its type, it is not the real question. It is a question which begs other questions. Yesterday, in the Observer, there was a short article by its defence correspondent which, I thought, brought the point out very clearly. I am not quoting exactly, but the sense of the writer's arguments was that the Army cannot get enough men and no ingenious measures about sea-borne forces and the rest can alter that fact.
There is a collection of half-truths and unprepared remarks in that statement. Why concentrate on the Army? The Army is not our only defence force. If the Army cannot do certain things, are we quite sure that other people cannot? Equally, what is meant by "enough men"? That cannot be decided until we know what the overall policy is, until we know what the commitments are that one wants to hang on to, until we know what are the means of fulfilling those commitments, and until we have examined the relationship between the various Services. Without those questions being answered, it is pointless to say that any particular number is enough, too many or too few.
On policy, there are some decisions which have not yet been taken. The Minister of Defence should tell us about them. Is it, in fact, the case that we need two kinds of Army, one trained, equipped and deployed for service in the European theatre, which might be of a nuclear connotation, and one armed, equipped and deployed elsewhere for the so-called other overseas commitments? I do not think that that is true at all. I wonder whether the Government have made up their mind about that, because on it turns whether we can do with a smaller Army than otherwise we could.
What is the position of the Strategic Reserve? Can part of the Army stationed in the European theatre be part of the Strategic Reserve? I think that it can. But, here again, have the Government decided this, because how we decide that again affects whether we want more or less than a given number of men? I do not believe that the Government have decided that question more than the other question. At any rate, we have not heard from them on the subject.
Then there are the commitments. Which commitments that we currently hold—this comes back to the point about which the noble Lord interrupted me earlier—make sense politically or militarily? Have the Government examined the large numbers which are in the Far East? This makes the phrase which the Secretary of State used in his charming way about dishonourable scuttle completely irrelevant. What the Government ought to ask themselves is, "For what purpose do we keep 20,000 men in Singapore and Hong Kong?" It is clearly too large a number for mere presence operation. It is probably too many—I should have thought it was—for a purely internal security operation. Anyway, there could be other ways of doing that. But it is fantastically too few for a real military operation. Meanwhile, however, it ties down 20,000 men.
We have bits and pieces all over the Middle East. It is very difficult to see what their purpose is. They add up to battalions. I find it very difficult to see—is it 5,000 men in Libya?—what their purpose could be for the sort of Middle Eastern operation for which we may want to use them. We know what we were permitted to do with the men in Malaysia. We could not use them at the time of Suez without first bringing them back to this country because of our obligations to King Idris.
We have a brigade group there, 5,000 men. Is there a military purpose for it? The Government do not deal with that question. It has nothing whatever to do with dishonourable scuttle but with an honest attempt to face up to requirements. What about the ridiculously enormous command structure in Cyprus? We have a battalion there—very few fighting troops. But we have a vast number of men in an enormous potential command. It has no command at the moment. Is there to be a command should something else happen? Does this make sense?
We hear a lot about administrative specialists, about the tail as against the teeth. My case is that it is precisely in these areas where there is an enormous command, as in Cyprus, the Far East and Lybia, that we have administrative specialists. It is there that we are tying down the specialists of which we are said

to be so short in Germany. Which of the commitments makes sense either politically or militarily? Which of them could be undertaken by a seaborne force? The Far Eastern and the Middle Eastern service might be able to be undertaken in this way.
Of course, if we could do it in that way it would be a very considerable aid to answering the question, "How many soldiers do we need?" It is ridiculous to say that one figure is more relevant than another until this answer has been given, which it has not. On the other hand, there is the European commitment, which I regard as essential and to which we are tied by the most solemn undertaking given by a Conservative Prime Minister, and which is not currently being fulfilled. Of what are we short in Germany?
The Minister has tied his case for the Bill to the shortage in Germany? How big is it? May I make a guess and say that if it were 12,000 more than it currently is that would be acceptable to S.H.A.P.E. and would fulfil our obligations to the Council of the Western European Union. If it is a shortage of 12,000 men, then the capacity which the Government are taking under the Bill is not justified by any standards. Again, if the figure is 12,000, then I submit that the opportunities for getting that number out of the overseas commitments, either out of the Far Eastern 20,000 men or out of the large number in the Middle East and elsewhere, are very much easier without any dishonourable scuttle.
It is a question of a more realistic examination of what we have got there. Therefore, I think that the position in Germany, as a soldier put it to me in a letter, is being used as a heaven-sent opportunity to allow the Government to do something which for other reasons they are very happy to do. It is sometimes said when I use this argument that one cannot take an individual from one theatre and put him into another. Did the Secretary of State nod his head? I understood him to do so.

Mr. Profumo: I understand what the right hon. Gentleman is saying.

Mr. Brown: I understood the right hon. Gentleman to agree with that view, because in his speech he said that that


was exactly what he was going to do, that when later in the year he was holding back men from other operations they would be available for Germany. Surely, if that can be done with a lot of men, it can be done with individuals taken out for other reasons without the compulsory stick having to be applied at all. Therefore, I do not think that that horse runs as hard or as fast as some try to persuade us that it does.
I accept that to do this in units and regiments creates some very unpleasant consequences, but that is different from saying that it cannot be done. Why are we so reluctant to face the question of incentives by way of pay for jobs unpopular in the Service? I understand the fighting man's feeling about special pay for those in administrative services, but we find the same problem in civilian industry. It has to be faced. I can never understand why it is regarded as somehow indecent in the case of the Services while it is a regular feature in every other walk of life.
I would have thought that this system would be good especially in the R.A.M.C. I have letters from Service doctors complaining bitterly about how they are treated in the R.A.M.C. We all know how desperately short we are of doctors and orderlies in that service, and will be when National Service comes to an end.

Mr. Wigg: I am sorry to interrupt my right hon. Friend, but I do so particularly having in mind what the Labour Government tried to do at the end of the last war, and at the end of the previous war, when it introduced the star system. The great moan of the troops was that the nearer they were to danger the less they got. The extreme case in the First World War was that the man in the trenches received 1s. a day and the lorry driver got 6s. a day. Therefore, one had to be very careful not to fly around with incentives.

Mr. Brown: I understand that, and that is why I said I understood the fighting soldier's reaction to it. His reaction to this Bill is going to be pretty hot, too. I am not sure that a straightforward explanation of why things are done in the way which the serving soldier does not like might not be acceptable to him.
We have got to get tough about the wastage question, too. When I was in

Germany—without looking for it and without commenting on it when I found it, because I did not want to make people feel that I was hole hunting with a small toothcomb—again and again I saw examples of sheer downright ignorance of how to deal with men. I saw officers, especially young officers, still acting as though the men under them could be pushed about. I will give the Minister examples if necessary, but I would rather do so personally than across the Table. There was too much of it for my liking. I guess that there are many opportunities for talking rather seriously to officers about the way they have to handle men if they want to create the right atmosphere.
Another thing that we must do before we can answer the question about how many soldiers and whether a certain number is too few is to review the organisation and structure of the Army. Not only, in my view, is the Army too unit-conscious and, therefore, keeps too many units and reduces their establishment number to try to make the number of units fit in with the number of men, consequently producing inefficiency, strain and weaknesses, but it also over-eggs with commands.
The situation in Germany ought to be looked at. We now have the lot. We went to the division and then away from the division to the brigade group. We are now back to the division. We now have corps headquarters, divisional headquarters, brigade group headquarters, regimental headquarters and battalion headquarters. In a recent debate, I even heard of a battalion group headquarters. The only thing missing is the Army, and we will have that if the Second Corps ever has to co-operate and work as the First Corps is now doing. This is ridiculous. Instead of getting us a streamlined Army, it has produced an Army heavily over-egged with commands.
I attach a lot of importance to the relationships of the three Services. If we are to provide or try to provide a three-way split in the money and maintain the prestige arrangements so that each Service has to have more or less its traditional place in the scheme of things, the Government will be tempted to think that they need more soldiers


than they can get and they will be trying to do something with the Army when it could be done with the men whom we have elsewhere. This ought to change.
Other Services than the Army can recruit more easily. Other Services than the Army could fulfil some of the functions, some of the rôles and some of the services with which the Army is curently struggling. Why do not the Government consider lifting the ceilings on those Services or on any one of them that can obtain more recruits? Why not consider transferring responsibilities to those other Services and move as steadily as possible towards the idea of one Service—with three different uniforms, it may be—operating in all fields?
For that purpose—I can only at the very end indicate what I mean—we require one effective Ministry of Defence. We certainly require one accounting officer. The Government will never do this job on the present basis of the separate accounting officers for the individual Services. We want a combined command and planning staff and we want them responsible to the Minister of Defence.
I was invited to say not merely that we were against the Bill and why, which I have done. I was also challenged in those terms by the Secretary of State to indicate how I thought the job could be tackled. I hope the House will believe that I have fairly carried out that assignment as well as the other. The House may or may not accept all our ideas about it, but there are other ways in Government machinery. They have not been disposed of. They have not been adequately examined. For that reason, one cannot say, as the Observer so glibly did yesterday, that the number is just too few and the Army will never get it.
We believe that Britain can fulfil her proper and essential commitments by voluntary forces. We consider it politically desirable that we should do so. We believe it to be militarily essential that we should do so. I have suggested some of the methods. They make an effective answer to those who simply say that the Bill is an unfortunate necessity.
There are two final requirements. The first is to make it clear that conscription is to be done away with and is not coming back. It is the tendency of the

Government, which the Minister of Defence has regrettably repeated, which has animated all his predecessors, always to be willing to be pushed off his decision just before it is about to become effective. This has been done about arms and equipment and now it is being done about National Service. It is no use the Minister shaking his head. National Service is now with us for another three and a half years. Those who wanted it that way will now be hoping that by the time the three and a half years are up, they can push another form of permanent, selective service through the House of Commons. That is what they hope. Those who do not believe it should counter it. To try to fob us off with a story that pretends it is not so does no service to themselves or anybody else.
If the Minister said "I am not being pushed off this perch", the War Office would have to face the realities of the situation. Then, however, it would be entitled to put a second requirement to the Government. The military and the civil servants would be entitled to tell the Government that it is the job of Ministers effectively to plan ahead and that it is their job to adhere to the plans when they have made them and not give them up when told what they will cost or if they become inconvenient in some other way, and to realise that there is no way by which to get effective defence on the cheap. I am sure that this is very much at the bottom of the Government's problems in all this.
If the Government would do that, we could end these panic measures which come upon us so regularly and so unhappily. We could end these continual changes of direction which have happened ever since I became associated with defence in this House in 1956. We could, if not actually save money, end some of the enormous waste of money which is going on in the meantime. We would not need this gross unfairness to a few men which the Bill imposes. For all those reasons, among others, I invite the House to carry the Amendment and reject the Bill.

5.17 p.m.

Mr. Aubrey Jones: The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) opened his speech by saying that one could not


discuss the Bill intelligently without looking outside its confines. I entirely agree. One cannot form an intelligent judgment on the Bill without, for instance, constructing a manpower budget—and we have had no manpower budget put before us.
What we know is, as the right hon. Gentleman said, that the Army is planned on the basis of 180,000 men. We know that in a year's time we are likely to have from voluntary recruitment about 160,000 men, which means a gap of 20,000. Is it the purpose of the Bill to make good this gap? The right hon. Member for Belper assumed that it was. I may possibly have misunderstood what has been said, but I can only say that for my part I am not quite sure. I am not quite sure because I believe, as does the right hon. Member for Belper, that the Bill is a grossly unjust Bill and likely to give rise in operation to great resentment, which, I suspect, may cause the Government to flinch from the full operation of the Bill.
I hope, therefore, that before the end of the debate we shall have a clear statement whether the purpose of the Bill is to give us over, say, the next five years an Army of 180,000 men. Under Clause 1, I believe, we can have 180,000 men for, say, eighteen months from now, but thereafter, until the spring of 1966, we shall be dependent upon Clauses 2 and 3. Suppose that under Clause 3, which establishes the "Ever-readies", an insufficient number of men come forward. Can we get a clear statement from the Government that in that event, they will unhesitatingly use Clause 2, despite its great unpopularity, so as to get them their 180,000? I shall be very grateful for a clear statement to this effect.
Thereafter, after the spring of 1966, we shall be entirely dependent on voluntary recruitment eked out by Clause 3—the "Ever-readies"—and I should like to suggest that the contribution of Clause 3 in the long term is utterly negligible. The men to be called up under Clause 3 will be Territorials who have done their fortnight's camp and, if they have been conscientious, their 30 nights a year in a drill hall. They will be entirely untrained. So by the spring of 1966 we shall be dependent on an Army, as I see it, derived entirely from voluntary recruitment.

Sir Richard Glyn: I wonder if I may help my right hon. Friend in his quoting of the liability of the Territorial soldier and of the liability of the National Service soldier? He is quoting the liability of the National Service soldier in days past when there was a liability to continue service in the Territorial Army. First of all, there are no such people left in the Territorial Army. Secondly, the Territorial soldier does not have a minimum commitment of that style at all. He trains as much as he wishes, and I hope very much that it will be the keener ones who will be recommended by their commanding officers for the right to serve in what are called the "Ever-readies". Such people—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speech."]—in many cases have done a hundred drills in a year, and I personally—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speech."]—have knowledge of some who have done 400 drills in addition to camp.

Mr. Aubrey Jones: Even if I happen to be wrong about the details—and the last thing I would wish to do would be to challenge my hon. Friend on the details—I think that my main statement remains unchallenged, that after the spring of 1966 we shall be entirely dependent on voluntary recruitment.
What we have, therefore—and the Secretary of State, I think, admitted this—is essentially a short-term Measure. We have a limited retreat from the fundamental decision of 1957 to abolish National Service. There seem to me, therefore, to be three questions to be asked about this Bill. Are we, in fact, confronted by a purely short-term problem? Secondly, does the famous decision of 1957 seem in retrospect so right that all we need to do is to perform a limited short-term modification? Thirdly, if we were to conclude—and this is my belief—that a more radical revision of the 1957 decision is necessary, we must ask of this Bill, does it facilitate such a more radical revision or does it in fact impede it?
For my own part, I believe that we are confronted on the Continent of Europe with something much more than a mere short-term problem. This is not the moment to go into Soviet motives, except to say that they seem to me to be a compound: a steady resolve, on the one hand, to tilt the balance of


power in the Soviet's favour by means short of full war, and, on the other hand, the fear—which I personally believe to be exaggerated, but nevertheless the fear—of a resurgent Germany.
It is the resurgence of Germany which has brought the Berlin problem to the fore, and even if the Berlin problem were settled by the spring of next year the resurgence of Western Germany would go on. What we have, therefore, on the Continent of Europe is the reappearance of the old-pre-war problem of Germany in Europe, and added to it now the post-war problem of a vastly more powerful Soviet Union. This is not a short-term phenomenon, and there is no quick change to this.
Simultaneously with this long-term deterioration in the European situation, we have a fundamental change in Western strategic thinking, a feeling of dismay at the inflexibility of a Western defence which relies primarily on nuclear retaliation, and a search, difficult though it is, for greater flexibility by placing greater emphasis on conventional forces.
The impulse for this change comes from the new United States Administration. The new United States Administration has not yet been in office one year. We are in the first year of what may well be an eight-year tenure of office by the Kennedy Administration. The pressure for this change is, therefore, likely to go on. What does this imply? It implies, it seems to me, the full implementation of the Mc70 plan which calls for 30 N.A.T.O. divisions as against the present nominal 25 and the present effective 15. How does this leave the British position? Under the Mc70 plan this country is due to provide four divisions, 75,000 men. Even if we were released from the obligation to provide the Mc70 divisions, even if the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that S.H.A.P.E. would countenance our present number of formations, that is seven brigade groups, greater emphasis on conventional forces requires greater battle readiness on the part of some of the formations we have. This implies a number on the Continent, I would judge, of between 65,000 and 70,000 men—I do not greatly differ from the right hon. Gentleman—65,000 to 70,000 men as distinct from the 55,000 we now have, and

as distinct from the 45,000 at which the Government have sedulously aimed over the past few years. I wonder if the Government in their long-term thinking are still thinking of 45,000 men.
We are confronted, then, with a greater need for men in Europe. Where are they to come from? From, it will be said, overseas commitments; and, of course, this is true up to a point. We are being forced out of certain overseas commitments by political circumstances, but, speaking for myself, I would be chary of adding to those circumstances by voluntary acts of our own. I have an impression, in looking at this problem of overseas commitments, that we look at it purely in British terms, whereas we ought to be looking at it in terms of the entire Western Alliance.
We were once a great naval country. I believe our naval value today lies not so much in our actual Naval strength, but in our know-how and in the overseas bases which we put at the service of the American Navy. Over-hasty withdrawal from certain overseas commitments would, I think, injure the American Navy; but, over and above any material injury to the United States Navy, I think we ought to have regard to the psychological effect on the United States of an over-hasty abandonment of overseas commitments.

Mr. R. T. Paget: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us of any naval bases which we put at the disposal of the United States Navy or any bases at which the United States Navy has got stores?

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Holy Loch.

Mr. Aubrey Jones: There is Singapore and there is Hong Kong.
But, quite apart from material damage, I submit we ought to have regard to psychological effect. I myself believe that we are endeavouring to enter Europe on conditions which I believe to be impossible of fulfilment, and we are in an impasse in which we require every ounce of support and friendship from the United States that we can muster. It seems to me that by the abandonment of overseas commitments we risk piling one American resentment against us on another.
To summarise, if my proposition about the Mc70 forces is accepted, and, if I am right in believing that we should be cautious about abandoning overseas commitments, then I believe that in the four or five years of the operation of this Bill we shall need more than 180,000 men.
But, even if we get 180,000 men under the Bill, are we likely to have an Army of 180,000 men from the spring of 1966 onwards, when the powers conferred by the Bill will be exhausted? The interesting thing is that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War has not ventured to commit himself on this subject. We have never been told whether or not the Government think it likely that they will have an Army equivalent to the 180,000 of their plan by 1966, and therefore we are driven again to make our own guesses.
My guess is that we shall have in 1966 an Army of just under 180,000, say 175,000 but that Army, although equivalent to the plan in round figures, will be short in certain special skills. The right hon. Member for Belper tried to justify his attitude on National Service by aligning it with his fundamental political philosophy. If I understand it aright, the core of the political philosophy of the party opposite is that market forces, if allowed to operate of their own, will not produce a distribution of resources desirable from the public point of view. I believe that to be abundantly right. If that is true, what reason then is there to believe that in this context market forces will produce a distribution of special skills desirable from the public point of view? I believe that the Army will be short of certain special skills.
R.E.M.E. will appear to be all right in round figures, but I suggest that it will be short of the electronic technicians without whom guided missiles cannot be guided. The Signals Corps will be all right in round figures, but it will be short of special signals operators without whom the targets cannot be fixed. This will mean that the effective strength of the Army will be below 175,000 men. I venture to put it at 150,000 men, short by the Government's present standards, and short even by the optimistic version of the Government's intentions in this Bill, and shorter still by the more exacting standards which I suggest are required in 1961, as against 1957.
I therefore come to the fundamental question whether we should return to National Service. Both the Bill and the Opposition Amendment take their stand on the premise that the 1957 decision was right. I should like to deal as objectively as I can with some of the arguments against National Service as stated this afternoon. They seem to me to be roughly three. First, there has been the argument of quality, namely that a homogeneous force is better than a heterogeneous or mixed force. I am not disposed to quarrel with that for a moment.
Then it has been said that a mixed force would be expensive. This was a point which was put by my right hon. Friend. How expensive? I estimate the cost of a National Service man at £1,000 a year. If, therefore, instead of a volunteer Army of 180,000 men we have a mixed force of 220,000 men, the extra cost is £40 million. Even in the most mismanaged economy, it could scarcely be said that £40 million a year is an intolerable burden, and it need not even be a gross addition.
If other economies are needed in the defence budget, let the Government look at the research and development programme and ask themselves how many weapons they are developing which they will require in very few numbers. Let the Government harden their minds against the pressure now upon them to feed into the aircraft industry projects which are out of tune with the requirements of other parts of the world. I cannot regard the expense as a conclusive argument.
The third argument put by my right hon. Friend was wastage of manpower. I take it that what he had in mind was that in order to train rapidly large masses of men we need a certain training force—if we take in 20,000 National Service men we need roughly 20,000 trainers. This admittedly is true up to a point. I would contend that if we pass out National Service men more quickly from the basic training organisations to their battalions we should not need one trainer for one National Service man. We could do with, as it were, half a trainer per man, and if 20,000 National Service men were taken in we could make do with 10,000 trainers. I concede


this point, though not as fully as my right hon. Friend would claim for it.
But no course of action in this life is all advantage. Every course of action is a balance of advantages and disadvantages. But in no speech, from the Prime Minister through the Minister of Defence down to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, has any attempt been made in this Session to assess the broad balance of advantages and disadvantages of National Service. Nothing has been said about any countervailing disadvantage. It has been kept quietly hidden. Therefore, it is up to us to try to bring it out.
I will describe what seems to me the basic disadvantage of the 1957 decision to do away with National Service, and I should like to describe it not in terms of abstract theory but in terms of harsh reality as we have seen it since 1957. When the decision was taken in 1957, it was thought that the number of voluntary recruits was likely to be 165,000 a year. Later, in 1958, the Army was planned on the basis of 180,000. Why this discrepancy? No explanation has ever been given of this mystery. The malicious would no doubt say that this is due to muddle on the part of the Government.
I prefer to be more charitable. I think that the real explanation was that the discrepancy was evidence of the strait jacket which the abolition of National Service from the very first put on the Army, and with the first gleam of hope in 1958 that we might be able to recruit 180,000 men the Army grasped at the chance, slender though that was. That was in 1958, but in 1961 there came the Kennedy Administration with a new emphasis on conventional forces.
In this reorientation of Western strategic thinking we as a country, because of the decision of 1957, have played no part. In the earlier strategic doctrine of nuclear retaliation, we were the first. It was we who started it, but in this new reorientation of thinking we in this country are the laggards. Later in 1961, the Berlin crisis arose, with the cry for more conventional forces in Europe. Would I be going too far if I said that we responded to this cry the last and the least? We lagged behind everybody and, pro-

jecting ourselves forward into 1962, it seems likely that in order to pay the Peter of Europe we shall rob the Paul of overseas. But I prophesy that both Peter and Paul will be robbed, both will be deficient, and to the resentment left in the United States by our deficiencies in Europe in 1961 we shall add further resentment by our deficiencies overseas in 1962.
I grant my right hon. Friend that there are certain technical advantages in a wholly volunteer force. But the technical advantages are, to my mind, heavily outweighed by the inflexibility which a wholly volunteer force places upon one's whole defence policy. With a volunteer force the one fixed element is the number of recruits that one can raise, and to this everything else—change of doctrine, change of circumstances—has to be sacrificed. It is my belief that in order to restore a much needed flexibility to British defence policy and, therefore, by extension, to British foreign policy we should return to National Service.
By National Service, I mean essentially something on the American model—the elimination on grounds of trade, health and intelligence of large numbers of people and the definition, on grounds of trade, health and intelligence of a final category of people all of whom are then inducted into the Services; that final category can be expanded or contracted as circumstances require.
I now come to my last question. If I am right in thinking that such a radical revision of the 1957 decision is necessary, I do not think that the Bill will facilitate such a revision. I differ in this from the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper. I believe that the Bill impedes such a radical revision, and I believe that on two grounds.
The first is the purely technical ground that in five years' time the technique of rapidly training large numbers of men will have disappeared from the Army, and it will not be easy to re-create it; but I also believe this on public relations grounds. This will have been the second time, at a time of emergency in Europe, when the Government will have said "We do not believe in National Service." The more often and the longer this is said, the more difficult it becomes to eat one's words. I believe that the Bill makes more difficult the radical revision which I believe to be necessary.
So one asks oneself: Why this clinging to the decision of 1957? I reluctantly conclude that there can be only one explanation. It is that the decision of 1957 was one of the first important decisions taken by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on his assumption of the Prime Ministership, and, therefore, a great deal of personal prestige is attached to it.
But I would ask the Government to reflect that when they say that the decision of 1957 is sacrosanct, what they are saying is that they cannot adjust themselves to changing circumstances, and when a Government say that they cannot adjust themselves to changing circumstances, normally they will be proclaiming to the country that the adjustment to changed circumstances can come about only if others take up the reins of Government. But in this case the alternative Government have nailed their colours to the mast, too. The alternative Government believe that the decision of 1957 was right. So the alternative Government equally cannot adjust themselves to changing circumstances.
But the changing circumstances will have their way and will reflect themselves. There is only one way in which they can reflect themselves—in pushing down the weight which this country exercises in international councils, pushing it down below the level which even in our reduced straits, we deserve.
I suggest that this is for both parties as straight an issue of country versus party as I have seen in the eleven years that I have been in the House of Commons, and I trust that both in this debate and in the Division Lobby tonight there will be some at any rate who will show that they still think of country.

5.44 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) has deployed his case with his usual skill, but he came to a conclusion which appeared obvious as he developed his argument, namely, that we should return to some form of National Service. I beg him to understand that he proceeds on a completely false assumption, which is that we require far more men than it is within the province of the Government to provide.
As for his suggestion that we must regard this problem not as an essentially British one but as one which concerns itself with the whole of the Western Alliance, I agree with him. Right from the end of the last war, we have made a more substantial contribution to the Western Alliance, having regard to our resources, than any other country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. If any hon. or right hon. Member wishes to challenge that statement, I advise him to examine the facts. Ever since the Labour Government decided to embark on the policy of National Service when we were asked to make our contribution to the Brussels Treaty Organisation, which preceded the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, we furnished two divisions.
Let there be no misunderstanding about what is meant by a division. Our divisions in those days were far larger in numbers, as regards both the teeth and the tail, than they are at present. Indeed, they were far larger than in any other country associated with N.A.T.O. In those days, when we furnished two divisions to the Brussels Treaty Organisation, at the time when Field Marshal Montgomery was chairman of that organisation, a division consisted, in both teeth and tail, of about 30,000 men. So we were providing a total of 60,000 men.
But since then there has been a substantial change and a reorientation of what is meant by a division. Now a division may consist, in teeth, of about 10,000 or, at most, 12,000 men. It is difficult to say what the tail consists of, because it contains civilian personnel as well as military. If one examines the Estimates presented by the Secretary of State for War when we last debated the Army, one will discover that the total amount of remuneration payable to the civilian personnel of the Army exceeds that paid to the military.
Therefore, I repeat that the right hon. Gentleman proceeds on a fallacious assumption, which is that we require vast numbers of men and that without vast numbers of men we are incapable of fulfilling our commitments.
I should like to relate an experience of mine. After I had been Secretary of State for War and had had to administer the National Service scheme, full of


complications, I went to the Ministry of Defence. We were then embroiled in the Korean affair. At that time we had 400,000 men in the British Army, roughly 220,000 National Service men and 180,000 Regulars. Yet we were at our wit's end—it was not a matter of anybody being blameworthy; we had vast commitments and were spread all over the place, as was well known at the time, and there were other complications which ensued, following upon the war itself—to create an efficient and effective brigade group to dispatch to Korea—and that, despite the vast numbers that we had, was a brigade group consisting of 6,000 or 7,000 men.
It does not follow—I speak from what experience I have had; maybe I do not possess the authority or the knowledge entitling me to state this view, but, nevertheless, I state it—that mere numbers do not enable us to provide an effective contribution to N.A.T.O. or to furnish any of our other commitments.
What is the position? Here is a Bill which is undoubtedly harsh in its operation—if it ever does operate, as the right hon. Member for Hall Green has said—but which will not provide the number of men required by the Secretary of State for War. Let us look at the arithmetic of it. We have at present, I think, about 130,000 Regulars—perhaps 140,000, including boys and so on. The immediate target is 165,000 men, so we require about another 20,000 men.

Mr. Wigg: No.

Mr. Shinwell: Let me develop my case. I have thought about this as well. The Secretary of State envisages a maximum target of 180,000. If anyone challenges my figures, I have them with me, straight from the horse's mouth. No exception can be taken to them. We have 143,880 Regulars, which includes those on long-term and short-term engagements. There are 6,796 short-term engagements.

Mr. Wigg: It is 141,000, less boys but with officers added. If my right hon. Friend is to make comparisons, he must make comparison between the same kind of things.

Mr, Shinwell: I am sorry, but that intervention does not vitiate my argument, whether it is officers and other

ranks or whether other ranks alone that I am speaking of. Roughly speaking, this is the number at the Secretary of State's disposal. He wants a minimum target of 165,000. I am sorry to repeat myself, but if I am to be diverted from my argument by interventions then I must repeat myself in order to make some impact on people who think that they know all about this subject and that those of us who have been in these Departments for a long time know nothing about it.
I repeat that the Secretary of State wants 165,000 men. That is his minimum target. Therefore, he needs roughly about another 20,000 men. His maximum target is about 180,000 men. What does he want them for? That is a very important question, and I hope that we shall have an answer. Is the right hon. Gentleman thinking of filling up gaps? Presumably he has an idea of that kind in his head, because he is not speaking of replacing a number of units but of individual selection. There is a problem here, and I do not deny its existence. Perhaps in B.A.O.R., or in Gibraltar, or Hong Kong, Malaya or Cyprus—wherever we have men—there are gaps. He wants technicians—signallers, drivers and men in R.E.M.E. and so on.
The right hon. Gentleman appears to be aiming to select a number of men, but it never seems to have occurred to him that, instead of adopting this cockeyed idea, this dog's breakfast—excuse the mixed metaphors—this series of confused proposals, he might have adopted something like a scheme which I adopted when we ran into difficulties. This was to continue the engagement of Regulars. Has that occurred to him?
In this way, he would have men who had been in the Service for six or nine years. He could retain them for 12 months, or, indeed, just six months, which is precisely what he intends to do with National Service men. It constitutes a hardship to the National Service men, but if he retains a Regular for six months the man's pay continues, perhaps with an additional bounty—obviously the right hon. Gentleman can afford to do that because he is to throw money around, as I shall show later—and the Army has a trained man to whom the retention causes no real hardship. He is in the Service for another six months


and that will not matter a great deal to him, while the Army has a trained man. By retaining National Service men one is imposing hardship upon them.
The right hon. Gentleman is also calling up men who are simply undertaking their reserve liability and who never expect the call-up except in dire emergencies. How many the right hon. Gentleman expects to get in that fashion I do not know, but it is a substantial number.
The right hon. Gentleman should do something which he should have thought about before. He should stop the wastage through the method of purchasing out. After all, three months after joining a Service should be ample for a man in which to consider his position, and a man should be retained after that period unless some exceptional situation arises. In this way it would be possible to obtain the men—mark what I am saying—not for the long term, to which I shall come later, but in order to fill the gaps. If that is what the problem is, then it is possible to find an easy solution.
There is another way out, and this relates to the long-term problem. I agree 100 per cent. with the right hon. Member for Hall Green about the resurgence of Germany and the re-creation of an old-time problem—a European problem. I believe that the cold war will last for a long time, not merely because of the intransigence of the Soviet Union but because of the resurgence of Germany. The Germans are an extremely military people, are highly organised and know where they are going—and they will go places unless we are very careful.
I know that some of my hon. Friends will challenge me, because I was as much responsible for German rearmament as anybody else at the time, but I think that all hon. Members are aware of how it happened. We were under pressure by the United States Government, which had a case because of French defection. The French have let us down all along the line. Let us compare, in parenthesis, our contributions overseas with the French contributions. The French had trouble in Indo China—we had trouble elsewhere. They have trouble in Algeria—we have commitments elsewhere. The French have never, except on paper, made an effective contribution.
Naturally, the United States Government—Mr. Dean Acheson was Secretary of State and General Marshall was Secretary of Defence—prevailed upon Ernest Bevin to agree to some form of German rearmament. I well remember the conference in New York and the subsequent conferences in Washington, when we very reluctantly agreed, on behalf of the Labour Government, to accept the principle of German rearmament and to allow the Germans to raise a small number of men for internal security. It was called a "paramilitary force" in order to satisfy Jules Moch, who was French Minister of Defence and who would have nothing to do with the project otherwise. I agree that we were responsible but we never expected, and I doubt if any hon. Member ever expected that Germany would eventually have nearly 300,000 men under arms.

Mr. S. Silverman: I did.

Mr. Shinwell: Of course, my hon. Friend knew about it, but people like myself knew nothing about it. We were just ignoramuses. But I must say, since I have been challenged, that the Labour Party accepted the proposal for German rearmament by a very large majority.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: Oh, very large!

Mr. Shinwell: I can say a lot of other things, which I shall come to in a moment. However, I think that it is wise to bury the past. There were faults on all sides. When one has been in a Service Department, one has a great deal of sympathy with Ministers, for such Departments are full of complications, particularly manpower problems, and one has to adapt oneself in a Service Department to changing circumstances. They have nothing to do with the military situation, but depend upon a change in the international scene, or in the international atmosphere. That is the cause of all the trouble, but we are not now having a foreign affairs debate.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Hall Green that, much as we deplore the fact and hope that we are wrong, we have to envisage years and years of the cold war. There are those who may not agree with this view and who may call us unwise prophets, but I believe that we have to envisage a continuance


of the cold war for many years, and shall have to sustain some kind of alliance in the West to provide an effective deterrent against a conflict—though some people would not agree that it is effective.
Incidentally, let there be no beating about the bush and let it be remembered that, by an overwhelming majority, the Labour Party accepted the principle of N.A.T.O. I need not argue about it. Whether rightly or wrongly, the Labour Party accepts the principle, as does the House and the country at large. There is only a minority.

Mr. William Baxter: Mr. William Baxter (West Stirlingshire) rose—

Mr. Shinwell: I know that my hon. Friend the Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. W. Baxter) is one of that minority, and he need not bother about it.

Mr. Baxter: After his admission of having made many mistakes in the past, does not my right hon. Friend now hesitate about advising us about the future?

Mr. Shinwell: My hon. Friend had better await what advice I decide to give. Of course we have made mistakes, but I am now dealing with the inescapable fact, which cannot be challenged, that the Labour Party and the House and the country generally accept the principle of N.A.T.O. Whether it will be effective is beside the point. If N.A.T.O. is accepted, some content must be injected into it. We do not want a mere ornament to put on the mantle-piece, or in a glass case, or to have conferences and conversations and White Papers about it. There must be some content, and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) who has so often said that if men are sent to any theatre, we must see that they are properly protected in both numbers and equipment.
If we have N.A.T.O., we have to make a job of it, but the question now is what we are to do about that. The right hon. Gentleman has put forward this piffling, pettifogging Measure which is unjust in its imposition whenever it is imposed. It is a sort of miniature selective service arrangement under which the fellows who are waiting to

go out and who have wanted to go out from the start, the National Service men who have completed their two years' service, are to have to remain for another six months. That is bad enough with all its complications and hardship. Incidentally, no matter how many hardship tribunals are set up, there will always be difficulties, and many hon. Members will be receiving letters from constituents and from the wives of men doing National Service. We have had plenty of trouble with the National Service grant in the past and we will again in the future if this arrangement is continued.
What of the men who are due to be called up, out of the blue, for six months? How many does the right hon. Gentleman expect to get? It will be 5,000 or 10,000 at the most. He will get only the residue of about 20,000, for that is all he will have left. He has told us that the number of National Service men is 50,000. He says that after April the number will be reduced to perhaps 40,000 and then, towards the end of next year and the beginning of the year after, there will be about 20,000 men undergoing National Service. If he has to pick and choose from among that small number, how does he expect to be able to get this provision?

Mr. Profumo: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, because I appreciate that he is trying to be as clear as possible. However, I think that he has misunderstood me. I said that there were 50,000 National Service men who were now serving in the Army and that by April next year that would be reduced by about half and that by the end of the year, or the beginning of 1963, they would all have gone. The people on whom we then have to call, if we ever have to resort to them under Clause 2, would be about another 100,000.

Mr. Shinwell: I see the point. The right hon. Gentleman is proposing to call up men undertaking their reserve liability?

Mr. Profumo: Yes.

Mr. Shinwell: Even so, that liability is bound to end in the course of three years and the right hon. Gentleman will be left only with the "Ever-readies". I will now deal with those.
I pay great tribute to the Territorial Army for what it has done. However, do not let us be under any illusion about it, for the men are not properly trained. It is true that National Service men, who are undertaking their reserve liability and who join the Territorials and form part of the units of the Territorial Army, have had some training, but the average man who joins and who goes for perfunctory training two nights a week is not properly trained. Some of these men even have anti-aircraft training in a very modest fashion, but most of them regard the Territorial Army as a social club. Indeed, that is what it is, and a very good one, too.
I suggest that if the right hon. Gentleman intends to proceed with his "Ever-ready" proposal, the one thing he must ensure is that the Territorials are properly trained. But that is not what he is proposing to do. What he intends is that somebody should select them and that he will "vet" them and that they will then get £150 a year, or £3 a week, which is not bad for doing nothing. I agree that they may be called up, but that is very unlikely. However, if they are to be called up, is the right hon. Gentleman to call up the men who are untrained? What use will they be for filling the gaps in B.A.O.R. if there is trouble in Berlin or Europe? The suggestion is useless.
The one good thing we have been doing—and it has been going on for some time—is to build up the reservists. I have always said when we have discussed the Army that we should build up a stronger Regular Reserve and a stronger Emergency Reserve, providing the men with decent retainers. We have never given proper retainers, paying only a miserable couple of shillings a day, or whatever it may be. Why do we not build up the numbers in the reserves and retain the Regulars, if we require to do so, if there are gaps to be filled in B.A.O.R. or anywhere else? By retaining Regulars for another six months, or even nine or twelve months, the right hon. Gentleman could fulfill his mission.
However, what he really wants is 182,000 men and he cannot get them from volunteers alone. He can get them only by a combination of volunteers and "Ever-readies", the men who are selected from their reserve liability, and he has that reservoir for a period of three

years. He says that he wants them to build up our forces in B.A.O.R.
The right hon. Member for Hall Green spoke of 1957 and blamed the Prime Minister for what then happened. It may be that the Prime Minister was blameworthy, but so were others. The year 1957 was when the West departed from the conventional system and adopted the nuclear theory. Let us examine that. If the right hon. Gentleman had 200,000 men and could take all of them to B.A.O.R.—and he cannot afford to do that—by renouncing all our other commitments—and he cannot afford to do that, because, although there are places where we should reduce the number of men, he could not entirely abandon our commitments—and if trouble occurred, those 200,000 men would not greatly help General Norstad to get his 30 divisions. He will not get his 30 divisions for a long time, and yet he would encounter the full strength of the Russians with more than 100 divisions and certainly with 50 effective divisions, highly trained and capable of speedy mobilisation.
I am sorry to have to say it, but it is my firm conviction that if there were conventional war of the most limited character over Berlin or in Europe, it would be the prelude to a nuclear war. I am not alone in that view. It has been put forward by some of the greatest military experts. I could quote them, but hon. Members are well aware of what they have said. I am certain that however strong our forces—and we can provide forces only within our capabilities—we could not match the might and strength and formidable power of the Russians. Then, rather than surrender—and I can understand that—we would use nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons to begin with, if we had them, but then the full blast of nuclear weapons. Then the balloon would go up and where should we be?
That is why I am with those who say that the Bill will not do a very great deal and that what matters is not the men furnished to B.A.O.R. and our other commitments, but preventing further trouble in Berlin, preventing further trouble throughout the world. It is that to which we ought to be addressing ourselves and not talking in terms of conscription and so on.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) derided conscription, saying that it was not a sound principle. I beg to differ from him. I do not regard National Service as being unsound and inherently improper. The rendering of service, provided that it is carried out satisfactorily with equality and proper judgment, is not a bad principle. The Labour Party adopted it and that principle was in operation when my right hon. Friend became the Opposition's Front Bench spokesman on the subject in 1956.
It was my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley and my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) and I who, during an Adjournment debate one Friday in 1952, demanded the end of National Service, realising from our experience that large numbers of men did not enable one to meet one's commitments.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Now the right hon. Gentleman has changed his mind.

Mr. Shinwell: The noble Lord should not talk like that. He changes his mind, and it is a good job that he does, from time to time. We are gratified when he does and we look forward to his changing his mind still further. He is coming our way with great speed and remarkable expedition. There may be a full stop one of these days—a pause, as we say.
I say this about conscription. I said it the other day at a meeting. It is politically unacceptable to the country at the present time. I am not saying that, because something is unpopular, the Government should not address themselves to its implementation, but I do not believe that the country wants conscription. As for conscription of the kind which the right hon. Gentleman suggested—selective service—that is much more unfair and unjust than National Service.

Mr. Aubrey Jones: The American system is far fairer and far more just than anything in this Bill.

Mr. Shinwell: If the hon. Member says that the American system is fairer, he had better ask the people called up, who are drafted. I read the American

periodicals and the stories related of how men want to dodge the draft, and the methods they indulge in to dodge it. I am not so sure, therefore, that it is popular in the United States. It is a device employed there to get the men. I do not believe that we require to use it. We do not need it because I believe that we shall have the number of men we want if, as I suggest, we adopt a system of retaining the Regulars for another six or nine months and training the Territorials effectively. In that way, and by building up the reserve forces, we can supplement the activities of the Regulars and enable them, if trouble should occur, to give as good an account of themselves as could ever be expected.

6.15 p.m.

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: We always enjoy listening to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). As usual, he made a courageous and self-critical speech. There is one point that I should like to take him up on. All of us on both sides of the House and throughout the country, I am sure, have had grave misgivings about the rearmament of Germany. But what were the alternatives? Was Germany to remain an occupied country for very much longer? Were her total manpower and all her financial resources to be used in economic competition against the rest of us in Europe? How long was this state of affairs to continue? Were we never to reach a stage where the rest of us would consider that the German race had worked its passage and that we were justified in giving them once more a fair trial?
I subscribe to the view that we had reached that point and, also, that we were forced to that point by the sheer weight of economics. A Germany deploying her full manpower in industry, putting her full financial resources into competition with our industry, particularly with the events that had occurred in the Common Market in Europe, was a very different proposition to the sort of proposition that we were facing after 1919. I think that we have been right in our decision. I agree that we took a chance on it, but I hope, as we all hope, that events will prove us right. I am convinced that the closer we can combine ourselves to Germany through N.A.T.O., and possibly


through other alliances, the less likelihood there is of danger in the future.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said that the Government's defence policy had crashed in ruins about the Government's ears. It seems to me that even if a few pinnacles have fallen off, the edifice is still massive and that the bricks that fell must have been rubber bricks, because the crash was soundless. He spoke of the tremendous hardship of a further six months' service—hardship agreed—but to describe six months' service in a man's life as tremendous hardship is, I think, slightly exaggerating the case.
If we go back to that much discussed document the 1957 White Paper, we find that it was clearly stated at that time that some limited form of compulsory service might he required to bridge the gap. Some of us had pious hopes that this would not be necessary, but I was afraid, some time ago, that those hopes were unlikely to be fulfilled, unfortunately, I think, for the Army.

Mr. Wigg: Hear, hear.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: I do not quite know what comfort the hon. Gentleman who said "Hear, hear" can take from these facts.

Mr. Wigg: Only eating your words.

Lieut.-Commander Maydon: There is no question of eating one's words. It was a question of facing up to the possibility which we knew might occur, but which we hoped would not.
There are three courses open to the Government at this time, so far as I can see. We could revert to the policy of conscription for the future. The first argument against that is that it is not likely permanently to be required. Then there are a series of other arguments. It is against all the best military advice from the point of view of the welfare and efficiency of the Army. We want, and need, a whole-time force of dedicated men, not a mixed-up force with some people doing compulsory service, much against their will, for a short period of time.
It is uneconomical of manpower. If one compares the small number of men who are likely to be needed to bridge this gap—perhaps as few as 20,000, and

perhaps as many as 30,000—and then take into account not only the military manpower which is wasted in training, but the civilian administrative manpower, the doctors who have to do the medicals, and all the rigmarole of registration and call-up, it is a tremendous waste of effort. Lastly, of course, it is contrary to our national traditions, for very good reasons which I will not go over again now.
The second possible course the Government could have followed was to institute a form of really selective service, somewhat along the lines the Americans are following. It is administratively clumsy, and even in this scheme there are gross unfairnesses, but the big difficulty, which I do not think was mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones), is that the Americans need 170,000 men, whereas we need only between 20,000 and 30,000.
America has roughly three times our population but that population is spread over an area of the earth's surface more than three times the area of the British Isles, so one gets a greater number of men being drawn from a less densely populated area than in Britain, and in consequence, the unfairness between Smith and Jones, who live adjacent to, or opposite each other in the same street, is not nearly so apparent in America as it would be here.
The second disadvantage is that if we institute conscription by selective service the men coming in will still be raw recruits, having to be trained and so taking up the valuable time of highly trained men. Lastly, these men will not be needed once the new Territorial Army Reserve has got into its stride.
There was a third course, and that is the one the Government have taken. There were many permutations and combinations of what might have been done, but I think that the Government have chosen the right one. It will, and we all admit it, be unfair to a number of men, but all conscription is unfair. What the Government have done is to restrict that unfairness to a comparatively small number of men over a limited period of time.
The burden falls heavily on that section, and we are all very sorry for that, but, nevertheless, this is a necessity, and I


think that we shall find that the great majority of these men will accept the situation and take it in their stride provided that good warning is given, and that my right hon. Friend has already started doing this afternoon by saying that nobody discharged before 1st April next year will come into this category under Clause 1.
There are one or two questions I should like to ask my right hon. Friend. A point, which has worried many of us, is the question of wastage. I would be grateful if my hon. Friend, when he replies, will give us some idea of the wastage which is occurring at present, with the comparative figures over the last three or four years, due to discharge by purchase, and also the figures for the wastage due to men not coming up to the required medical or physical standards after they have joined up.
The other danger which I foresee when we look to Europe is the question of the Common Market and other countries in it pointing to Britain and saying, "You are the only one out of step. All of us here in Europe endure conscription and grin and bear it. You are the only one who has a voluntary Army." I hope that the Government will not fall for that sort of argument. If we go into the Common Market, there must be no question of how we regulate the numbers of men coming into our forces, whether it is done according to our own choice or by some common European standard. That is a thing which must be firmly resisted.
I support this Measure although I recognise that it will fall heavily on a small number of men, but I am sure that the great majority of them will realise their responsibilities and do this extra service with willing hearts for their country.

6.27 p.m.

Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: In listening to the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon), I felt some regret that he had done his homework so thoroughly, because his defence of the Bill was strictly in line with the Minister's defence and completely disregarded all the speeches which have succeeded the Minister's. We have heard

from my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), and in the powerful speech from the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones), a series of serious questions about whether this was the best Measure available. I felt that the hon. and gallant Member could have attended with advantage to some of the objections and dealt with them in his reply instead of merely repeating, in more wooden form, some of the points raised by the Minister.
I got the impression from the Minister's speech that he tried to make this a small occasion. This was to be unimportant. This was not to matter. A very small Bill can do a great deal of damage, and I regard this as an excellent example of a miserable little Bill which may have the most grave, long-term repercussions for this country. It will have grave repercussions because, once again, the House of Commons, if it passes the Bill, will have preferred a popular, or not unpopular makeshift way of getting on for two or three years, to a serious attempt to tackle this problem.
That reminds me of something which occurred last week. It was, I think, the first television performance of the new Leader of the House, the new Leader of the Conservative Party. I did not see the broadcast, but I got the text of it because I wanted to know what our new Leader of the House would say on his first appearance before a television audience. He seemed to be leading a party which had courage and conviction and which did what was really necessary for the good of the country in defiance of losing votes.
I should like to quote the right hon. Gentleman. He said:
Now first—defence. A Government's first duty is to safeguard this country, and a Government must never consider for a moment whether what it does is popular, or unpopular, so long as it discharges that duty.
He went on:
You know the position very well in the world today. There are troubled areas in many continents. But now, as so often before, the spotlight is on Berlin. And in Berlin, we, with our Allies, have solemn obligations to fulfil. We cannot be sure that we have enough men to fulfil those obligations unless we take powers, as we propose to do, to continue National Service for a short time. …


He ended:
Now, I daresay this will be unpopular. Indeed, of course, it is bound to be so.
Frankly, the right hon. Gentleman is a very clever propagandist, but sometimes one can be too clever by half. After all, there are, you say—if you are a Government of this kind—25,000 or 30,000 people who will suffer under this Bill. There will be a very little unpopularity; but many millions of people will be relieved to feel that, once again, they will not be called on to do anything. I cannot think of anything more characteristic of a Government seeking to appease public opinion, instead of warning it, than this Bill.
I can think of no Bill less in accord with the convictions of the party opposite of which we were reminded by the right hon. Member for Hall Green in what I thought a very remarkable speech. I did not agree with it, but the right hon. Gentleman spoke in the tradition of his party. At least, he outlined this in his analysis and the questions which he asked seemed to me questions that the Minister of Defence might be courteous enough to try to answer at the end of this debate, since they certainly were not answered at the beginning.
I regard the Bill as bad for two reasons. In the first place, it does not tackle the long-term problem, but merely permits us to postpone it until May, 1966, when the last man leaves over whom we have any control. In the second place, not only is it bad in the long-term, but the makeshift measures it proposes combine the maximum injustice with the maximum administrative difficulty. These are the two points with which I wish to deal, and here I want to agree with at least one thing which was said by the hon. and gallant Member for Wells. He said that the Sandys defence policy was not in ruins. I agree. He said that one or two pinnacles had fallen off, but that they must have been made of rubber because nobody heard any noise.
But some noise was heard by the right hon. Member for Hall Green, and there have been about twenty hon. Members who, for years past, have been noting the falling off of pinnacles and thinking sometimes that we might reconstruct, because the wrong edifice was built in

1957. It is my deep regret that the policy of 1957 is not in ruins. The Government, come what may, in defiance of any fact, are sticking to the policy of 1957, are clinging to it in defiance of the interests of this country and in defiance of reality. That is really what is wrong with the country today.
Let us recall two aspects of the policy of 1957. The first and central aspect was to get rid of conscription before we knew for sure whether we would get the men on voluntary recruitment. The Government were warned about the unwisdom of this by many people. Hon. Members on both sides of the House asked whether it was really wise to take a tremendous gamble on abolishing conscription before being sure of getting the men. What was the reply? We all know now that the Government "cooked the books" and that they have been "cooking the books" ever since. They cheated with the figures, and when they could not cheat with the figures—as I shall show later in my speech—they cheated on selective service, by saying that they had not got it and by introducing it back to front.
The second thing that they did to cover this was to say that it was all right because we should need fewer men and that the fewness of the numbers would be met by having nuclear weapons. That was to be the substitute for conventional fire power. Even today, in N.A.T.O., we are the most nuclear-minded country of all for the very simple reason that we have the worst conventional forces and we are more dependent on these weapons. This country, which is more liable to nuclear attack than any other country in the world, and which should be more concerned to move the balance away from the nuclear side to the conventional side, is tied by its manpower policy to nuclear weapons. And this has even prevented us from assisting the Americans in their efforts to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons. To me, that seems disastrous.
I wish to ask how, even now, the Government can go on telling us that we should continue this policy. How can they go on saying that now they know in advance that in May, 1966, they will have sufficient men obtained by voluntary recruitment? They are not such good prophets. How can they


tell in advance that by May, 1966, they will not need a single National Service man? Had the Government been good prophets in the last ten years; had they shown themselves powerful prophets about future manpower figures, I should have more confidence in them. But their prophecies have been wrong throughout. How can they tell us today that they know for certain, and that, for that reason, they can introduce this makeshift Measure specifically designed to ensure that we have a wholly voluntary Army from May, 1966 onwards? Those are the questions to which I should like answers.
I wish now to come to the short-term aspects of this Measure and to ask whether if we assume—as I do for the moment—that we shall get a voluntary Army from 1966 onwards, this be the best method of filling in the gap? The Minister made some significant remarks. He said that he did not believe in equalisation of misery. He used that phrase. I wish to remind the right hon. Gentleman that if he went to America he would find that the central argument for a selective draft is to avoid equalisation of misery, and that the arguments he used about not getting more men than we require and selecting what we need is, of course, the American argument for a selective draft. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper is absolutely right. This Bill is a Bill far a selective draft, for selecting certain people and for saying, "It may be unjust, but for the good of the country we need you, and we will take you."
The Bill has the disadvantage that it takes only the people who have done their service already. Any reasonable selective draft takes people who have not yet done their service and gives them a turn. This is a unique British Establishment selective draft. Because they commit themselves not to have a selective draft on any account, they have to have recourse to the dirtiest kind of under-the-counter selective draft in order to go on pretending that it is not a selective draft when, of course, it is. I will—

Mr. Profumo: The argument of the hon. Gentleman is slightly off-beam. The selective draft with which he is comparing this is a selective draft of new untrained people who would not be

ready trained to do the job now such as we shall want in the ensuing months.

Mr. Crossman: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. This will strengthen the point I want to make about reserves.
In fact, this method of running down our trained reserves—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If hon. Gentlemen will tell me what other people we shall have to call up who have had any training at all after May, 1966, I shall be glad to know. By May, 1966, there will not be any person who has been trained and served as a National Service man available any more. Therefore, we shall have to rely after May, 1966, on the famous "Ever-readies," untrained in any normal sense of the word and getting £3 a week to be stuffed in as untrained stop-gaps.
While the rundown goes on we are to select from those who have served, or who are serving, on the ground that after that we shall not require it. Is this the most sensible thing to do in these three years? Would it not be wiser to have what my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper described as an honest-to-goodness system of open selective service? I assure the Minister that he would not find it any more administratively difficult to have an honest, above-the-counter selective draft than to have a dishonest, below-the-counter selective draft.
If the right hon. Gentleman thinks that the discontent will be soothed by a hardship committee while he makes all the decisions himself, he had better think again. He will spend the next three years arbitrarily selecting those people to serve again when they have already done one period of service. Let us have an honest-to-goodness selection of men as a trained reserve. That would be a far better short-term method of doing it. I entirely support my own Front Bench on this important issue. The short-term proposal made by the Government is the worst possible makeshift.
There is another point we have to remember. The Government may be wrong in their figures. If they were to introduce an honest-to-goodness selective draft in the next three years then, if they happened to get their arithmetic wrong, a system would be available by which we could meet our requirements thereafter. The Minister's system is one


which, by definition, would leave us in a terrible crisis if his figures turned out to be wrong. My proposal would leave us with the possibility, of carrying on if we did not get what we needed for the Regular Army.
I agree with my right hon. Friend that we should all like to see this country served by Regulars. And, of course, we should do everything possible to try to build up the strength of the Regular Army. But I ask whether we are wise now, after the experience since 1956, to go on acting on the assumption that we can get a volunteer Army without any doubt in the future. Are the Government right in believing that we can look after our long-term obligations in this way?
On that, I make two observations and I hope that my hon. Friends will allow me to make the first of them without interruption. I have always had a belief that we were a very remarkable people, almost as peculiar as the Jews and as unique in our way. But can we claim that we are such a peculiar people that we can be the only member of the Western Alliance who can fulfil our obligations without National Service? What is this peculiar quality which enables the British people alone to raise forces in this manner while the Germans, the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese do not?

Mr. John Hall: Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

Mr. Crossman: Yes, all those have a naval tradition and none of them is a part of the Continent of Europe.
Unfortunately, for good or ill, under the leadership of my right hon. Friends we entered the Continent of Europe strategically. When we signed an obligation in Paris to keep four divisions in Europe we signed the obligations of a European Continental Power. I was against that and I warned the House that I did not think the British people would take such obligations at all easily, but I was pushed aside. The House of Commons decided to take the obligation to maintain a large continental standing Army. On this matter, we are more insular than the Americans. They have said, "If we are to take part in an alliance we must take on National Service obligations with the rest." They

have a form of selective draft which enables them with considerable flexibility to keep a large standing Army and then to add to it a certain number of other people if required. I have with me an excellent manual, the Report of the Director of Selective Service in America for 1960. I wonder how many hon. Members who are opposed to this idea have bothered to study how it works and whether it is possible in our case.
I am not saying that it would be a permanent solution, but it would be a lesser evil in the next three years to have an experiment of this kind than to have a Bill which does this gross injustice of making men already in the Army stay on—or, even worse, calling back men who have left the Army. Is it right to say to a man that because he is a good soldier he will be called back and the "scrounger" will be left out?
Would it not be wiser if, as a member of N.A.T.O., we were at least to consider the possibility of the selective draft system as a lesser evil and an interim solution? If the calculations were right and if my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper proved to be right in saying that we could raise the men whom we shall need, we would not need to continue the system. But if the calculations were wrong, we could carry on without "welshing" on our commitments.
Another thing I want to say concerns Germany. My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington said that he was surprised, after he and Mr. Bevin had agreed with the Americans on the question of German rearmament, that the Germans got a big army. I do not know why he should be surprised. The Germans do not do things by halves. I was surprised to find how slow they were in getting things going at the beginning. When my right hon. Friend was a member of the Government we were the best equipped element in N.A.T.O with two crack armoured divisions which were first rate. We mattered then, but now what is N.A.T.O. today? N.A.T.O. today is a German Army with some additions.
The biggest single contribution by far is now made by the Germans with eight divisions. When they have increased to


12 divisions by putting up their National Service to eighteen months, N.A.T.O. will still be a German Army with small additions to it.
There is bound to be a difference between the balance of political power in a Europe in which there was a British-American-French Army with no German soldiers and a Europe in which, twelve years later, there will be 12 German divisions, three undermanned British divisions, two French, and five under manned American divisions. We are handing over control of Western Europe by this fact to the Germans. That is a fact we ought to face.
Maybe it is a thing worth doing. I remember Lord Morrison of Lambeth once saying that we ought not to allow the Germans to stand about with their hands in their pockets, but to let them get on with rearmament. Their hands are no longer in their pockets, for they have eight divisions and soon will have 12.

Mr. John Hall: If the hon. Member is looking at the figures issued by the Institute of Strategic Studies, I think that he will agree that it is unreasonable to say that the German forces will outnumber the others in N.A.T.O. If he looks at the figures more closely he will find that that is not so.

Mr. Crossman: I said that they make the largest single contribution of any nation in N.A.T.O., and they will make much the largest contribution when they have 12 divisions, we have three, the French two, the Americans five and the Belgians, Danes and Norwegians have their units too. We can add them all together and also the Greeks and the Turks, who are a long way off, but it is not facing reality if the House does not see that a shift in the balance of power is occurring as Germany is given more and more of the conventional power in N.A.T.O.
That brings me to my last point, which is about nuclear weapons. The excuse for all this has been that we could substitute nuclear weapons for British conscripts. None of us likes the call-up. We have all said, "How nice it would be not to have the bother of the call-up or selective service, but to have streamlined, highly paid forces armed with nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical

substituted for conventional fire power." As a result, B.A.O.R. is unable to offer any serious conventional resistance in case of war, because of its shortage of conventional equipment, because of its shortage of manpower and because it has been trained to rely from the first day on nuclear weapons.
Therefore, when the Leader of the House talked about Berlin and our contribution to the Berlin crisis he was talking nonsense. The contribution that we should make to the Berlin crisis is a rapid call-up of our conventional forces, which is what the Americans are doing. That is needed to prolong the pause, if an incident arises before nuclear war. The whole future of civilisation depends upon the length of that pause. If we have to fight a nuclear war from the first day, we have not hope of survival. If we have an interval of a fortnight or three weeks, then there is a chance of survival, because negotiations could be started. If we rely exclusively on nuclear weapons, there's none at all.
I ask myself what is the contribution which this House should make and what should be the contribution of this country to that pause. My argument is that we should waste nothing on nuclear weapons, nothing at all. We should not try to have our own deterrent, but we should do all de can in terms of conventional forces alone. We should try to make them as efficient and well-trained as possible. If I am told that the choice for Britain today is a choice between a nuclear policy and a selective draft, I will be blunt with the House, and will say that I would rather have the lesser evil of a selective draft than risk helping to tip the world into disaster by reliance on nuclear weapons.
Is that the choice? I must say that I have been listening very carefully and that my own feeling is that it probably is, and we must face it. Certainly, the Government have to answer these questions, which have been put to them from both sides of the House, before we pass this miserable Bill. I believe that if the country were presented with the facts, the country would do the right thing. The appalling consequences of the nuclear dependence of this country is something about which the country has not been told. I will go into the Lobby tonight against this Bill with passion.
I warn the Government that the people will never have any respect for them unless they stop these makeshift measures and decide upon a long-term policy which will give the country Armed Forces which will contribute to peace and which do not increase the risk of war.

6.54 p.m.

Mr. Nigel Birch: I think that the House is rather intrigued by the fact that the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) spoke from the crowded Liberal Bench. Whether this means that the Chairman of the Party has adopted revisionism in its most extreme form I do not know. But one thing upon which I can congratulate him whole-heartedly is his absolute predictability.
When he last spoke on this subject, he was against all selective service. The time before, he was in favour of it. When I last spoke, I said that it was a consolation to me, because I was certain that the next time he would be in favour of it again, and my only regret today is that the next time he speaks he will be against it. I am pleased about his attitude today, because I agree with him.
It seems to me that the Amendment which has been put down by the Opposition and the speech made by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) are both entirely ridiculous, because the central point of the Amendment and of the right hon. Gentleman's speech is that the Government's defence policy has collapsed. The whole trouble is that it has not collapsed. It is exactly as it was before. The core and centre of that defence policy was that we could afford to abolish conscription and to have a small number of men, provided that these smaller numbers were equipped with what the right hon. Member for Belper so elegantly describes as tactical nuclears. That is still the policy, as it always has been the policy of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper. In fact the 1957 White Paper might be described as the Brown-Sandys plan, because, that is what it was. As far as I know, the right hon. Member for Belper is still in favour of it. I do not think that his defence policy has collapsed. It is exactly the same as that of the Government.
Nobody has any right to criticise this Bill who is not in favour of a rational system of selective service. What could my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State do other than what he has done provided that he was not allowed to bring in selective service? He had to botch up something. The only thing he could do was to take power to retain National Service men and to recall them. It is possible that if he has all the luck in the world—I hope he will—he may just scrape through on this policy until early in 1966, but, after that, it seems to me that difficulties will arise.
That brings me to the new Territorial Army Reserve, to which my right hon. friend has chosen to give the name of a popular brand of safety razor. The first point is on readiness. The lower the level of your Forces, the more ready they need to be, or the more ready we need to pretend they are. How feasible is it to fly a young man straight from the gas works, having done a fortnight's camp and a few drills, to man corps or divisional signals? How feasible is it to fly him straight out to action in the tropics? I think that the answer to both questions is that it is not feasible to do so.
The second point, and the more important and more subtle point, is on recruiting. None of us can tell how the new venture will go, but my own guess is that until early 1965 recruiting may well be good. The men who join can reckon that between them and being called up is the substantial cushion of National Service men, who must come first. They know, of course, that in a big emergency they would be called up and in that case they would be content and proud to serve, but they also know that under a voluntary system the forces are always bound to be unbalanced, because for men to join in the exact proportion in which they are required would be a miracle; and there is no reason to suppose that the laws of nature will be suspended in favour of the War Office. They know that there will always be these great deficiencies.
After the National Service cushion has gone there will be no way of making up these deficiencies without calling up the "Ever-readies", and I do not think that they will be very keen to give up six months of their civilian lives and their


family lives just to fill in a gap. It would be well and good if it were a great emergency, but just to fill in a gaping gap in some service or some unit is something which they will not be keen to do; and as they are only on a one-year contract, it will be very easy for them to give up their £3 a week just at a critical moment. What I would say about this reserve is that it is quite a good reserve provided that it is made clear that we shall never use it for the purpose for which we are most likely to want it.
That brings me to the crux of the argument—the immense importance of the conventional forces. I have addressed the House on this subject on many occasions. I thought that from the moment the Russians detonated their first atomic weapon the final result would be to increase and not to decrease the importance of conventional forces. The reason is that once a balance of terror has been built up—indeed, a complete balance is not necessary—or indeed once both sides have nuclear weapons, then they will not be used. We have seen again and again that the Russians are never willing to risk a nuclear war, and as long as the West has a viable deterrent, they will not risk it.
But other things go on, are going on and will go on, such as indirect war, guerrilla war, subversion, Communist gun-running and all the cloak-and-dagger work in corners which makes up the cold war. A process which was once, oddly enough, described by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations as total peace. Whether we call it cold war or total peace, the answer is that it is the conventional arms which matter. If we have no conventional arms we can use only atomic arms, and that means that we cannot use anything and that we lose.
Kuwait was a good example of this. We were bound by honour and interest to go to the aid of the Ruler of Kuwait and fortunately, we had enough conventional arms to do it. Suppose we had not had enough conventional arms, what could we have done? We could easily enough have dropped a hydrogen bomb on Bagdad, but even the right

hon. Member for Belper would not have suggested anything as obscenely wicked as that. The answer is that we should have had to capitulate.
This idea is getting through. I thank heaven for the fact that the Americans understand it. President Kennedy and his military and civilian advisers understand that in this world conventional arms are of immense importance. I do not despair of our coming to understand it here. We need all three Services in conventional war. But it is unquestionably the fact, and it has been ever since the war, that the main strain falls on the Army. At the moment our army is overstrained, under strength and unbalanced. It looks to me as though over the years to come we shall be short of 30,000–40,000 men—and therefore the forces will go on being overstrained, under strength and unbalanced. This, with all the consequences that flow from it for recruiting and everything else, is the case for selective service.
May I deal with one or two of the points which are sometimes made against this case? It is argued—and I understand that this is the main leg of the Government's case—that the position at the moment is unusually difficult. I agree that the situation at the moment is unusual. But I think that it is unusually easy. Of course, we always have Berlin with us, although as far as I remember we are not even under an ultimatum at the moment. For the first time, almost, since the war there is not a single hot spot anywhere round the globe with which we are having to deal.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War, indicated that he thinks that tension may arise at any time. I think that he slightly misunderstands the point. Surely the real point is that the likelihood of tension is in inverse proportion to the strength of one's forces. The weaker one's conventional arms, the greater the tension is likely to be. That frankly, is the situation today.
The second point, which is not often argued in public—it is thought not to be right to argue it in public—applies to all three parties: it is thought that selective service is politically impossible. If that is the argument, I do not believe it to be true, and I will instance something in recent history to support my


point. On 31st March, 1947, the American Selective Service Act expired. On 17th March in the following year President Truman proposed to Congress that the Act should be re-enacted, on the ground that the voluntary system was not producing sufficient forces for the safety of the State. On 24th June selective service was re-enacted. In the following November, against the odds and against the polls, Truman was re-elected President of the United States.
I was in America in March and I took a great deal of trouble to find out how their selective system was working. I found that it was accepted as rational and fair and that there was no real opposition to it. That is witnessed by the fact that during the American Presidential Election selective service was in no way an issue; it was not mentioned during the whole of that campaign. If the Americans can devise a system of selective service which their country holds to be fair and is willing to work and which causes no political difficulty, I cannot for the life of me see why we in this country cannot do the same thing.
Next, it is argued that selective service is wasteful, inefficient and against the genius of the British people. Clearly, if we could recruit exactly the number of men we require and if they join precisely the arms and services for which we need them, that would be far better, far more efficient and far less wasteful than conscription. But we know that will not happen. There has been no army of any account for many years which was not based on compulsion in some form. Was the German Army before the war inefficient? Is the American Army inefficient? Is the Russian Army inefficient? Have the other armies which have either total or partial National Service all resulted in waste, folly and stupidity? Of course not.
What about the genius of the British people? Cromwell's new Model Army was based on impressment. Nelson's sailors were raised by a very special and rather unpleasant form of selective service—the press gang—and, as far as I have been able to discover, they did quite reasonably well at Trafalgar. We had conscription in both world wars, and we still have it.
In any case, was the old system quite as idyllic as all that? In the spring of

1939, when it was quite obvious that there was going to be a war that autumn, I did an attachment with the Durham Light Infantry, in 1st Division in the Aldershot Command. That was the first Division to move. At that time there was a form of conscription. There was the Military Training Act which had been passed against the bitter opposition of right hon. and hon. Members opposite at a time when Hitler's soldiers were marching through the streets of Prague. Whether that meant that hon. Members opposite were congenitally good at defence I do not know. None of the conscripts had then reached their units. Out of the whole battalion when we were doing platoon training, only one under-strength platoon could be raised. It was manoeuvred every day by about three majors and fifteen other officers, and I felt very sorry for them. It does not seem to be much of a life to live in a unit which is hopelessly under strength.
There is the old argument about abandoning one's commitments. So far as I can make out, the Minister of Defence would like to cut down in Germany and to hold on elsewhere, while the Opposition would like to increase our forces in Germany and to abandon our commitments elsewhere. I do not think that either is really feasible. It seems to me that the integrity of the Western Alliance is absolutely vital to us. People say, "Surely we are being overstrained because we are not only part of that Western Alliance but we are maintaining commitments overseas which are not only in our interests but in the interests of the Alliance as a whole".
One ought to look at the figures. An hon. Friend of mine mentioned a study which had been made on military balance for 1961–62 by the Institute of Strategic Studies. There is a table of figures giving the contributions by the powers in N.A.T.O. The men in all three Services are shown as a percentage of the total male labour force. We were eleventh out of fourteen. But that was based on a total figure for our forces of 454,330. If we cut down to 400,000, which I gather is the intention, we should be a hot tip for the bottom place. If we compare ourselves with others I do not think one can say that we are doing as well as all that.
Now about commitments elsewhere. Take Hong Kong, which the right hon.


Member for Belper picked on. What would happen if we withdrew all our forces from Hong Kong? I do not think the Chinese would advance and take it by storm, but that the morale of the inhabitants would be broken; and then I believe armed men would infiltrate and that it would go into Communist hands. Those who stood by us then would be murdered. I cannot contemplate this with equanimity. Can we afford to run out of all our obligations in S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O. with giggling levity? Are we never to be able to intervene in the Persian Gulf? Can we never help a friendly Government or an oppressed minority in Africa? Can we do nothing for the High Commission Territories?
It is true that there may be some places where we can cut down a bit, but this does not amount to much and it can only be done slowly. We are forced to echo the prayer of Charles of Anjou after the Sicilian Vespers: "Lord God, since it has pleased you to ruin my fortune, let me go down only by small steps." Many people would like us to go down by big steps; but we are bound to echo that prayer.
Then people say, "It would cost money if we had selective service. Do you believe in economy? Do you want the Estimates to go up?" I answer that very simply. I do not want the Estimates to go up. It would cost money to have selective service, but I would take the money out of the strategic deterrent.
We have constantly had thrust down our throats the opinions of named serving officers as being in favour of the continuation of the voluntary system. I do not think it is right or tolerable. Under our system Ministers take the praise and the blame, and they argue the case themselves. When the argue the case they get what advice they can from serving officers and from their civil servants, but they do not involve them in the arguments, for the simple reason that they cannot speak for themselves. What would be thought of the Prime Minister if he were to say, "You may not agree with what I am doing, but Sir Norman Brook was in favour of it"? Or suppose the Chancellor of the Exchequer was being challenged and said, "Sir Frank Lee, with all his experience, thinks this is the

right thing to do." They would be laughed out of court.
The case of serving officers is on all fours. Sometimes, by the supine inattention of this House, there is gradually brought about some constitutional change which is undesirable, and I do not think we ought to allow this one to go by. If, inside or outside this House, any right hon. or hon. Member uses the name of a serving officer to bolster up his argument, I intend to put down on the Order Paper a substantive Motion calling his conduct in question.
I believe that selective service must come, and I shall continue to advocate it. I am not in the least disturbed if somebody says that it is not patriotic to advocate it. The abolition of conscription was a political job in which all parties competed to scratch up a few votes. If one is caught out in a job, it is no good saying that somebody else is unpatriotic. My withers are unwrung. Selective service must and will come. I only pray that it will come before a humiliation and not afterwards.

7.17 p.m.

Mr. Ness Edwards: The right hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) has certainly not come down in favour of the Bill. He advocated selective service. The Bill refers only to the selective service of those who have already served and does not refer to those who have not served. In that sense it does not conform to his ideas.
The right hon. Gentleman's ambition to maintain the British flag in all parts of the world, I suppose, is an indication that the ideas of Empire have not died in the minds of many right hon. and hon. Members opposite. The fact is that the debates which we have had on manpower and defence indicate that this country has been trying to maintain a position for which it has not the resources. Every manpower debate that we have had since the last war has brought out the fact that the commitments of this country, and the demands that are made upon its manpower, have always been too great for the manpower that is available.
I join my right hon. and hon. Friends in opposing the Bill. The grounds of my opposition are rather wider than the grounds they have chosen. I oppose it


because the suggested addition to the Forces is made necessary by the misguided foreign policy of the Government. I oppose it because of our bloated defence commitments, which make our economy more liable to crisis.
Over ten years ago, two of my right hon. Friends called attention in a dramatic way to the fact that this country's defence expenditure was bound to bring us nearer and nearer to bankruptcy. Every two or three years since then, we have had economic crisis after economic crisis as a consequence of our attempting to maintain a burden which the economy could not bear. My interest in this debate on the military side is directed not to the nature of the instrument, but to the purposes which the instrument is intended to serve.
Cuts in our welfare provisions, a high Bank Rate, borrowings from foreign bankers, the pay pause, postponement of building programmes, cuts in housing subsidies—these are all consequences of our trying to maintain a military suit too big for the economic body. So long as we indulge in this bloated defence expenditure so long shall we have recurring crises when pay pauses, cuts and slashes in the Welfare State and the rest become the order of the day. Some of these things are due—I say this to the right hon. Member for Flint, West—to the policy of maintaining all over the world the tawdry trimmings of a dead Empire. The House must try to put an end to the policy of keeping up appearances which more and more cease to conform with reality. We are not the "big boys" of this world, and it is no use pretending that we are.
The Bill is one of the consequences not of a decision made in 1957, but of our foreign policy. The mess that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer made of foreign affairs he is now making in economic matters, and this is one of the expressions of it. Last week, we discussed his futile efforts to save the economy. This week, we are discussing adding burdens to the economy and taking away the very manpower which could be the means of saving the economy. I was astonished to hear the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones), who has tremendous industrial experience, say that the men most wanted in the Army

were electronics engineers. Are not those just the men who can make the greatest contribution towards solving our economic problems? I was astounded by the right hon. Gentleman's argument.
At whose behest are we committing this folly? We have heard much talk recently about national sovereignty, but in the context of the Bill we are acting on the demand of an Under-Secretary of the United States Government, we allow General de Gaulle to veto our efforts to do away with the need for these forces, and all for the purpose of saving the Germans from the consequences of the defeat which followed their aggression. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Yes, that is the position. The purpose of the Bill is to build up B.A.O.R. What is the function of B.A.O.R. today? It is to save Germany from the consequences of her own aggression. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite may differ with me about that. On some occasion we may have the opportunity to discuss the matter fully.
I remember being in Stalingrad with Marshal Voroshilov, who is now out of favour. As he described what the Germans had done and told of the blood which had flowed in that battle, he slammed the table with his fist, saying, "The Germans will never be allowed to do that again". It is the fear of a united Germany which is the cause of the need for these forces in Europe. Until we face that, we shall go on trying to get more and more men, to build up the deterrent, until, eventually, we bankrupt our economy. That is my view of the background to the Bill.
We oppose the Bill because it contains a complete contradiction of every principle laid down in the National Service Act, 1948. In that Act we were concerned about equality, fair play and the rights of the citizen. We made the needs of the State subsidiary in peace time to those of the citizen. This Bill totally disregards every one of those principles. It lays down no rule. It is completely unfair to the youth of the country. Those who have done nothing are not to be asked to do anything, and those who have done much are to be compelled to do more. Surely that is unfair.
Who decides who is to be retained? What rule governs selection? Are any


restrictions to be placed on commanding officers to prevent men being held back because they are good cooks or good batmen? Under the main Act, the citizen had rights in regard to his call-up. Is he to have any rights at all in regard to his retention? Are single men to be retained and married men to be set free? Are men with dependents to be set free and those without retained? What is the rule? What will govern the detention of men under Clause 1?
What is to happen to those who have elected to complete their service first and who have places reserved for them in colleges to which they intend to go? Are they to be detained for another six months so that they waste twelve months of their life? What is to decide between the cupidity of a commanding officer and the rights of a citizen?
The Secretary of State told us that the application against detention would be made to the commanding officer and that, if the commanding officer thought fit, he would send it on to the War Office. The War Office would then send it on to a tribunal. What rules will govern the tribunal? What will be the constitution of the tribunal? Will its decisions be governing and final? What will be the position of the soldier whose application the commanding officer will not send on?
If a commanding officer refuses to send on an application for release, will the citizen then be entitled to write to his Member of Parliament and demand that his case be considered by the advisory tribunal, and will the commanding officer be made to look a fool if the advisory tribunal recommends that the man be released? Is that to be the sort of administrative result which we shall have? The Bill does not provide any protection at all for the citizen and all those things which were clearly put in the main Act are absent here.
Clause 2 is as bad and unfair an instrument, in my view, as the purpose it serves. Will a man who has done his full-time service and gone to college be liable? He may be the square peg for the round hole. Is he to be lifted out of college and transferred to the Army? We are told that that type of person will have the right of appeal, not to the tribunal set up under the main Act, but

to the advisory committee. It will be for the War Office and the War Office advisers to decide.
What about apprentices? Is their apprenticeship to be regarded as of lower value than their place in the Army? What about those who have entered into large financial commitments? Under the Tory Government, people can buy their own houses. A man who comes out of the Army perhaps buys his house on mortgage. Is he to be protected? Is that a question of hardship? Who is to decide it?
What is to happen to the men who have done their service and gone into excepted employment in the mines? We are not told anything about this. What of those who have married during or since their full-time service? Are they to be called up? We have had assurances from the Minister, but his assurances do not necessarily govern his successor. If it is seriously intended to protect the Service man and those liable for service, why are there not provisions in the Bill? Or is this an afterthought to placate the criticism that was bound to arise? Neither in the case of those to be retained nor in the case of those to be called up is any safeguard whatever provided in the Bill.
In these days, when we are not at war, the Government at least should have been concerned about ensuring that this instrument, poor as it is, would not cause the maximum of misery, as, undoubtedly, it will, for those who are called up. On Second Reading of the Bill which became the main Act, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) reminded the House of a quotation from Burke:
They never had any kind of system, right or wrong, but only invented occasionally some miserable tale for the day, in order meanly to sneak out of difficulties into which they had proudly strutted.
That would be a fitting epitaph for those who sit on the Government Front Bench.

7.33 p.m.

Sir Richard Glyn: I will not attempt to follow the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) into the finer detail of his arguments. I should, however, like to comment on his suggestion that in introducing the Bill my right hon. Friend the Minister is "selecting a military suit


too big for the country's economic body." I have not noticed any hon. Member, on either side, suggest how the same purpose could be served in a more economic way. I do not believe that the economic cost of this Bill will be in any way alarming or extreme.
The right hon. Member referred to hardship, which, of course, is an important matter and, no doubt, will be thrashed out more fully in Committee. In introducing the Bill, however, my right hon. Friend pointed out that there were special provisions and a right of access to a new committee to be formed to deal with hardship cases. He indicated that hardship cases would be allowed a good deal of latitude and I hope very much that he is right.
I suppose that it could be said of the Bill, as Julius Caesar said of Gaul that it is divided into three parts but that the three parts differ greatly and some are more attractive than others. I regret the circumstances which have made it necessary to introduce Clauses 1 and 2, which have been criticised. The circumstances having arisen, however, I have not heard any clear alternative suggestions from either side of the House except that of selective service, to which I will refer presently.
I consider it absolutely right to try for an all-volunteer Regular Army. I welcome that intention and wish it success. I was very glad to hear that the recruiting figures of volunteers for the Regular Army have come on so well. A great number of the new Regular volunteers have volunteered for six or nine years service. Very few are accepted now for less than six years, whereas formerly, in the ordinary way, they volunteered mostly for three years. Thus, the present volunteers are worth more in terms of length of service than those of a few years ago. If anything like the present recruiting rate is continued, I think that in four or five years' time the Army may be in a much more healthy state than it can be said to be now. I hope that this will be the case. Nevertheless, we have to face the fact that there is a gap. The object of the Bill is, first, to fill that gap for the present and then to deal with any remnants of the gap that may remain in future. Having said that, I should like to say a few words about selective service, which is the alternative which has

been put forward from both sides of the House.
I was very impressed, as I think we all were, by the attractive speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch), who speaks with great knowledge in these matters. The first thing to be made clear is that the damaging shortages in the Army are not merely shortages of what might be described as general duty men, but of specialists and technicians. I do not believe that any form of selective service at present in use by any country, or any other form of selective service, would serve to fill this shortage of specialists and technicians. By selective service, we mean a method of picking out individual men by their position, their status and their availability for service and taking into account hardship and all other considerations. We do not in any way mean selecting them for the purposes for which the Army needs them. Some people who speak of selective service sometimes tend to overlook this fact.
If we need technicians and specialists, they should come from the volunteer, long-term Regular recruits. If a man enlists for six, nine or more years, it is well worth while to train him in these complicated technical duties, which have to be thoroughly understood and have to be carried out with the utmost efficiency and speed in modern war. To train a National Service man who will be with the Service for only 18 months is relatively a waste of time, even if he has superficial knowledge of some of the skills before he arrives. It would take a long time to train him, and by the time he was trained he would have only a few months left to serve. Therefore, these technicians and specialists, of whom the shortage is most acute, must come from volunteers, preferably from those with long-term engagements. Therefore, I do not believe that selective service of National Service men will appreciably help to fill the gap.
It has been pointed out that every National Service man who is called up needs a Regular to train and administer him. This dislocates the Regular Army considerably. Even if two National Set vice men can be trained by one Regular, this is a tremendous drain on resources If 10,000 more men are needed, 20,000 must be called up and 10,000 trained men allocated to look after them. This is a


wasteful method which is not suitable to the present atmosphere or to the present state of tension in international affairs.
If international affairs were calm and quiet, possibly the Government might have considered that course. At present, it would be quite wrong to inject, I could not say exactly how many, but, let us suppose, 30,000 new National Service men into the Army and to detail 15,000 to train and administer them. This would be bound to have the effect of weakening the Army for the time being. I do not think that this is a time when that course would be appropriate or proper.
Now I come to one other point which has not, I think, been mentioned, which is the new balance being created between the reserves and Regulars under this Bill. This Bill increases the authorised number of Army reserves from 15,000 to 60,000. That is a very big change. It means that if all the Army were mobilised, reserves as well as Regulars, we should have a force of 240,000 men, about 180,000 Regulars, if they can be got, and 60,000 reserves. To match this with the old reserve level of 15,000 men—it is pure mathematics—we should have to have 225,000 Regular soldiers. Therefore, this is not only to change the position but to change the balance within the total number of soldiers available, because, of course, in the case of the Regular force of 225,000 with 15,000 reserves the reserves would be less than 7 per cent. of the total, whereas under the position envisaged by the Bill the reserves would be no less than 25 per cent. of the total. This does, I think, throw sharply into relief the greatly added importance that this Bill places on the reserve Army, particularly the Territorial Army, which will be responsible for training the new so-called "Ever-readies"—a name which I personally feel perhaps could be improved upon.
It has been said—it has been said with force and it has been said from both sides—that the Territorial Army is not sufficiently well trained, that it is in no position to train other reserves. Here I have to plead an interest. I have served with the Territorial Army all my life and I am now in an honorary

capacity. Having said that, I would point out—for example, to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easing-ton (Mr. Shinwell) who, I regret is not here at the moment—that when it is said that the National Service men were all right and the Territorials all wrong, he was overlooking the fact that National Service men who went into the Territorial Army in many cases volunteered to stay there and some of them are there now. If we go to a Territorial unit and ask the men, particularly the National Service men who volunteered to stay on, confidentially whether they were very much better trained than ordinary Territorials, the answer will sometimes be "Yes" but very often will be "No".
Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who have said that we must have more A.E.R.s and not rely on the so-called "Ever-readies" who will be trained by the Territorials are entirely overlooking the fact that the Territorial Army already has the responsibility of training many of the A.E.R. and if the A.E.R. is all right, so will the "Ever-readies" be all right. I believe that much of what has been said about the weakness—stronger words have been used today—of the Territorial Army, is founded upon a misapprehension. Otherwise, people called up for National Service who went compulsorily into the Territorials would not volunteer to stay on, as many did.
I should like to point out that our Territorial Army is recognised by all our N.A.T.O. allies as being the best reserve army in N.A.T.O., and I should like to think that hon. Members of this House who are not aware of its qualities and capabilities would spend a little time improving their knowledge of it. Let us be absolutely sure that no reserve army should be as equally well trained as a regular army. Let us start from that, but having said that, there really arc many Territorial units and formations of a surprisingly high standard of training. I am thinking primarily of these.
I entirely welcome this new reserve formation under Clause 3 of the Bill. I hope it will be accepted, subject to certain considerations. I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend say that he proposed that commanding officers of Territorial units should be given some say in who becomes what he calls an


"Ever-ready" and who should not. I feel that this is an important point. The standard of attendance of Territorials does vary, and it would be inappropriate if people who perhaps were attracted merely by the money and who did not do their drills regularly were given preference over other people who drilled regularly and who were really of a higher standard. I think that a C.O. should be given full power in indicating who is the more suitable if there are several volunteers and a selection has to be made.
I also hope that the number of—we will call them "Ever-readies"—who are in any Territorial unit will be carried as surplus to the establishment of that unit. Some of the Territorial units since amalgamation are coming very close to the ceiling of the number of men they are allowed on their establishment. It would be a great attraction if the "Ever-readies" were allowed to be held as surplus to the establishment so that a unit could recruit up to its establishment without regarding the "Ever-readies", who would still train as part of the unit. That, I am sure, would be appreciated.
Further, the Territorial units will, I apprehend, have the responsibility of kitting up and distributing personal weapons to the "Ever-readies" when they are called up. This may have to be done at very short notice. This will be a new burden on the Territorial Army which at present acts on the supposition that there will be a Proclamation before any of its men are embodied and which is, therefore, not prepared in the present circumstances for immediately kitting up or issuing equipment to anybody. This will be a further responsibility, and a further burden which, if any unit has a substantial number of "Ever-readies", will become weighty, and units may need some additional resources, and there may be extra training stores required, too.
There are many more hon. Members who wish to speak, but I am glad to have had this opportunity, because I believe that I am one of the relatively few hon. Members of this House who have had a long association with the Territorial Army, and in view of some of the things said by hon. and right hon. Members, who, in my view, are not fully informed on this matter, I wanted to put the record right, particularly in regard to the

Territorials' ability to train reservists and to discharge their new responsibilities.
I believe that, in the present circumstances, the Government are doing the right thing in bringing in this Bill and are showing courage in putting forward a Measure which they know will not be popular, but which, I believe, is the only effective way of filling this gap which we all agree exists. I hope that these measures will be effective, and, for these reasons, and in the absence of any workable alternative, I strongly support the Bill.

7.48 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: I disagree with the hon. Gentleman the hon. Member for Dorset, North (Sir Richard Glyn) when he says that no reserve army is ever as good as a Regular army, for when we think of the British Army at Mons and the Marne with 60 per cent. reserves—

Sir R. Glyn: I did use the word "should" and not "could" and there is a very slight difference.

Mr. Wigg: I quite agree, but I must make the point that the Regular long-service man was trained to do his job and he did it. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not mind if I tell him so very kindly.
I wanted also to point out to him that I think he made a mistake in doing his sums about the reservists. Under Clause 3 there is a limit overall of 60,000 men. Therefore, it is not strictly comparable with the 15,000 which the hon. Member mentioned.
The hon. Member spoke with enthusiasm and knowledge about the Territorial Army. This brings me to a point which the Minister ought to answer tonight. A Territorial is a Territorial and a Regular is a Regular and the call-up process in each case is quite different. The one is embodied, the other is mobilised. What will be the position of the man who is a Territorial serving in a Regular unit after mobilisation? This is a legal point which I shall not press, but the House should be told what steps the Government intend to take to resolve it.
There is another point of substance which the hon. Member raised which caused him to repeat something which has been said over and over again and


yet is profoundly untrue. It has come to be accepted, because it has not been challenged, that a National Service Army is necessarily wasteful because of the size of its training machine. I can tell by the hon. Member's grey hairs that he is not much younger than me and he knows something of the organisation of the Regular Army. He will know that the Cavalry Depot used to be at Canterbury and that in 1926 Canterbury was closed and from then on all cavalry recruits were sent direct to their regiments for training. The regiment at home was linked to a regiment overseas and drafts passed to and fro between them.
The wasteful system of training in the Army to which the hon. Member referred, and which absorbed so many men, did not arise because of National Service but because of the introduction of the short-service engagement. The whole Army was engaged like a sausage machine in turning out trained men. The Brigade of Guards has always dealt with soldiers recruited on a short-service engagement and has done so economically. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the shorter the engagement the more wasteful the training machinery. It does not follow, however, that if we have a system of National Service, whether selective or by ballot, we necessarily must have a wasteful training system unless the War Office chooses to have it.
The hon. Member for Dorset, North also seems to have overlooked the White Paper of July, 1957, when the Government said that if they were faced with the situation of recruiting by compulsion they would rely on the ballot and not a selective service. That statement of policy is completely and conveniently forgotten. For it must be remembered that we are here introducing a form of selective service of the most wasteful short-term, and militarily inefficient type that it is possible to devise. First, those fortunate enough to go into the Navy or the Air Force are exempted completely. We are going to swing our policy over to the using of our Army reserves and we shall be using up extravagantly the very forces on which we have to rely in the case of serious trouble.
I was astounded that nobody so far has challenged the fact that essential figures about the size of the existing reserve forces, in Sections A, B, C and D and in Categories I, II and III have not been made known to the House. How anyone can even pretend to talk about the subject without having that essential information is completely beyond me. It is now eight o'clock and this is the first time that a voice has been raised to ask for that information.

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: Nearly all the speakers up to now have been Privy Councillors.

Mr. Wigg: I am not responsible for that, but I should be failing in my duty if I did not point out that this essential information is not available to the House.
This is in accordance with what has gone on during the past ten years. If Lord Head were here he would agree with me, for we have got to the point when the foreign and colonial policies of this country are discussed not in terms of our contribution to the security and peace of the world nor of our international obligations, but in terms of the number of men we can recruit. If that is not putting the cart before the horse, I do not know what is. It is a long way from the glories of this country in the early part of the century when this the greatest deliberative assembly in the world discusses the vital subject of defence without the essential information and then says that it will decide future policy when it finds out the number of men we can raise.
I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Cross-man) drew attention to the broadcast by the Leader of the House. I have also obtained a copy of the speech. I was struck with the fact that he presented this proposal in these terms:
… it is our duty to put this forward and it is theirs to accept it.
How often have we heard that sentiment?
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die:
"We, the wise men tell you, never mind how bogus the reasons, you just carry out your duty ". Implicit in what the right hon. Gentleman said what the fact that he was tying all this up with the


crisis in Berlin. He certainly could not have read the Prime Minister's speech. The Prime Minister told us on 31st October, in the debate on the Address, all we wanted to know. I repeated it in debate on the Address and I repeat it now without apology. The right hon. Gentleman's words were:
In the first place, whatever the size of the Army next year, it will not, and I admit it, be properly balanced."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st October, 1961; Vol. 648, c. 5.]
That is a confession, for surely the Prime Minister's prime concern is for the defence of the country.
What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by "properly balanced"? What does the British Army of the Rhine completely lack which causes the unbalance? It has no medium artillery. It has nothing between the 25 pounder, now being replaced by the 105 millimetre gun, and the atomic artillery Honest John and the Corporal atomic weapon. There is a great yawning gap. Every competent military observer knows that we can only fight an atomic war, and that for only a limited period. B.A.O.R. has no third line supporting units and no base depots, and so the Government are forced to put forward policies based on the hypothesis that there will be only a short war, for we are incapable of fighting any other war but a short one, and then it would have to be of a nuclear character. This is another example of putting the cart before the horse.
If we are to understand the problem which now faces us we must see that for the last ten years we have been discussing only the political miasma and not the military realities. It may now be too late to reverse that policy. I am inclined to share the pessimism of some who think that it is too late and that now the House is engaged on the funeral rites of the Army. I say that with no joy, but with infinite sorrow. The Secretary of State may be taking the last steps which will finally put paid to the Army as an effective force.
Let us look at the history. There is nothing new that has happened. Nothing has cropped up as a result of Berlin. It is not as the hon. Member for Dorset, North and his hon. Friends think. The problem has not arisen overnight.
Let hon. Members listen to this. I have read this to the House before. On

15th August, 1959, from Headquarters, Southern Command, the Commander-in-Chief sent to every commanding officer in the Command:
You will have noticed the unsatisfactory trend in Regular recruiting during the last few months. Unless this is reversed, we shall find ourselves in a very serious situation in 1962 when we are due to reach our ceiling of 180,000 men.
I also read this to the House. The Adjutant-General, in June, 1960, in his quarterly liaison letter, said:
If the rates of recruiting experienced from April, 1959, to March, 1960, continue, the original target of the 165,000 Army should be achieved during the first quarter of 1963 and the present target of 182,000 during 1965.
The present Quartermaster-General, at an officers' conference in Camberley on 12th October this year, said:
The target is not 165,000. The Army has always aimed at 180,000 to 185,000.
Now we come to the Minister of Defence who was responsible for all this. He is now the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. I have waited and preserved this, because I knew that the time would come when I should want to use it. Here is a Press notice issued from the Ministry of Aviation on 29th June, 1960, when he held that office. It said:
It is said that the Government's defence policy is in ruins because we shall not get an Army of 180,000 men. We may not get 180,000 men. But we never said we needed 180,000 men. The target set in the Defence White Paper of 1958 was 165,000. … Our target for our future Regular Army remains unchanged at 165,000.
Everybody else knew—Lord Head told the House on 28th July, 1958—that the figure of 165,000 was bogus. It was bogus then, and hon. Gentlemen should realise that it is bogus today. The figure on which the Army has been planning is 182,000.
The Bill is a very simple one. It arises, first of all, from the problem that, for political reasons, the Government announced the cutting down of the Army to 165,000. But the Army has been planning on 182,000. We are now approaching settling day. We have a Prime Minister and a Leader of the House who are, above all, politicians. They have to satisfy the Army and give it the 182,000, but they dare not come here and tell their supporters that the 165,000 is a bogus figure. The Bill is the result.
I asked the right hon. Gentleman earlier on in an intervention, and I ask him again now—this is the test: will he tell the House of Commons what the strength of the Army is planned to be on 1st December next year? What it will be, of course, is round about 182,000. That will be achieved, first of all, under Clause 1, by holding for an extra six months, the chaps who are serving or, if there are not enough of these, the Government will fetch a number back under Clause 2; and then in the long run we shall have the "Ever-readies".
The Government are, of course, gambling on a very simple fact. The Secretary of State for War this afternoon told us that recruiting was good in September, October and November. One can always be sure that recruiting is going well when the figures are readily available. If recruiting was not going well, one could put down Question after Question but not get an Answer. The fact is, however, that the Secretary of State for War has had a preview of the fact that things are going well. I have tabled Questions on this subject. I do not know whether anyone will be interested in that fact, but I can give the dates when I tabled those Questions. I did so on 6th February and 8th November. I asked the Secretary of State for War to break the figures down for me for the respective months by recruiting centres. If hon. Members will compare the answers given to those two Questions, they will see what happened.
Exactly what happened in 1958 is happening now. There is a little slack in the economy. I am not one of those people who believe that there is a direct correlation between unemployment and recruiting. The crude statement that hunger was the recruiting sergeant before the war had an element of truth in it, but it was not wholly true. There is no direct correlation. The relationship is much subtler.
I have tried to understand this situation, and this is what I think happens. If there is a slackening in employment in Coventry, a young man of vigour may leave Coventry and go to London to look for a job. He may get a job in London, but perhaps he will find that it is not as good as the one that he had in Coventry. He may then throw up the

job in London and go back to, perhaps, Birmingham. He may then go from Birmingham to Southampton, and then find that he is unable to get a job in Southampton, and it may well be that in Southampton he will enlist in the Army. As I have said, there is no direct correlation in this respect. I defy anyone to find one. However, when we have a slackening in the economy, a few months later we begin to find a rise in the recruiting figures. That has happened now as it did in 1958. But, of course, as soon as the economy picks up, then the problem is with us again.
There is another factor on which the Government are gambling. It is that the number of young men available begins to rise sharply in 1961. I understand why that is. The way that one should approach the figures, I understand, is to make an allowance of 15 per cent. for death, going abroad, mental deficiency and the like, and another 30 per cent. for medical rejections. Nevertheless, the point is that in 1963 the figures rise quite sharply and thereafter they go on rising. They are about the same in 1964, but they rise sharply in 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, and then they begin to go down again. It is, of course, anyone's guess what the actual figure is going to be.
What is also true is that—whether the right hon. Gentleman has done this deliberately or not one does not know; I am prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt and say that he has not—there has been a marked falling off in quality. I do not want to weary the House by giving figures, but there are some which I must give. In a famous corps the number of discharges by purchase in 1958 was 83; the number in 1961 up to September was 190. The rejections on medical grounds in 1958 were 125; the number for the first nine months of this year is 190. There has been a quite staggering increase in the number of discharges for misconduct. In 1958 the number was 225; in 1961 it has risen to 390.
I will now give the House another example, though I do not want to make too much of it. The House may remember what happened to the 17th Training Regiment at Oswestry, where fifty men were concerned in an affray. No fewer than fourteen of those fifty men were


found to have had civil convictions, one of them had thirteen. What steps have been taken to prevent a recurrence of such an event? It could not conceivably have happened in the Army before the war.
Now for another recent example concerning a man serving in the same regiment. The superintendent of police described a young private soldier as a "high-grade mental deficient with a mental age of eight". What happened then? One would have thought that when the Army found that out, something would happen. It was said that the soldier was "irresponsible and easily led, and that he had domestic troubles. He had been sent to the Royal Military Depot, Woolwich, and was likely next week to be sent to Germany."
The great drive for recruits for the Army has led to a diminishing, of standards. I do not believe that it is a direct result of any change in policy but I believe that it has come about through the pressure on recruiting officers to find recruits at all costs.
The argument about whether the Army's target is 165,000 is now dead. It is clear that the target ought to be 182,000. It is equally clear that, in spite of the pressure, the Rhine Army figures are not go down to 45,000, but are they to go up? My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) this afternoon asked the Secretary of State a pointed question about the figures. I think that most of us know the kind of chit-chat that is going round. It is said that General Stockwell came over last week and told the Government, "N.A.T.O. wants 65,000 men from Great Britain. If you do not face up to having 65,000 men in Germany, the Germans will be authorised to provide six extra divisions?" That, of course, is in line with what has been said—that the German Army will be expanded, and that N.A.T.O. will solve its problems, if we do not make an effective contribution, by authorising six extra German divisions.
It is, however, not the conventional part of the German Army which worries me but that the Germans have already got Mace. I thought that one of the first acts of President Kennedy was to cancel the order placed under the Eisenhower Administration for supplying

Mace to the Germans, but I understand that the Germans have already got most of the 100 they ordered. What is equally true is that an order has been placed with the Americans for the Germans to be supplied with Pershings. If, therefore, we have an expanding German Army equipped with ultra modern atomic weapons, then the ingredients are being provided for the third world war.
I have no love for conscription, for I am far too fond of the Regular Army to want it to be anything but regular. My protest in 1957 was that both sides of the House rushed into a conception of all-Regular forces without being prepared to pay the price. That price was not in terms of money, however. I was intrigued when my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper said that we must he prepared to pay the price. We have already paid the price in what we have done to the Army by constant increases in pay without any regard to the effect.
I was proud when a Labour Government introduced the star system in 1945–46, designed to remove the major grievance of the fighting soldier by ensuring that we do not have the fighting man taking the rap in the front line while being regarded as anything but the skilled technician which he is. A whole list of pay increases and rank increases has been poured out, in contravention of a simple truth, which, in a moment of jocularity, I have called "Wigg's law ", because no one believes it. That "law" is that no matter how much the Government talk about pay and £10-a-week privates, there is only a given number of men in the country who like a military life. I am one of them, and I should like to start again—but not in the Army as it is being run nowadays.
Both sides of the House got out of the situation in 1957 because settling the account was a long way off and because they also inserted into their conception the argument about atomic weapons which has torn the Labour Party apart. This party, with its pacifist traditions, has had secret meetings and discussions about weapons. Was there ever anything more futile than that? The party is tearing its guts out about weapons which did not then exist and do not exist now, except in the minds of those who use half truths to further their own ends. The fact that the Labour Party


is torn apart is not only weakening to the party—it is weakening to the country. The whole country is suffering because of it, and we shall never get back to power unless we face the truth.
That brings me to the Opposition Amendment. I shall not go into the Lobby in support of that Amendment, because I shall stay true to my principles. There is another simple reason: one can say what one likes about a rat which leaves a sinking ship, but there can be no two views about a rat who joins it. I have been engaged in ten years of protest. Please God, do not let me say "I told you so," but after all that, I am asked to turn around and say that I believe we can get a sufficient number of recruits.
We may do—in the long run. But the Secretary of State faces the situation in which he needs those recruits in 1961 and 1962. He tells us that he must have this Bill in some form unless the House is prepared to face long-term realities. In 1939 I was a determined and vocal opponent of Chamberlain and all he stood for. That made me for conscription. The worse one's foreign policy, the more one has to do about the Army. The worse the military situation, the more reluctant one is to support this unfair, piffling nonsense which the Government call a Bill.
What is the alternative? I am faced with the realities of the situation in my constituency. Ten days ago the first battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment went to British Honduras. The constituency of my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) is hard by mine—we are in the same brigade. The Worcestershires went to British Honduras on a task which I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) will approve—succouring those who suffered the hurricane.
That battalion was 384 strong and 50 per cent. consisted of National Service men. B Company had just come back from British Honduras, and so it was right that it should go back there. But suppose that battalion had been asked to go on active operations only 384 strong? Some one would have paid for it with his life. By the end of the year it will not be even at that strength.
I shall not support this situation. I shall seek to amend the Bill. Much can be done to make it better, but the real solution is for the Secretary of State to go to the Prime Minister and tell him that it is the united view of the House of Commons that it is about time the Government stopped monkeying about with our defence policy and faced reality. If that were done, the rise in our stock in the council of the nations, with our Commonwealth partners, and in the negotiations with the Common Market would be sensational. The rest of Europe and the world would know that once again the British people were on the march. Let us not forget this: our defence policy, and the Army policy inside it, are no more than a projection of the society they serve. Military disaster is only evidence of national decline brought face to face with reality in the conflict of war. The dynamic in society and its creative capacity are reflected by a nation's defence policy.
If the right steps are not taken, hon. Members on both sides should remember this: they may get the votes they want, wherever their hopes may lie, but sooner or later, as sure as night follows day, this country must face the reality that ten years of pusillanimous cowardice have landed us with this Bill tonight.

8.19 p.m.

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and I came into the House in 1945 together and both soon realised that each of us was as keen as the other to see that we had a proper Regular Army. Of all the opinions which motivated hon. Members who entered the House in 1945, none exceeded our desire to make quite certain that never again, if we could possibly help it, would the Regular Army be committed to fulfilling rôles which it had not the strength to fulfil.
We have to ask one question of the Government about this Bill, before all others. Is this Bill a stop-gap operation, designed to fill a gap until such time as we have reconsidered our commitments, or is it not? As the debate goes on, it is becoming clearer that that is the issue which we have to face. If it is not the Government's policy to reconsider our commitments, it is perfectly


obvious that Regular recruiting will not provide the necessary troops to meet present commitments.
I know that there are some who believe—I did myself for a number of years—that if the pay is doubled, we get the necessary number of men. There are some who argue that because there has been such an extraordinary increase in the strength of the Army Emergency Reserve, Class 1—because of the increase in the bounty to £60—if the pay of the Army is increased by approximately the same amount, there will be a commensurate increase in Regular recruiting.
But there is a world of difference between taking a bounty to sign on the reserve, from which one may or may not be called up, and being attracted into the Regular Army, possibly for the first time, as a result of the pay being substantially increased. I wish that it were true that increased pay increased the number of recruits. I would be the first to wish to say that even if the increase meant putting up the defence budget to £2,000 million a year, it should be given.
However, as I said when we debated conscription for the first time in the 1945–50 Parliament, as a Regular soldier I loathe everything that conscription stands for. The other day the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) suggested that the Bill was a general plot to try to reintroduce conscription. I should be very surprised if it were. I know that some generals want National Service to go on, but I am sure that they are in a minority and that commanding officers of regiments who want it to continue are in a tiny minority. Sooner or later, conscription always produces some men who are only counting the days until they get out. As long as they are serving, we will never have a unit, how-eves well run it is, as good as it should be.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Most of them want to get out.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: I do not know what the hon. Member means. I have forgotten his distinguished military experience. Perhaps it would make more sense if he had the same sort of experience as I have had.

Mr. Hughes: The hon. and gallant Member spoke of men who wanted to get

out of the Army, and I said that most of them did.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: The hon. Member may take that view. I am inclined to think that those who have the good fortune to serve in fighting regiments, with a terrific esprit de corps and who count the days before they get out, are in a minority. It may be true that some of those who have the more irksome tasks do want to leave. One can sympathise with them.
However, at least the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and I can agree in that we both dislike conscription. That merely serves to emphasise that part of my argument. I hope that at the end of the debate the Government will make some attempt to answer the question which I have posed: is it intended to review our commitments? Unless we are, the Bill does not make sense. Even Clause 3 would not then make sense, in the long run. I am entirely in favour of doing something to ensure that, in the light of the increased tension over Berlin and the light of the increased tension which may arise in other parts of the world, we should improve our readiness to keep the peace. This is the right way to do it.
I have seen it suggested in one of the weekly journals that I am simply blindly following what the Government have been doing and backing them up on this matter. To that, I would only reply that for at least eighteen months I have been putting pressure on the Government to alter our rights for calling up reservists, which is what the Bill does. I am delighted, but only so long as the Bill is regarded as a stop-gap measure.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend on the clarity with which he moved the Second Reading. It is not an easy Bill to understand, because there are many cross-references to other legislation. He emphasised that Clauses 1 and 2 were short-term while Clause 3 was longer-term. I am all for encouraging Territorial Army recruitment by Clause 3, or by any other way which can be devised. However, as weapons become more complicated and as the teaching of how to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight a war becomes more and more difficult, I doubt whether the Territorial Army as we know it will, in the long term, be capable of training men to an adequate


standard—if we continue with our present military commitments.
I do not believe that it will be possible to train Territorials to supplement Regular troops. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that we revise our commitments. It is in this respect that the hon. Member for Dudley will agree with me. When he has put the challenge of whether we can fulfil these commitments, I have always said that if we could not the choice before the Government was to reduce the commitments, or to take some other steps to get the extra men required.
I know that some of my hon. Friends believe that we have already reduced our commitments to danger level. I wonder whether they are right. There is one overriding factor which we must always bear in mind when we consider our commitments. One thing we can never afford to do—and in the past have never been able to afford to do—if we hope to be in an influential position in the world, is to become alienated from the greatest sea Power of the day. It may seem a little pre-atomic to take that view, but I wonder whether it is.
I have referred to this in debates on the Army Estimates in previous years and I repeat my argument now because it is relevant to this debate. The importance of the geographical position of this country is unique. Of no other country is it true that if one makes that country the Pole and draws a new Equator, virtually the whole of Asia, certainly the whole of Europe and Africa and virtually the whole of the two Americans are in the hemisphere of which that country is the Pole. Comparing capital with capital, Paris comes nearest to London in that respect, but we occupy that unique position. That has automatically made us the maritime centre of the world in the past, and today the same pattern of lines is appearing on the air map.
We make a terrible mistake when we have the usual map at the end of the Air Estimates Memorandum every year. What we ought to have is a globe, which we could inflate. If one studies the map, more especially if one studies the globe, one sees an extraordinary state of affairs which runs counter to all my military teaching of the old days when I was

taught that the one thing which should not be done was to get one's forces into penny packets. From the map or the globe one gets the impression that there is now an appalling indecision about the difference between a token force and a penny packet.
As the means of communication improve and as weapons become more destructive and the means of delivering them more far reaching, one thing becomes clearer and clearer—the fewer fixed bases on which we have to rely and the better and more mobile our forces, the better. I know that there is a great danger in Members of Parliament attempting to be armchair strategists, but I have been giving much thought to this subject ever since I became a Member. Even back in 1948 I wrote a book on this subject, although it is now out of print, and nobody read it anyway.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: What is it called?

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Defence of the Realm—it is in the Library. It is essential to regard the United Kingdom as the home of the Strategic Reserve.
After that, where do we go? I should have thought that it was becoming increasingly obvious that the one thing that we shall not be able to do is to maintain for very long our bases in countries whose politics we do not control. I am a little disturbed by some of the things said about the enormous success of the Kuwait operation. It is perfectly true that we carried out an extraordinarily rapid movement of all arms into the vital area absolutely essential to us.
I think that it may interest the House if I quote, from the N.A.T.O. Journal of September, 1951, these words:
In the Middle and Far East also, there are few possibilities for major cuts. For example, naval forces in the Persian Gulf and at Singapore are being modernised with new or rebuilt ships. The recent operations in Kuwait, prompted as they were solely by potentially disastrous electoral results that would stem from gasoline rationing in Britain, have cost a considerable amount of money. While Press officials in the various Government Departments have been falling over themselves to emphasise how effective the operation has been, they have quietly omitted to mention that the operation scraped the bottom of the defence barrel so far as manpower was concerned.
I do not know to what extent General Norstad has any say in what goes into the N.A.T.O. Journal.
I think that we would all agree that had we not had the bases in Africa that we had and the bases in Cyprus, it might have been much more difficult than it was. Yet one can see that in Africa things are moving in the direction where, in some years to come, I am not attempting to forecast when, perhaps bases will have to be folded up in Kenya or elsewhere in Africa—who knows? If Cyprus is anything to go by, we have to ask ourselves how long we can really expect, in the event of Makarios getting difficult, to be able to use that base unless we are prepared to lock up a whole lot of troops there, in which case the base tends to defeat its object because we want to be able to use it to send troops elsewhere if we ever want to use them. There are all these considerations.
It seems to me that we are concentrating more and more in certain places—I will not say what they are, or attempt to forecast what they should be, but there must be certain places in the world which we must regard as absolutely vital—and we must hang on to them through thick and thin, come wind come weather, as far ahead into the future as we can see, if we are to play any part in preventing war from breaking out in other parts of the world. If we cannot make some economy of forces and cannot limit the enormous demand which was made on our manpower as it was in days gone by, when we were a Colonial rather than a Commonwealth Power, it seems to me that something has gone very wrong in the logistics department of the War Office.
I cannot believe that the strategy for the application of the principles of war ever stands still. There are certain constants. I have suggested one, and that is our geographical position. There is one other which, I think, is also a constant. We are an offshore island to a continental land mass, and, because we are that, we must base all our planning on exterior lines of communication and on having our forces as mobile as possible. I believe that in the course of that we can considerably lower the demand for our manpower, but, as the hon. Member for Dudley and others in this debate have rightly said, there is this great problem, the commitment in Europe.
I know as well as the hon. Gentleman what word has been given on behalf of this country, and I hate seeing this country go back on its word. I think that it was the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards) who mentioned national sovereignty. It is often said that every treaty we sign limits our sovereignty. It should not. What it does limit is our authority. Our sovereignty ought to be intact so long as we have the right to seek amendment, or as long as we have the right to terminate. As regards N.A.T.O., I should have thought that after all these years we still had the right to negotiate to get an amendment.
I would be prepared to reduce our commitment in Europe, provided that in doing so we were not accused of breaking our word. I do not think that that would do us any good. It never has, and never will, but we ought to reduce our commitments in Europe. I still believe that we may have to prick up some of the little pinpoints of red on this map, which, I believe, are no more token forces than the man in the moon. I believe that they are penny packets, the most dangerous form of the deployment of forces in which one can indulge.
I believe that if we do that, and if, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) said, we gear our scientific research and development behind all this, if we place the contracts with the people who are to make us as mobile as we should be, and if we co-ordinate the grouping of our forces around the world in such a way that there are balanced forces of all three Services, not only within each other, we shall be able to economise in our forces.
It is on the assumption that that sort of thinking is going on that I accept the Bill and am prepared to support it, but I support it only as a stop-gap Measure. It is not a long-term solution to our real problem. Our real problem is still, and will continue to be, that of ensuring adequate mobility in the conditions which obtain at any one time.
The stupidest people are those who will not budge from a policy no matter how much the circumstances have changed since the policy was first introduced. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green, who appears like


Mohammed from the mountain and then vanishes from the debate having delivered an oration of some importance, was a little unfair to the Prime Minister when he said that the only reason why we have not been able to alter that White Paper was because it was the first one introduced after my right hon. Friend became Prime Minister. If my right hon. Friend can honestly say that when he was Minister of Supply he took all the decisions which he ought to have taken at the right time, I would think more of him, but I am not sure that he did.
When I know the problems of those upon whom depends our ability to make our forces mobile, and when I hear of the problems of the Government in placing contracts, delivery dates, and all these things, I say that not only is the 1957 White Paper in need of alteration but that I am convinced that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is aware of this, otherwise I do not believe that he would have said what he did the other day—that the forces were unbalanced at the moment.
The fact that he realised that shows that he is prepared to change it, and, on the assumption that it will be changed as soon as possible, and that in the meantime we will ensure that no British forces or formations or units are committed to a commitment which they cannot possibly hope to fulfil with the strength they have, I will support the Bill. But if the Government fail in this they have failed a great many of us who first came to this House in 1945 and whose resolve was that our "Never again", after the Second World War, meant that never again would we see British troops having to train with flags at a time when war was marching relentlessly.
I happened to come across, a few days ago, some rather beautiful words. They were uttered 384 years ago by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the elder half-brother of Sir Walter Raleigh. Writing to Queen Elizabeth I, in 1577, he said:
The wings of man's life are plumed with the feathers of death.
The wings of man today may be supersonic and their feathers may sometimes be radioactive. But there are certain constants which go on and apply just as

much today as they did over 300 years ago.
Two, I suggest, are the geographical position of the United Kingdom and the everlasting truth that, however important it may be to have an Army and a Royal Air Force, upon the sea and upon Britain never being alienated from the position of a great sea Power will depend the future safety of this great nation.

8.42 p.m.

Mr. E. Fernyhough: The Secretary of State for War must be feeling friendless tonight. Seldom have heard a Bill introduced which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen sitting behind the Minister have attacked so viciously. No one on this side of the House has had a kind word for the Bill and, apparently, no one sitting opposite wishes to foster it.
While some hon. Members may be perfectly entitled to adopt such an attitude one of the things which nauseates most back benchers is hearing an ex-Minister complain about a policy which was put into operation when they were in office. If I felt about any legislation as some ex-Ministers sitting opposite reveal from time to time that they feel, I should have resigned from office. I should have considered that the honourable thing to do. But ex-Ministers become very critical only when they no longer occupy the Government Front Bench.
The Secretary of State for War said that the need for the Bill was not because of the collapse of his recruiting policy, but the requirement for trained men. I should have thought that if it brought in 10,000, 15,000, or 20,000 extra men into the Regular forces it would have solved his problem. He is arguing that it is only to keep about 20,000, but it is the keeping of the 20,000 which is so wrong in view of what was said in the 1951 White Paper on Defence, which stated that National Service was to end in 1962. The present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said that the run-down would be so quick that there would not be the calling up of large numbers of those who were liable to be called up.
The right hon. Gentleman must face the fact that the Bill will cause a terrible amount of bitterness because some


National Service men will have to stay beyond their time while, because the policy of the 1957 White Paper has fallen down, while others will not be called at all. I am not one who wishes to call anybody. I am prepared to say that the men who volunteer for the Services are entitled to the best pay and the finest conditions that can be offered them. If I am not prepared to do a job myself, I must very adequately pay someone who is prepared to do it.
I do not think, however, that we afford to go to the limits mentioned by the hon. and gallant Member for Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke), who spoke in terms of a defence expenditure of £2,000 million. I do not know whether he has read the 1957 White Paper around which this debate is largely centred. It stated:
Britain's influence in the world depends first and foremost on the health of her internal economy and the success of her export trade".
We cannot have a strong internal economy and a flourishing export trade while at the same time spending £2,000 million on defence.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Nor can we have a full-blooded Welfare State and be properly defended. Sometimes we have to cut that.

Mr. Fernyhough: The hon. and gallant Member would not protect our people from diphtheria, or from smallpox, or when they are injured or sick. If they die from sickness that is nothing to do with him, but let an enemy, 3,000 miles away, threaten us and he is prepared to spend £2,000 million. I believe that it is as essential to protect people from cancer as it is to protect them from Communism, for if one is killed by either one is dead. When the hon. and gallant Member says that he would sacrifice the Welfare State, and talks of attacking the Health Service, I tell him that the Health Service defends the lives of our people just as effectively and surely as any part of the Armed Forces.
The man in the street is bewildered by the Bill, because he remembers 1957 and what happened then. In 1957, the predecessor of the present Secretary of State

said in the House that we had too many lieutenant-colonels in the Army, too many majors, too many warrant officers and too many n.c.o.s. We had to sack about 15,000 of them. We have been sacking or declaring them redundant. We have compensated them generously. I wish hon. Members who are prepared to be very generous to those rendered redundant in the Army—although I do not object to compensating them—would be equally sympathetic when dealing with the claims of redundant workers in industry.
If a man in industry has his career interrupted, he is just as entitled to compensation as is the man in the Army. The man in the street cannot understand why the Government were able to dispense with 15,000—who, I understand from reading the speech made at the time, were mostly lieutenant-colonels and majors, the "top brass", highly paid people—but the Minister tells us that he cannot do without National Service men. What kind of Fred Karno show is this? Men we have been paying as much as £1,000 and £2,000 and more have been got rid of and are not wanted, yet we are keeping in those whom we pay 32s. 6d. a week. No wonder the average man in the street cannot understand this logic.
One would have thought that the lieutenant-colonels, the majors, the generals and the field marshals, whoever they are, who have been declared redundant were the people whom the Army required—the people who ought to be able to do every job. But no, we can manage without 15,000 of the top men, but we cannot manage without the National Service man on 32s. 6d. a week.
Broadly, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force do not have a problem in this respect. It is rather remarkable that the Navy can man its forces by the voluntary method, and it is very probable that the R.A.F. can man its forces by voluntary methods, but the Army cannot. Why? There have been many commissions set up and inquiries conducted into various things, but it is time we had an inquiry into that. Why is it that the Royal Navy and the R.A.F. can get their manpower, but the Army cannot? Is it because of the discipline, or because of the treatment they receive? I should have thought that if the right


hon. Gentleman was seriously concerned about getting his volunteers, he would have made some inquiries along these lines.
The truth is, and I say this not only to the right hon. Gentleman but even to some of my hon. Friends, that I do not believe that they are making the necessary effort to understand the men in the ranks. In industry, the Minister of Labour is holding meeting after meeting on human relationships in industry, trying to create a better atmosphere. Does anybody try to do these things in the Army? Does anybody know whether the private soldier is any more important today than he was one hundred years ago? Basically, the treatment is not different. The truth is that he is still an inferior being, he is never allowed to answer back, he still cannot argue and he still loses every bit of freedom he has ever possessed when he dons a uniform.
If we treated men on the shop floor in the factories as we treat privates in the Army, industry would be constantly running to a standstill. I am quite sure that the fact that men can be placed on petty charges, causes rancour, that they never have their own convenience considered, that they can never argue but can be put on charges for very flimsy things, detract from men entering the forces. Basically, the best recruiting sergeants should be the men who are already in. They should be the men who are best able to persuade others to go in, and it is rather a remarkable thing that very few of them take that line. I am quite sure that if the National Service men were the recruiting agents, the right hon. Gentleman would not have his problem.

Mr. Profumo: If the hon. Gentleman had listened to my speech, he would know that I pointed out that recruiting was extremely good. I agree with him that it is very largely because the best recruiting sergeants are the Regular soldiers themselves that we are now getting an increase in our recruiting.

Mr. Fernyhough: The Minister says that recruiting is doing so remarkably well, yet he is having to introduce a Bill to keep men in the forces longer than they would have been kept if what was said in 1957 had been acted upon.

Mr. John Diamond: They are not recruits for the Army.

Mr. Fernyhough: As my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Mr. Diamond) says, they are not recruits for the Army, but for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman gets all he requires.
I have never understood why many right hon. and hon. Members opposite were prepared to take all the powers of the State to compel men to enter the Armed Forces against their will, but held up their hands in horror if anyone ever suggested directing industry to development districts or directing the capital of private people where it would best be used in the service of the nation. Why should we shrink from directing capital while we are directing lads into the Army? What kind of people are they who place private capital before human dignity? I do not understand why there is this great defence of private interest, private property and wealth while no regard is paid to the fellows compelled to go into the forces.
Britain today is faced with exactly the same problem as faces every other nation. With the exception of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, three comparatively small nations, no country in the world can manage its armed forces on the volunteer principle. America, Russia, France, Britain—they have all introduced conscription and have compelled men to serve in the forces to get forces of the size which they feel are adequate.
I regard that as one of the most hopeful things in the world, because it is obvious that if it were not for the politicians and the statesmen in Russia, in Britain, and in every other country, the ordinary people would not be anxious to go to war with one another. I do not believe that the average man in Russia tonight is thinking that a Briton will bomb him, or that the average man in Britain is thinking that about his counterpart in Russia. The common people of Russia, of Britain, of the entire world are hoping and longing for peace. They are concerned more with their own immediate problems of jobs, homes and all the rest than they are with the international politicians and statesmen.
I believe that the British people can give a lead. I hope that we shall not increase international tension, as any considerable build-up of our forces is bound to do. I believe that the country has taken many risks in connection with war in the past, and I am one of those who are prepared to let it take a few risks for peace in the future.

8.58 p.m.

Mr. Christopher Mayhew: The speeches from both sides of the House today, and the Bill, could hardly amount to more complete proof of the total failure of the Government's defence policy, which has arisen not from anything unexpected or unpredictable. The Secretary of State said, in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough), that recruiting is going remarkably well. The Bill is not being brought forward because of the situation in Berlin. The Secretary of State lacked the courage to advance that excuse today, although he did so in the debate on the Address. It arises simply from lack of courage in taking necessary decisions and from bad government.
We have heard a number of questions, very pertinent, important and well-informed, asked from both sides of the House. I know that the Under-Secretary will not think it a discourtesy—we are all looking forward to his speech—when I suggest that it would have been better if these weighty questions from both sides of the House on the general subject of defence had been answered by the Minister of Defence at the end of this debate. The Minister of Defence was courteous enough to tell me and my right hon. Friend that he had another non-official engagement this evening. But he has a lot to answer for in this field, and I think that it would have been better if he had been here to answer it himself; not that we always get clear answers from the Minister of Defence on many of these subjects.
I was struck by one remark made by the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones). He said that the Government's policy threatened to discredit National Service. One of the things that worry me is that the Government's policy threatens to discredit the whole voluntary system. There is no better way of discrediting this than

by abandoning conscription without creating the conditions in which the voluntary system can succeed.
When the Government took the decision in 1957 to abandon conscription they said at that time, in the White Paper, that they needed a considerable reduction in our overseas garrisons, greater mobility of our forces and changes in the organisation of the Service manpower. But, in fact, since then no effective action has been taken to adjust the tasks of the Army to its numbers, to increase mobility, or to integrate the Services. It was only last year that an all-out recruiting drive was started. We still have not got enough married quarters ten years after it was started, and that itself is a great bar to the voluntary system. Only in the last month or two have the Government appointed the Festing Committee to review our overseas commitments.
Having taken this decision in 1957 and failed to carry out all the necessary actions that should have followed from it, they have placed a fearful strain on the voluntary system, and I am afraid that this may have associated the voluntary idea in the public mind with the idea of manpower shortage and under-strength battalion, and thus for some time perhaps discredited the system itself.
Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen have criticised the Government from the point of view of those who wish to reintroduce selective service or some form of compulsion, and there is this to be said for them—although we on this side do not agree with them—that if the Government were going to drag their feet after 1957 in the way that they have done, the abandonment of conscription was premature. Granted that they were not going to take the necessary action to make the voluntary system succeed, it might have been better to continue for a little while with compulsion.
Then, at least, we should have had in the Army in 1963 and 1964 Service men who were young and who had been fairly selected for the job; instead of, as we look like getting, Service men who are older and who have already spent their two years in the Services, men selected not because of age—on the contrary—not because of their occupation, not because they are unmarried,


not even selected impartially by a ballot, but selected simply and solely because it is the easiest way for the Government to get the men.
That is the only principle of selection in the Bill. It is the quickest, cheapest and politically most convenient way for the Government to get themselves out of the mess in which they find themselves. That is the principle behind the Bill, the principle of Ministerial convenience. The Secretary of State said—I think that I understood him aright—that he did not believe in the principle of equality of misery for all. But we on this side of the House do believe in the principle of equality of burdens. If what the Minister meant was to reject the idea that it is wrong to burden those who have already made sacrifices, I do not understand what is this principle of rejecting equality of misery.
A lot has been said already, and I will not repeat it, about the hardships caused by the Bill. No one has yet, at any rate while I have been here, quoted from letters of the sort which hon. and right hon. Members will receive from Service men in the months to come. I have a number here and, no doubt, other hon. Members have some. As no one has yet done so, perhaps I should read into the record some of the things which men are writing and saying. Here is one letter:
Having been informed of the prospect of another six months in the Army as a National Service man, I am shocked to hear this. I have spent fourteen months in the R.A.S.C. and was quite resigned to the thought of spending another ten months here. … I am married, and I do not think that this is at all a fair way to treat National Service men, as I have to complete two years in the Army with very little money trying to make ends meet, also being parted from my wife and son. I am quite sure that after this last piece of news my wife will have a breakdown over this news. My son is only two months old but when I am finished with the Army he will not know me very well, but with six months added it will make things difficult for both of us.

Mr. Frank Allaun: My hon. Friend has raised a very important matter. I am concerned about the National Service man with a wife and family. I know that exemptions have been made on compassionate grounds in certain cases, but will the Government give an undertaking that in no circumstances

whatever will any man with a wife and a young child or children be called up for an extra six months? The House is entitled to know about that.

Mr. Mayhew: I am very grateful to my hon. Friend. We look for an answer from the Minister.
Here is another characteristic letter of a kind which we shall all be receiving, I am sure, from our constituents. A mother writes:
Today, I have received a letter from my son, who is a National Service man serving in Malaya. He just heard about the Government's proposal. He says, 'We are all hoping that it is just another rumour and that someone is playing a nasty joke on us, as the boys just could not take it'.
She goes on to say:
The boys, who are due for release next year, are counting the days, and this will cause a lot of distress among the Forces and disgruntled feelings among their families at home.
Perhaps I should add that I feel a special sympathy with the writer of this letter, because she ends by saying:
Trusting, Sir, that you will pardon my liberty in writing to you, but we have no Labour Member for this constituency of Bristol since Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn finished.
If I may read just one more, this letter comes from an officer who is a doctor, and it illustrates the kind of administrative problem that the Minister will face and some of the more detailed problems and uncertainties facing those who may be affected. He writes:
I am a doctor at present serving in the R.A.M.C. and due to be released on 3rd April. Today we are informed that six weeks' notice will be given to those who are to be retained. This is wholly inadequate notice as far as doctors are concerned. Six weeks ago, I was offered a post which commences on 1st May, an offer which, it so happens, I have turned down. It is common practice to advertise vacancies three or more months in advance. At present, I have applied for another post. If I have the good fortune to be short-listed, what can I tell the interviewing committee when I am asked when I can start?
That letter gives expression to just one problem out of many which those who are to be affected by the Bill will face. It will cause enormous uncertainty.
The Minister promised that no one could be called up who was released before April next year. Of course, men are still liable to be called up afterwards. The uncertainty is not removed altogether. Let us not forget that all


those National Service men who are serving now, or who served up to some years ago, are all liable under the Government's proposals. That is not removing the uncertainty. What is more, the Minister said, "We shall not give these people any notice"—

Mr. Profumo: May not.

Mr. Mayhew: May not give any notice. It is not removing the uncertainty. All these thousands of men are now living under the shadow of possible recall at any time, with little or no notice for some of them, and they will continue so for the next three and a half years. These are some of the very important human problems which will be set.
Our view, as stated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), is that we must keep the voluntary system if it is humanly possible to do so. Here, I think, there is a wide measure of agreement in the House, not only on the basic principle that in a free country a free choice is preferable to compulsion but also on the practical ground that for the same job one can get equal or greater effectiveness with fewer men in that way.
Several hon. Members have asked about Britain's position in the world as contrasted with that of our N.A.T.O. allies. They ask why we, and only we, should have this voluntary professional Army. Surely it is a great mistake to judge the strength of an Army and its forces simply by counting heads. To prefer a larger conscript Army, most of the members of which are longing for the day of release and half of whom, in the case of many foreign conscript armies, have less than six months to train, to a smaller Regular Army of fully-trained professionals is to make an altogether wrong estimate of the military value of the two forces.
Germany was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) and also by the right hon. Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch). That is not a good country to choose from this point of view. According to the very useful publication of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Germany has a smaller percentage of its male labour force in uniform than any of the N.A.T.O. allies—1·98 per cent., which is a much smaller figure than for any other country.

Mr. John Hall: The hon. Member will see from the same publication that Germany is increasing her forces.

Mr. Mayhew: She is not the only country in the N.A.T.O. Alliance which is increasing its forces. We on this side say that we should, if possible, give the voluntary system what the Government have not given it—a chance of succeeding. Hon. Members, especially hon. Members opposite, have said that it is too late to rely on the voluntary system. No one on this side of the House would disagree with the proposition that the Government have almost destroyed the chance of making the voluntary system work.
As, however, my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper showed in a speech that did not gloss over any of the difficulties, which was coherent and which went into considerable detail, on certain assumptions—assuming that the Government take certain actions about overseas commitments, about the integration of manpower in the three Services and about mobility—it is still possible to meet these difficulties with the voluntary system, especially, I add, with the extra reinsurance of the "Ever-readies", a part of the Bill which deserves a welcome and which, we hope, will succeed. We hope that the Secretary of State will get the volunteers he wants for this new reserve.
On the subject of commitments, most of the criticism from the standpoint of the Opposition has centred on the question of whether we can fairly find manpower resources by pruning our overseas commitments. We have had no answers about this from the Government. I am glad to see that the Minister of Defence is present. Perhaps he would answer some of these questions. For example, Hong Kong was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Flint, West, who defended the Government and said that it was impossible for us to make manpower economies in Hong Kong.
I should like to ask the Minister, apart from the internal security rôle of our 10,000 men in Hong Kong, what is the operational rôle of the troops there? Let the Minister answer this. He refused to answer it at Question Time last week. He told us a little about the operational rôle of the troops in B.A.O.R. and in other parts of the


world. What are these men intended to do? Is it to defend Hong Kong against external aggression? Is it really impossible to make economies here? Do we really need tanks in Hong Kong, Hunter aircraft, or 10,000 men? Is this an essential operational commitment?

Mr. James Dance: The hon. Member keeps on about Hong Kong. I was there recently and I saw the great confidence our troops gave to all our people out in Hong Kong. Any withdrawal from Hong Kong would be viewed with dismay. The hon. Member has also mentioned tanks. I know that they may not appear to have a very effective operational rôle, but, by heavens, they give confidence.

Mr. Mayhew: Here we have the secret of why our troops are wasted in posts overseas. What does this presence mean? The hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Mr. Dance) says that it gives confidence. We ought to distinguish carefully between a presence which constitutes a usable, effective military force, a genuine military power—for example, our troops in Malaya during the emergency—and a presence which appears to give security, and to give an opportunity of defence against external aggression, but which, in fact, is much too weak to carry out that rôle. So I think that that clear distinction ought to be drawn here.
The fact is that not only' in Hong Kong, but in many parts of the world we have troops who are given operational rôles for which they are really too thin on the ground, and where they cannot be used, very often, for diplomatic reasons, or for reasons of internal politics, or reasons of internal security. I would say that a presence like that in Hong Kong is really worse than useless. If it encourages the local people to rely on us for military force and military effort which we are not in practice capable of delivering, it seems to me a thoroughly dangerous situation.
I have in mind several places, not only Hong Kong. It can be valuable, of course, on occasions to have a presence of that kind, but it should not obscure the truth—and I am thinking especially of South-East Asia and the Middle East—that ultimately the success of our friends overseas in defending themselves

depends on their ability to stand on their own feet in their own country, and nothing encourages that self-reliance more than having to stand on their own. The current difficulty in Singapore—

Mr. Anthony Kershaw: Will the hon. Gentleman explain how Hong Kong can stand up to China by itself?

Mr. Mayhew: Is the hon. Gentleman seriously asking that four Hunter aircraft could stand up against the Chinese air force?

Mr. Kershaw: Certainly not, but the hon. Gentleman was making the point that it was really very much better for these countries to learn to stand on their own feet. Is he including Hong Kong?

Mr. Mayhew: I was not referring to Hong Kong in that context, as HANSARD will show. Of course, we must have some internal security force in Hong Kong. I do not think that anyone, any of my hon. or right hon. Friends, has said anything else. What I am asking the Minister is: what rôle in Hong Kong have 10,000 fighting troops, tanks and aircraft, and against whom? At what stage is it proper to ask 10,000 men to fight 35 Chinese armies? That is what we want to know.
I should like to say a word about the Singapore position. We have a similar position there. The position in Singapore has developed very much as we feared it would, and as, in the debate on the Address, we said it would. We would not go so far as some experts. We would not withdraw our commitments as would experts like Field Marshal Harding or Field Marshal Montgomery.
For instance, I have here the statement of Field Marshal Harding on the radio, to which my right hon. Friend referred. Asked by the interviewer how many of these commitments he would like to see cut down, and which ones, he replied:
I would start cutting from the Far East, I think. Hong Kong, I think, could be reduced solely to an internal security basis, with, perhaps, mobile constabulary. Then Malaya, Singapore, now that the Communist terrorists have been defeated, I think could be reduced, probably more than it has been already. Going back to the Mediterranean, Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar, and Libya in particular.
This is not the policy of dishonourable scuttle by the Secretary of State for War. I am bound to say that I do not think


it helps to question the motives of people who take this point of view. I do not think that it is cowardly to recommend this policy if one is a field marshal. I think that it would be better if in these defence debates we all assumed that, according to our lights, we were doing our best in the national interest.
If I may refer briefly to the position in Singapore, as forecast in the Queen's Speech the Government have made demands for the military use of the Singapore base which are politically embarrassing to the Malayan Government and to the Singapore Government and are harming the prospects of Malayasia. In the communiqué they dressed up their demands by following formula. It was agreed that Malaysia will
afford the British Government the right to continue to maintain bases at Singapore … for the preservation of peace in South-East Asia.
This is a good example of what we mean by the need for a clear statement on the operational purpose of this base.
This statement could mean one of three things. Either we can use the base for S.E.A.T.O. without further permission from the Malayan Government, and this interpretation, quite understandably, is put on it by the newspapers, or it could mean the opposite—that we cannot use the base for S.E.A.T.O. purposes without the further permission of the Malayan Government. This is the interpretation put on it by the Malay Federation Government. Finally, it could mean that we have no idea whatever whether or not we can use this base when the time comes, with or without the permission of the Federation of Malaya. To have 10,000 or 15,000 British troops tied up in Singapore for an operational rôle which is not at all clear and to conscript men because the Government will not face the hard need to review some of these commitments is thoroughly incompetent military policy.
I know that the base has other rôles in Singapore. It staves the economy. There is an internal security rôle and a rôle of local defence against aggression, but for none of these purposes is anything like the manpower required that we have at the base at present. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite have gone so far as to say that the Government's defence policy is in a total mess, and I know of

no speaker who has really defended the Government wholeheartedly. But they maintain that our suggestion of relying on the voluntary system and making the decisions which are essential to that reliance could not work. They say that we must go back to some kind of selective service. That is the line taken by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East and the right hon. Member for Flint, West.
But if it were ever possible or desirable, it is plain that it is far too late now if we are to carry through the position next year or the year after. Selective service is too late. The decision to have selective service should have been taken last year or the year before, if at all. Quite apart from the difficulty of selecting one man in ten or one man in twenty of those eligible for service, the Minister would have to spend a long time in the months ahead, if we do not change the constitution of his advisory committee on hardship, deciding the hardship cases arising out of decisions taken on the Bill, let alone those to be taken if we were to select one man out of ten or one out of twenty in a whole age group.
Even if it were practicable, there would not be time. There would have to be a Bill which was much more complicated than the present Bill. There would have to be the machinery to hold a ballot and then there would be call-up papers, all before starting training the men. By the end of next year, under the system suggested by the right hon. Member for Flint, West, by the time Regular troops had been withdrawn to train these men we should finish with fewer men than we had at the beginning. Therefore, this is certainly not the answer to the problem.
This also ignores the detailed case put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, that it is not necessary and that we can use the voluntary system if the Government would take the strong and clear decisions which should have been taken long ago. When the Bill goes to Committee—and I think that this important Bill must be discussed in Committee on the Floor of the House—we shall have a number of Amendments to put forward. Why should this Bill, so controversial and so generally disliked on both sides of the House, run for five years? It should be renewed


annually. We should see how it is going. That is obviously something which needs to be done during the Committee stage.
We shall return to the point that the Minister takes a decision in hardship cases. Why does he need to take this power? It is not the case today. If the National Service man has a genuine, independent decision on his application on hardship grounds now, why should the new man have the decision from the Secretary of State? I believe that that is the situation. These men, who are obviously suffering greater hardship than any of the National Service men so far called up, and are in a very unfortunate position, should certainly have the benefit of an independent decision on their case.
The Government have brought this course on themselves. They abolished conscription without facing the hard decisions which simply had to follow. They failed to take the decisions on overseas commitments, on integration of Service manpower, on mobility and other vital matters of this kind. Rather than take those hard and necessary decisions, they have produced a Bill which takes it out on a small group of men who are not sufficiently politically powerful successfully to resist. This Bill is, in fact, the easy way out for the Government, but it is a contemptible Measure, and I hope that the House will accept the Amendment.

Mr. Speaker: Mr. Ramsden.

9.27 p.m.

The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. James Ramsden): The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. James Ramsden) rose—

Mr. Gordon Walker: May I ask you a question, Mr. Speaker? We have had a very wide-ranging debate in which great issues of defence have been raised on both sides of the House, and it cannot possibly be answered by the Under-Secretary. Is it not contempt of the House that the Minister of Defence should sit on the Government Front Bench and not answer the debate?

Mr. Speaker: This is the same old difficulty. The right hon. Gentleman was not called and cannot rise to a point of order, so he did not try. Mr. Ramsden.

Mr. Ramsden: Mr. Ramsden rose—

Mr. S. Silverman: Further to the point of order.

Mr. Speaker: It was not a point of order.

Mr. Silverman: Then may I put a question to you, Mr. Speaker? Is it not a strange departure from the tradition which was recently established by the Minister of Defence—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I indicated to the House the undesirability of rising to points of order which were not such. I am glad that neither the right hon. Gentleman nor the hon. Gentleman did so. But another of our conventions is that the person speaks who is called by the Chair. Mr. Ramsden.

Mr. Ramsden: Notwithstanding what has been said by one or two hon. Members, perhaps I may be allowed to reply to the wide-ranging and extremely interesting debate that we have had.
I find myself in agreement with a great deal of what the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) has just been saying. He confirmed our estimate on this side of the House of the value of all-Regular forces in the long run. He said, however, that we had not given this policy a fair chance of succeeding. There I must disagree with him. The one course of action which in the long run will give this policy of reliance upon all-Regular forces a chance of succeeding is for the House to pass the Bill tonight, for that is, indeed, one of the main purposes of the Measure.
As I have said, this has been a wide-ranging debate. We seem to have reached a position where most hon. Members opposite accept our objective of sticking to all-Regular forces, but they say that they would deploy and organise them rather differently from the way which we are proposing. Some of my right hon. Friends, in what may be termed an expected alliance with the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) and some in a somewhat less expected alliance with the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), would take a rather different view. They would like to see provision for larger forces, and they would be prepared to have selective compulsory service in order to raise them. What we are proposing to


do is to steer a middle course between those two extremes, and I do not find this discouraging in itself.
I am the more convinced that it is right in that none of the speeches we have heard today suggests a line of action which has fewer snags about it than what we are proposing. I shall be quite content if the House will accept the Bill as a kind of lowest common factor of what is possible and reasonable in the circumstances.
What we are trying to do—and this, if the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) will accept it from me, is the justification for my replying—is, through an Army Bill, to cope with the problem of manning the Army during the difficult period when National Service men will be running out and the Regular strength might not be sufficient for the Army's needs. The possibility of this situation arising was foreseen in the 1957 White Paper. Paragraph 48 is quite clear. It says:
It must nevertheless be understood that it voluntary recruiting fails to produce the numbers required, the country will have to face the need for some limited form of compulsory service to bridge the gap.
When we decided to rely on a policy of all Regular forces, we admittedly gave a hostage to fortune to this extent—that it was beyond anybody's power to predict what the rate of recruitment to the Armed Forces might in the future turn out to be. Faced with this uncertainty—and there was no practical way of escaping it at the time—it was only common prudence for the Government to stipulate that some special measures might turn out to be necessary, and it is such measures which my right hon. Friend is asking the House to approve tonight.

Mr. Paget: Is the hon. Gentleman saying—because it is exactly contrary to what the Secretary of State said in opening—that this Bill is introduced because the recruiting drive has failed?

Mr. Ramsden: No, Sir. The hon. and learned Gentleman has not listened. I will deal presently with how the progress of the recruiting drive is bearing upon this Measure.
One other factor mentioned by my right hon. Friend today—an obviously important one which has considerably aggra-

vated the difficulty of the problem facing us—is the present situation in Germany. I make no apology for basing my reply upon the 1957 White Paper, to which almost every speaker in the debate who attacked the Bill has in one way or another referred.
The House ought to be clear about the decisions which were taken in 1957 and about their implications. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite supported them in so far as they concerned manpower.

Mr. G. Brown: No, we did not.

Mr. Ramsden: I have looked this up. The party opposite moved a rather wide-sweeping Amendment which, in retrospect, I believe was designed to encourage into the Lobby some of their less conventional supporters in defence. It seems to me that the Opposition Amendment tonight is designed—unsuccessfully, I am afraid—to win the allegiance of the hon. Member for Dudley.

Mr. Brown: Disgraceful. It is an unconstitutional Bill.

Mr. Ramsden: It is my impression—

Mr. Brown: Outrageous.

Mr. Ramsden: Does the right hon. Member for Belper want to interrupt?

Mr. Brown: I am obliged to the hon. Member. The point the hon. Member asks me to make is this: we have had a debate dealing with a constitutional Bill of great importance, with wide-ranging defence issues. Yet the Minister of Defence sits there as though it could not concern him less. Now we are being inflicted with a stupid, prefect's Bill. Should not the Minister of Defence deal with this matter if he wants it through?

Mr. Ramsden: Members opposite—

Mr. Brown: Outrageous. It is an insult.

Mr. Ramsden: The right hon. Gentleman has called me a number of names.

Mr. Brown: There is the Minister of Defence, sitting there.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman has made his speech earlier today. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will be allowed to continue.

Mr. Ramsden: I was simply seeking to make the point—

Mr. G. Brown: On a point of order. Were you presuming at that moment to rebuke me, Sir? If so, may I make a submission to you?

Mr. Speaker: I am not trying to rebuke anybody. I am trying to get on with the debate.

Mr. Brown: May I make a submission?

Mr. Speaker: I respectfully thought that shouting from a seated position was not assisting us in the process.

Mr. Brown: May I make a submission? May I ask you how you might assist the House? This reply, as it has so far developed, is so removed from the level of the debate, from both sides of the House, as to be a mockery of the House and an insult to the people affected by the Bill. How does one make one's protest?

Mr. Speaker: Certainly not in the middle of somebody else's speech. I am sure that these matters can be dealt with at some other time, if necessary.

Mr. Birch: Further to that point of order. Is not this conduct, which we habitually have from the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), utterly intolerable?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a question to be addressed to me. Do let us get on.

Mr. Ramsden: I was saying that I understood that hon. Members opposite accepted the implications of the 1957 White Paper on Defence Policy, in so far as it concerned manpower. I should have thought that the terms of that Amendment and their speeches bore that out.
At any rate, tonight hon. Members opposite agree with us that our forces could and should be raised by voluntary means. Some of my hon. Friends who have spoken today at that time also supported the Government's policy. My right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) at that time confirmed their support of the 1957 White Paper in the Lobbies.
That policy foresaw three main tasks for the Army—first, to play our part with the forces of our allies in deterring and resisting aggression. This, I suppose, was the principal task then, and it is today. It involved the British Army of the Rhine in the West and our forces in S.E.A.T.O. Those were the two main areas in which trouble of this sort was foreseen, and so it has turned out. We have had periods of more or less tension in Laos and today there is the dangerous situation in Germany.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green, my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West and the hon. Member for Coventry, East all criticised the composition of the forces with which we were planning to meet this task. The right hon. Member for Flint, West said that he wanted larger conventional forces to be produced by a system of selective service, and he said that he was prepared to see them paid for by our spending less money on the policy of the nuclear deterrent. The hon. Member for Coventry, East asked whether the alternative to the Bill was that we should be prepared to rely to a greater extent upon the nuclear weapon in the British Army of the Rhine. My right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green took the same line and made what I thought was the rather surprising observation, when he estimated the cost of the necessary forces raised by conscription at £40 million, that he considered that that was not a figure of great significance in the country's Budget.
In reply to this argument, which has been one of the main features of the debate and which has been sustained in three very striking speeches, I should like to put forward three propositions. The first is that the logic of the argument of my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West leads us to the conclusion that N.A.T.O. ought to be prepared to confront the Soviet power in Germany with purely conventional forces, a possibility which, so far as I am aware, N.A.T.O. has never contemplated and which does not look particularly sensible, as the Russians themselves are known to be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons on a considerable scale. That is the logic of my right hon. Friend's plea that our conventional


forces should be built up to a greater extent than now.
The second thing is that if the deterrent is to mean anything—

Mr. John Strachey: Mr. John Strachey (Dundee, West) rose—

Mr. Ramsden: I wish to complete this part of my argument—it must surely mean that an attack by our enemies on anything but a fairly inconsiderable scale in Germany would evoke the full retaliatory powers of the Alliance. That, as I understand it, is what the deterrent means. To the extent that we switch the rôle of our conventional forces to anything but resistance to limited aggression and the enforcement of a pause, we are surely weakening the concept of the deterrent as such.

Mr. Strachey: Mr. Strachey rose—

Mr. Ramsden: I cannot give way any more.

Mr. Strachey: This is really very important, because it is a question of N.A.T.O.'s entire doctrine. The Under-Secretary of State is now saying that an assertion of the importance of conventional forces and strength at the conventional level means in logic abandoning all thought of nuclear deterrent. If that is Her Majesty's Government's policy it is far more nonsensical than any of us thought it to be.

Mr. Ramsden: I am saying that our conventional forces in Europe are there, according to accepted N.A.T.O. doctrine, to enforce a pause, and they are adequate to do that job. The logic of my right hon. Friend's argument, that we ought to rely to an increasing extent on conventional forces, must lead to the position that we should rely entirely upon them.

Mr. John Hall: I must apologise for interrupting, but this question of a pause has always rather interested me. Would my hon. Friend tell me what sort of a pause and how long a pause our forces are likely to be able to gain?

Mr. Ramsden: My right hon. Friend dealt with that in reply to a question from the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) the other day.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper asked about the level of our forces in B.A.O.R. in relation to the requirements of SACEUR. The present strength is around 51,000 men. It can be prevented from dropping below this figure only if the House passes this Bill. If we were to bring home forces from overseas, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, we could not achieve by April the retention of this figure, which is what we want to achieve.
In addition to the forces which we keep in Germany, we have the reserve division which is being formed and which is earmarked for N.A.T.O. but which we cannot station in Europe because of the difficulties over the support costs, the validity of which is fully recognised by our N.A.T.O. allies.
There is a further point on this. The initiative in these matters as things are rather lies with our enemies. They can turn the heat off or on in Europe, or in the Far East or between the two. I put it to the House that when they do this, they do it for a purpose and that we ought to be a little careful what our reactions to their efforts are. It is more than arguable that the kind of thing suggested by hon. Members opposite is exactly what Mr. Khrushchev may well want and, therefore, for us to act in this way is very probably wrong. I also doubt very much whether it would be acceptable to our allies.
Then there is the question of numbers, the size of the forces we maintain, and the scale of our whole military effort. There may be those who would wish to see this country have a larger capacity than we now maintain or that we have hitherto sustained for intervening in the world scene. But, again, in planning the extent of the responsibilities that we should try to assume, it has always been made clear that we must measure the effect of the demands on our economic resources to the extent of our contribution to defence. A good export trade and sound economy at home are the modern counterparts of the sinews of war. As the White Paper said, without these military power cannot in the long run fully be supported.
The other two tasks envisaged for our forces in 1957 were the defence of British Colonies and protected territories, and the ability to undertake


limited operations in overseas emergencies.
This is the job of garrisons and of theatre reserves. If their presence is effective in itself, there will be no need for operations, and in the main this is what has happened. I have been fortunate enough to see two examples. There was some trouble in the Cameroons where a battalion group discharged its responsibilities for over a year with great efficiency, and there was Kuwait, which some hon. Gentlemen opposite did not like because it disproved what they were saying, but where prompt action by our forces prevented the development of a serious emergency.
So much for the last four years. Along the lines of the White Paper we have discharged our responsibilities to the full.
What about the future? Hon. Gentleman opposite are saying in effect that we ought to remedy the shortages in the British Army of the Rhine by thinning out our garrisons from other theatres. In other words, they are saying that we ought to fortify our forces in Europe by sacrificing our ability to meet our commitments in other parts of the world.
There are a number of objections to that proposal which in sum are conclusive. I am trying to answer the main point of the right hon. Member for Belper. Even if, consistently with our friends and Colonies and our obligations to them, we could bring about the kind of redeployment envisaged by the Opposition, it would not help us as regards the shortages in Germany.
The kind of commitments which the Opposition seem to want given up are those concerned mainly with internal security and discharged mainly by a high proportion of teeth arms, infantry units and the like. A reduction in these would not avail to fill the shortages with which we are faced in the B.A.O.R. because these are shortages of specialists, signallers, drivers—

Mr. G. Brown: Mr. G. Brown rose—

Mr. James Dance: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) to keep interrupting my hon. Friend?

Mr. Speaker: I hope that we can make progress.

Mr. Ramsden: It was suggested that we should withdraw specialists, signallers, and so on, and that we could afford to thin out headquarters in our theatres in the Far East, but we are seeking to have an Army appropriately balanced for our requirements for every theatre, and it will not help to unbalance our Far East garrisons by bringing from there to the B.A.O.R. the specialists who are in that theatre.

Mr. Brown: Mr. Brown rose—

Mr. Ramsden: I am sorry, I cannot give way.

Mr. Brown: How can we have balanced forces in Hong Kong?

Mr. Ramsden: The second thing is that it would make worse than nonsense in the context of the contribution which we make world wide to the efforts of the West in the cold war if we were to make wholesale sacrifices in the strength of our efforts in the Far East, Africa, or the Mediterranean, in order to bring reinforcements to Europe, which is only one theatre among many where we have important responsibilities.
I am not saying—and here I reply to the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke)—that we may not decide to bring about some redeployment in our overseas garrisons or even at some time to effect some reduction. We have done this already, and, indeed, it was foreshadowed in paragraph 33 of the White Paper that it would be our intention to make some reduction where the situation justified it, but such a redeployment would have to be effected with reference to the needs of the general military situation. To undertake this now on the scale which the Opposition seem to contemplate, even if it were practicable within the time scale, which it is not, would be sheer military nonsense in the context of this country's responsibility in the cold war.
In their speeches my hon. Friends, and the hon. Member for Coventry, East have been offering us rather different sorts of solutions. They are, I think, appreciating a situation in which they do not foresee any time when we shall be able to dispense with any great


numbers of our conventional forces. In fact, they would like to see them in greater strength. They do not believe that we shall ever be able, by voluntary methods, to recruit an Army of the size and balance which in their view it would be fair to ask to take on the commitments which they think that we ought to assume. They are now telling us that we must face the failure of our recruiting campaign and that we ought to go firmly for a system of selective service, because only by this means do they think that we shall get the men and get them where we want them.
There is no doubt that this is a minority opinion in the House. But minority opinions on matters of defence have been right before, and I pay my hon. Friends the compliment of taking their suggestions seriously.
I still think that there are too many uncertainties surrounding what they wish to do and about the circumstances they are planning to meet for the course of action, which they are recommending to be acceptable.
There is the uncertainty about the course of recruiting, which was referred to by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). They do not believe that we should be able to build up the Regular manpower which we require. As my right hon. Friend explained, this belief is in no way justified by the figures. I am not going to say that we are certain of reaching the target of 165,000 all ranks by the end of December next year, but we certainly have a very good chance of doing so. Much more important than this figure, which has been bandied about as a target, is the steady rate of build-up towards a Regular strength of 180,000 this year up to 31st December and thereafter; and the recruiting results of recent months give very fair grounds for optimism that this rate of build-up will be achieved.
But recruiting is not the only factor where there is a considerable element of uncertainty. My right hon. Friend has already told the House that it is not only the way recruiting is going, and that is satisfactory, but the Berlin crisis, and the subsequent mounting of international tension, coming as it does at a period when we may be in difficulties over manpower, which have made necessary the measures proposed in this Bill.

But we do not know what the course of events in Europe may be over the next eighteen months and nor do hon. Members opposite.
Supposing there were a détente, or some development which gave to Europe a lesser military priority than it now enjoys, we should then be saddled with selective service, with all the disadvantages which my right hon. Friend has enumerated, and without the overriding need for the men which it would produce. I would not say that selective service is not a possible solution. I do not even say that it is a solution upon which one day, and in the last resort, we might not be forced back. What I do say is that if there is another solution, one which fills a short-term and certain need without saddling us with a policy for which the need may yet not arise, then we are entitled to ask the House to consider it, and to consider whether it is not more appropriate to the situation which we face today.
I wish now to make one or two more comments on the Bill. I wish to say a little more about our attitude to compassionate cases and to cases of hardship among those who will be retained. To have to deal with such cases is in itself no new problem for the War Office. We have well-tried machinery in the Department. We have the welcome assistance of S.S.A.F.A. and, in many cases, of hon. Members who interest themselves on behalf of their constituents. All this will go on, and I wish to emphasise that the quickest and most efficient, as well as the correct, way for a man to get his case considered is by application to his commanding officer in the first place.
However, the extra six months—because it is extra and will have been to a great extent unforeseen, so that it will upset all sorts of private arrangements—will give rise to some special problems out of the ordinary run of those with which we have been used to dealing. Hence my right hon. Friend's proposal for a special advisory committee to whom he can refer such cases for their guidance. There is no new principle in all this, but an addition to the existing machinery to match the special circumstances of six months' retention. Nor is there any new principle involved in how we shall determine, from among those due to be retained, who will actually be required to serve.
Our brand of National Service in this country has always been selective to the extent that from a given block of men liable to have to serve, compassionate grounds, or deferment, or occupation in the case of agricultural workers, coal miners, merchant seamen and so on, have reduced the numbers actually serving. More recently the system of premature releases has operated with reference to group release dates and the manpower needs of the Army.
We can pursue this in more detail in Committee, but I think I have said enough to indicate how we shall arrive at the total number of men we actually want and that there is nothing new in what we propose. It has been asked by the right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards), why should the tribunal not be independent and executive in its own right? There is an essential distinction between the retained National Service men now in the Army and the men called up for the first time from civil life. These problems will be problems of release, which we have always handled in the way we propose. The problems of those not actually called up are very different. The time scale itself, in which consideration has to be given to their circumstances, is all-important because it has to be remembered that the majority of the men to be retained will be overseas in B.A.O.R.
The tribunal procedure which normally would be accompanied by a right of audience and a right to present one's case in person would be extremely difficult to work in circumstances like these. My right hon. Friend and his Department have a primary responsibility for seeing that Army manning comes up to requirements. If all cases could be referred to

Division No. 13.]
AYES
[10.0 p.m.


Agnew, Sir Peter
Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Boyle, Sir Edward


Aitken, W. T.
Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Brewis, John


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Berkeley, Humphry
Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col.Sir Walter


Allason, James
Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)


Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian
Bidgood, John C.
Browne, Percy (Torrington)


Arbuthnot, John
Biffen, John
Buck, Antony


Ashton, Sir Hubert
Biggs-Davison, John
Bullard, Denys


Atkins, Humphrey
Bingham, R. M.
Bullus, Wing commander Eric


Balniel, Lord
Biroh, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Burden, F. A.


Barber, Anthony
Bishop, F. P.
Butler,Rt.Hon.R.A.(Saffron Walden)


Barlow, Sir John
Black, Sir Cyril
Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)


Barter, John
Bossom, Clive
Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)


Batsford, Brian
Bourne-Arton, A.
Carr, Robert (Mitcham)


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Box, Donald
Cary, Sir Robert


Bell, Ronald
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Channon, H. P. G.

independent tribunals, two things would follow. The Army would have to defer everyone until the outcome became known, and in the circumstances the retention would thus be considerably widened.

I grant that this Bill is hard upon those whom it affects, but so would selective service be. The main justification for this Bill is that it gives us trained men in the numbers we need and in the places and categories where we require them.

Selective service would be equally hard and would affect a much larger number of people. I repeat that Clause 1 will give the Army trained men and make them available at once. This was the main ground on which the party opposite justified the extension of National Service men's engagements in 1950, and the main reason why those on this side of the House supported them when they did so. I know that there was fighting in Korea at the time. I am not trying to make a party point or to draw analogies which do not exist, but I am anxious that these young men and their families should understand, and that the House should accept, that the need for their continued service is a real need, a national need which is no less great than it was then.

I hope the House will reject the Amendment and give the Bill a Second Reading.

Mr. G. W. Reynolds: Mr. G. W. Reynolds (Islington, North) rose—

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Martin Redmayne): The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Martin Redmayne) rose in his place, and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.

Question put, That the Question be now put:—

The House divided: Ayes 288, Noes 217.

Chataway, Christopher
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)


Chichester-Clark, R.
Hopkins, Alan
Prior, J. M. L.


Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Dame P.
Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho


Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Profumo, Rt. Hon. John


Clarke, Brig, Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Cole, Norman
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Pym, Francis


Cooke, Robert
Hughes-Young, Michael
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Cooper, A. E.
Hurd, Sir Anthony
Ramsden, James


Cooper-Key, Sir Neill
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Rawlinson, Peter


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Iremonger, T. L.
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Cordle, John
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Rees, Hugh


Corfield, F. V.
James, David
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas


Costain, A. P.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Ridsdale, Julian


Coulson, J. M.
Jennings, J. C.
Rippon, Geoffrey


Critchley, Julian
Johnson, Dr. Ronald (Carlisle)
Robertson, Sir D. (C'thn's &amp; S'th'ld)


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Crowder, F. P.
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Roots, William


Curran, Charles
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


Currie, G. B. H.
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)


Dalkeith, Earl of
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Russell, Ronald


Dance, James
Kershaw, Anthony
St. Clair, M.


d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry
Kitson, Timothy
Scott-Hopkins, James


Deedes, W. F.
Leburn, Gilmour
Seymour, Leslie


de Ferranti, Basil
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Sharples, Richard


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Shaw, M.


Doughty, Charles
Lilley, F. J. P.
Shepherd, William


Drayson, G. B.
Lindsay, Martin
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir Jocelyn


du Cann, Edward
Linstead, Sir Hugh
Skeet, T. H. H.


Duncan, Sir James
Litchfield, Capt. John
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'rd &amp; Chiswick)


Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David
Lloyd,Rt.Hn.Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)
Smithers, Peter


Eden, John
Longbottom, Charles
Smyth, Brig, Sir John (Norwood)


Elliot, Capt Walter (Carshalton)
Loveys, Walter H.
Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher


Elliott, R.W.(Nwcstle-upon-Tyne,N.)
Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Emery, Peter
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Stanley, Hon. Richard


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Stevens, Geoffrey


Errington, Sir Eric
McAdden, Stephen
Stodart, J. A.


Farey-Jones, F. W.
MacArthur, Ian
Storey, Sir Samuel


Farr, John
McLaren, Martin
Studholme, Sir Henry


Fell, Anthony
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)


Fisher, Nigel
McLean, Neil (Inverness)
Talbot, John E.


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain(Enfield, W.)
Tapsell, Peter


Forrest, George
McMaster, Stanley R.
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)


Foster, John
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Taylor, F. (M'ch'ter &amp; Moss Side)


Fraser, Hn. Hugh (Stafford &amp; Stone)
Maginnis, John E.
Taylor, W. J. (Bradford, N.)


Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Maitland, Sir John
Teeling, William


Freeth, Denzil
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Temple, John M.


George, J. C. (Pollok)
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Gibson-Watt, David
Marlowe, Anthony
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Gilmour, Sir John
Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Glover, Sir Douglas
Marshall, Douglas
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)
Marten, Neil
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter


Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Goodhart, Philip
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)


Goodhew, Victor
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Gough, Frederick
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Turner, Colin


Gower, Raymond
Mills Stratton
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Green, Alan
Montgomery, Fergus
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Gresham Cooke, R.

Vane, W. M. F.


Grimston, Sir Robert
More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John


Gurden, Harold
Morgan, William
Vickers, Miss Joan


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Morrison, John
Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis


Hare, Rt. Hon. John
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Walder, David


Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Wall, Patrick


Harris, Reader (Hoston)
Noble, Michael
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Harvey, sir Arthur Vere(Macclesf'd)
Nugent, Sir Richard
Webster, David


Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Oakshott, Sir Hendrie
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Harvie Anderson, Miss
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Whitelaw, William


Hastings, Stephen
Page, John (Harrow, West)
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)


Hay, John
Page, Graham (Crosby)
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Partridge, E.
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Hendry, Forbes
Peel, John
Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard


Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Percival, Ian
Woodhouse, C. M.


Hiley, Joseph
Peyton, John
Woodnutt, Mark


Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Woollam, John


Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Pike, Miss Mervyn
Worsley, Marcus


Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Pilkington, Sir Richard
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Hirst, Geoffrey
Pitman, Sir James



Hobson, John
Pitt, Miss Edith
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Hocking, Philip N.
Pott, Percivall
Mr. Edward Wakefield and


Holland, Philip
Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch
Colonel Sir Harwood Harrison


Hollingworth, John
Price, David (Eastleigh)

NOES


Ainsley, William
Hewitson, Capt. M.
Pentland, Norman


Albu, Austen
Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Hilton, A. V.
Popplewell, Ernest


Allen, Soholefield (Crewe)
Holman, Percy
Prentice, R. E.


Awbery, Stan
Houghton, Douglas
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)


Baird, John
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Probert, Arthur


Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)
Hoy, James H.
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Randall, Harry


Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Rankin, John


Benson, Sir George
Hunter, A. E.
Redhead, E. C.


Blackburn, F.
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Reynolds, G. W.


Boardman, H.
Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S.W.)
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Bowen, Roderic (Cardigan)
Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Bowles, Frank
Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Boyden, James
Jeger, George
Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Ross, William


Brockway, A. Fenner
Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield)
Royle, Charles (Salford, West)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Short, Edward


Butter, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Callaghan, James
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Skeffington, Arthur


Castle, Mrs. Barbara
Kenyon, Clifford
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)


Chetwynd, George
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)


Cliffe, Michael
King, Dr. Horace
Small, William


Collick, Percy
Lawson, George
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Ledger, Ron
Snow, Julian


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Sorensen, R. W.


Cronin, John
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Crosland, Anthony
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Spriggs, Leslie


Crossman, R. H. S.
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Steele, Thomas


Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Lipton, Marcus
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Darting, George
Loughlin, Charles
Stonehouse, John


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Stones, William


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
MacColl, James
Strachey, Rt. Hon. John


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
McInnes, James
Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)


Deer, George
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Stross,Dr.Barnett(Stoke-on-Trent,C.)


Delargy, Hugh
Mackie, John (Enfield, East)
Swain, Thomas


Dempsey, James
McLeavy, Frank
Swingler, Stephen


Diamond, John
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Symonds, J. B.


Dodds, Norman
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Ede, Rt. Hon. C.
Mallalieu,J.P.W.(Huddersfield,E.)
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Edelman, Maurice
Manuel, A. C.
Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness(Caerphilly)
Mapp, Charles
Thorpe, Jeremy


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Marsh, Richard
Wade, Donald


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Mason, Roy
Wainwright, Edwin


Evans, Albert
Mayhew, Christopher
Warbey, William


Fernyhough, E.
Mendelson, J. J.
Watkins, Tudor


Finch, Harold
Millan, Bruce
Weitzman, David


Fitch, Alan
Milne, Edward J.
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Fletcher, Eric
Mitchison, G. R.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Monslow, Walter
White, Mrs. Eirene


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Moody, A. S.
Whitlock, William


Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Morris, John
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Galpern, Sir Myer
Mort, D. L.
Wilkins, W. A.


Ginsburg, David
Moyle, Arthur
Willey, Frederick


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Mulley, Frederick
Williams, D. J. (Neath)


Gourlay, Harry
Neal, Harold
Williams, LI. (Abertillery)


Greenwood, Anthony
Noel-Baker,Rt.Hn.Phillp(Derby,S.)
Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)


Grey, Charles
Oliver, G. H.
Williams W. T. (Warrington)


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Oram, A. E.
Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Oswald, Thomas
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Owen, Will
Winterbottom, R. E.


Gunter, Ray
Padley, W. E.
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Paget, R. T.
Woof, Robert


Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil(Colne Valley)
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Wyatt, Woodrow


Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Pargiter, G. A.
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)


Hannan, William
Parker, John



Hayman, F. H.
Paton, John
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Healey, Denis
Pavitt, Laurence
Mr. Charles A. Howell and


Henderson, Rt.Hn.Arthur(Rwly Regis)
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Mr. McCann.


Herbison, Miss Margaret
Peart, Frederick

Question put accordingly, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:

Division No. 14.]
AYES
[10.10 p.m.


Aitken, W. T.
Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian
Atkins, Humphrey


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Arbuthnot, John
Balniel, Lord


Allason, James
Ashton, Sir Hubert
Barber, Anthony

The House divided: Ayes 279, Noes 216.

Barlow, Sir John
Goodhart, Philip
Mills, Stratton


Barter, John
Goodhew, Victor
Montgomery, Fergus


Batsford, Brian
Gough, Frederick
More, Jasper (Ludlow)


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Gower, Raymond
Morgan, William


Bell, Ronald
Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R.
Morrison, John


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Green, Alan
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Gresham Cooke, R.
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey


Berkeley, Humphry
Grimston, Sir Robert
Noble, Michael


Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Gurden, Harold
Nugent, Sir Richard


Bidgood, John C.
Hare, Rt. Hon. John
Oakshott, Sir Hendrie


Biffen, John
Harris, Frederio (Croydon, N.W.)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.


Biggs-Davison, John
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Page, John (Harrow, West)


Bingham, R. M.
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere(Macclesf'd)
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)


Bishop, F. P.
Harvie Anderson, Miss
Partridge, E.


Black, Sir Cyril
Hastings, Stephen
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)


Bossom, Clive
Hay, John
Peel, John


Bourne-Arton, A.
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Percival, Ian


Box, Donald
Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Pike, Miss Mervyn


Boyle, Sir Edward
Hendry, Forbes
Pilkington, Sir Richard


Brewis, John
Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Pitman, Sir James


Bromley-Davenport,Lt.-Col.Sir Walter
Hiley, Joseph
Pitt, Miss Edith


Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)
Pott, Percivall


Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch


Buck, Antony
Hirst, Geoffrey
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Bullard, Denys
Hobson, John
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)


Bullus, Wing Commander Eric
Hocking, Philip N.
Prior, J. M. L.


Burden, F. A.
Holland, Philip
Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho


Butler, Rt.Hn.R.A.(Saffron Walden)
Hollingworth, John
Profumo, Rt. Hon. John


Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Hopkins, Alan
Pym, Francis


Carr, Robert (Mitcham)
Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Dame P.
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Cary, Sir Robert
Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)
Ramsden, James


Channon, H. P. G.
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Rawlinson, Peter


Chataway, Christopher
Hughes-Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Chichester-Clark, R.
Hughes-Young, Michael
Rees, Hugh


Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)
Hurd, Sir Anthony
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas


Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Ridsdale, Julian


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Rippon, Geoffrey


Cole, Norman
Iremonger, T. L.
Robertson, Sir D. (C'thn's &amp; S'th'ld)


Cooke, Robert
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)


Cooper, A. E.
James, David
Roots, William


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard



Jennings, J. C.
Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)


Cordle, John
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Russell, Ronald


Corfield, F. V.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
St. Clair, M.


Costain, A. P.
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Scott-Hopkins, James


Coulson, J. M.
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Seymour, Leslie


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Sharples, Richard


Crowder, F. P.
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Shaw, M.


Curran, Charles
Kershaw, Anthony
Shepherd, William


Currie, G. B. H.
Kitson, Timothy
Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir Jocelvm


Dalkeith, Earl of
Leburn, Gilmour
Skeet, T. H. H.


Dance, James

Smith, Dudley(Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)


d'Avigdor-Coldsmid, Sir Henry
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Smithers, Peter


Deedes, w. F.
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)


de Ferranti, Basil
Lilley, F. J. P.
Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Lindsay, Martin
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Doughty, Charles
Linstead, Sir Hugh
Stanley, Hon. Richard


Drayson, C. B.
Litchfield, Capt. John
Stevens, Geoffrey


du Cann, Edward
Longbottom, Charles
Stodart, J. A.


Duncan, Sir James
Loveys, Walter H.
Storey, Sir Samuel


Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David
Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby
Studholme, Sir Henry


Eden, John
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Talbot, John E.


Elliott,R.W.(Nwcstle-upon-Tyne,N.)
McAdden, Stephen
Tapsell, Peter


Emery, Peter
MacArthur, Ian
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
McLaren, Martin
Taylor, F. (M'ch'ter &amp; Moss Side)


Errington, Sir Eric
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Taylor, W. J. (Bradford, N.)


Farey-Jones, F. W.
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Teeling, William


Farr, John
McMaster, Stanley R.
Temple, John M.


Fisher, Nigel
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Maginnis, John E.
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Forrest, George
Maitland, Sir John
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Foster, John
Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Fraser, Hn. Hugh (Stafford &amp; Stone)
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter


Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Marlowe, Anthony
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Freeth, Denzil
Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)


George, J. C. (Pollok)
Marshall, Douglas
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Gibson-Watt, David
Marten, Nell
Turner, Colin


Gilmour, Sir John
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Glover, Sir Douglas
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Vane, W. M. F.


Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John







Vickers, Miss Joan
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)
Woodnutt, Mark


Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Woollam, John


Wall, Patrick
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Worsley, Marcus


Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Webster, David
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick



Wells, John (Maidstone)
Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Whitelaw, William
Woodhouse, C. M.
Mr. Edward Wakefield and




Colonel Sir Harwood Harrison.




NOES


Ainsley, William
Hayman, F. H.
Padley, W. E.


Albu, Austen
Healey, Denis
Paget, R. T.


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Henderson, Rt.Hn.Arthur(RwlyRegis)
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Herbison, Miss Margaret
Pargiter, G. A.


Awbery, Stan
Hewitson, Capt. M.
Parker, John


Baird, John
Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Paton, John


Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)
Hilton, A. V.
Pavitt, Laurence


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Holman, Percy
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)


Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Houghton, Douglas
Peart, Frederick


Benson, Sir George
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Pentland, Norman


Blackburn, F.
Hoy, James H.
Plummer, Sir Leslie


Boardman, H.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Popplewell, Ernest


Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S.W.)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Prentice, R. E.


Bowen, Roderic (Cardigan)
Hunter, A. E.
Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)


Bowles, Frank
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Probert, Arthur


Boyden, James
Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Randall, Harry


Brockway, A. Fenner
Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Rankin, John


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Redhead, E. C.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Jeger, George
Reynolds, G. W.


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Callaghan, James
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Castle, Mrs. Barbara
Jones, Elwyn (west Ham, S.)
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)


Chetwynd, George
Jones, Jack (Rotherham)
Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)


Cliffe, Michael
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Ross, William


Collick, Percy
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Royle, Charles (Salford, West)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Kenyon, Clifford
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Short, Edward


Cronin, John
Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Crosland, Anthony
King, Dr. Horace
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Crossman, R. H. S.
Lawson, George
Skeffington, Arthur


Cullen, Mrs. Alice
Ledger, Ron
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)


Darling, George
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Small, William


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Snow, Julian


Deer, George
Lipton, Marcus
Sorensen, R. W.


Delargy, Hugh
Loughlin, Charles
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Dempsey, James
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Spriggs, Leslie


Diamond, John
MacColl, James
Steele, Thomas


Dodds, Norman
McInnes, James
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Dugdale, Rt. Hon. John
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Stonehouse, John


Ede, Rt. Hon. C.
Mackie, John (Enfield, East)
Stones, William


Edelman, Maurice
McLeavy, Frank
Strachey, Rt. Hon. John


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Stross,Dr.Barnett(Stoke-on-Trent,C.)


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Mallalieu J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Swain, Thomas


Evans, Albert
Manuel, A. C.
Swingler, Stephen


Fernyhough, E.

Symonds, J. B.


Finch, Harold
Mapp, Charles
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Fitch, Alan
Marsh, Richard
Taylor, John (West Lothian)


Fletcher, Eric
Mason, Roy
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Mayhew, Christopher
Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Mendelson, J. J.
Thorpe, Jeremy


Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh
Millan, Bruce
Wade, Donald


Galpern, Sir Myer
Milne, Edward J.
Wainwright, Edwin


Ginsburg, David
Mitchison, G. R.
Warbey, William


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Monslow, Walter
Watkins, Tudor


Gourlay, Harry
Moody, A. S.
Weitzman, David


Greenwood, Anthony
Morris, John
Wells, Percy (Faversham)


Grey, Charles
Mort, D. L.
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Moyle, Arthur
White, Mrs. Eirene


Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Mulley, Frederick
Whitlock, William


Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Neal, Harold
Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.


Gunter, Ray
Noel-Baker, Rt.Hn.Philip(Derby,S.)
Wilkins, W. A.


Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Oliver, G. H.
Willey, Frederick


Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)
Oram, A. E.
Williams, D. J. (Neath)


Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Oswald, Thomas
Williams, LI. (Abertillery)


Hannan, William
Owen, Will
Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.



Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Woof, Robert
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)
Wyatt, Woodrow
Mr. Charles A. Howell and


Winterbottom, R. E.
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)
Mr, McCann.

Bill read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mr. Chichester-Clark.]

Committee Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — ARMY RESERVE [MONEY]

[Queen's Recommendation signified.]

Considered in Committee under Standing Order No. 84 (Money Committees).

[Sir GORDON TOUCHE in the Chair]

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to make further provision with respect to reserves for the regular army, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any increase attributable to the provisions of that Act in the sums payable out of moneys so provided under any other Act.—[Mr. Ramsden.]

10.24 p.m.

Mr. Christopher Mayhew: After that disastrous vote for the Government, this Resolution gives a much-needed opportunity to the Minister of Defence to give us some of the answers to the questions which we asked in the previous debate.

Hon. Members: Where is he?

The Chairman: This is a debate on the Money Resolution and not a debate on the Bill.

Mr. Mayhew: I will not attempt to stray beyond the rules of order, Sir Gordon, but there is nothing to prevent the Minister of Defence replying to the remarks which I propose to make. After the experience which the Government have had this afternoon, they should welcome the chance to try to redeem something from the mess in which they find themselves.
There is also a secondary point. We want to make sure that the Resolution will not bind us too tightly during the Committee stage. There may be a number of fairly wide-ranging Amendments which we wish to propose, Amendments to which only the Minister of Defence can give a suitable answer. Therefore, we must look carefully at the Resolution which we are now asked to pass.
I am glad to know that the Minister of Defence is being sent for. When he comes, perhaps we can invite him to reply to some of our questions. My right hon. and hon. Friends have a number of questions to put on the Reso-

lution. Whilst waiting for the Minister of Defence, however, I should like to point out one anomalous matter in the Bill. Perhaps someone could explain it for us.

The Chairman: The hon. Member cannot refer to the Bill.

Mr. Mayhew: I understand completely, Sir Gordon. This is the description of the financial effects of the Bill. I wonder if I should be in order in referring to the paragraph headed, "Financial effects of the Bill" I take it there is no objection to that, Sir Gordon?

The Chairman: No

Mr. Mayhew: The paragraph in question reads as follows:
Some expenditure will arise from the provisions of Clause 5 relating to reinstatement in civil employment and protection of civil interests. The extent of the expenditure cannot be forecast as it is dependent upon the extent to which the powers under the Bill are exercised.
I should like your guidance on this point, Sir Gordon. Should not the heading, "Financial effects of the Bill" be comprehensive? Should not, therefore, the paragraph which follows refer not only to reinstatement in civil employment and protection of civil interests but to other forms of expenditure under the Bill, forms which are not referred to in that paragraph? Obviously, a great deal of expenditure will be involved. The Secretary of State did not attempt to hide this, nor did the Under-Secretary of State. I do not think any of the statements made publicly by Ministers about the Bill have hidden the fact that a good deal of expenditure is involved in it. Why, then, does this paragraph refer only to some minor part of the expenditure, to expenditure relating to civil employment and protection of civil interests?
We should like a further explanation of the meaning of this Resolution. After all, it has happened before that Resolutions of this kind have severely restricted discussion of Bills in Committee. Could we please have an explanation of the wording of the Resolution:
it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament of any increase attributable to the provisions of that Act in the sums payable out of moneys so provided under any other Act.


I think that we should ask for a full explanation before we agree to pass the Resolution.

Mr. George Brown: Come on, answer. Who is to answer?

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Alan Green): I hope I can give an immediate and direct answer to the hon. Gentleman. The Resolution refers, as the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill says, essentially to Clause 5 and the safeguards on reinstatement and on the protection of certain civil rights. The basic safeguards for National Service men are in Part II of the 1948 Act. These safeguards are applied by the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1950, to the National Service officers and to reservists or members of Auxiliary Forces called out in cases of emergency. The Ministry of Labour has responsibilities under both Acts, as the hon. Gentleman appreciates. It seems natural, therefore, for me to answer the hon. Gentleman's question.
The sort of sums which we expect to be involved under the machinery provisions of the Bill are to be counted in hundreds of pounds and not thousands. The reason for that, if I may give one or two figures from past experience, which is probably the best thing to go on, is that the cases of reinstatement which have been referred to tribunals have averaged about 100 in number each year since 1955; that is, from 1955 to 1960. The largest number was 165 in 1958. Of these, a small number, ten in one year, seven in another, appeal against the findings of the reinstatement committees. The cost per case averages about £20. There are also—about one a year—a small number of prosecutions of employers for ignoring prohibition of dismissal. These prosecutions cost about £10 each. The sum of money involved in the full operation in this respect of the National Service Act is, therefore, between £3,000 and £4,000 a year.
It is, naturally, expected that if National Service men are retained, or if others are called up there will be a certain number, a limited number, of additional appeals on reinstatement, or, at the time of call-up, for the protection of civil rights.
10.30 p.m.
We cannot, of course, estimate exactly how many they will be, but I hope that I have given the order of magnitude involved in the operation of the machinery of the Bill. The best we can say at the moment is that additional cost arising out of the machinery will run into hundreds of pounds.
The hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) may not like the way certain words are inserted in the Bill, but what I am seeking to answer is the terms of the Resolution and I have every intention of keeping within the rules of order. As I understand it we are concerned, under the terms of the Resolution, with the machinery of operation of Clause 5, and the cost of operating that machinery is, as I have said, a matter of hundreds and not of thousands of pounds.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I find this very mysterious. As far as I have understood, one of the constitutional protections which this country has always enjoyed is that military expenditure cannot be entered into unless authorised annually. We are told that this is a Resolution which authorises the payment of a few hundred or at most a few thousand pounds in legal expenses concerning appeals in connection with reinstatement. What about the other expenditure which the Bill brings into being? Is the Resolution wide enough to cover that?
Clause 1 covers a number of people who are to be retained for an additional six months, and not only paid for those months but paid at new rates. I should have thought that that involved a very large sum of money. Are we not to be asked to authorise it? Are we not to hear from the Minister of Defence what sort of sum is involved?
Clause 2, again, involves us in very large sums of money which are quite undefined. There seems to be no limit on the number of people who take on an engagement, whether they do anything under it or not, and who are to be paid at the rate of £3 a week, annually renewable. Where does the money come from to do that? I should be very surprised if we authorised that in the last Army Act. It certainly slipped my notice.

The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Profumo): I do not know whether I can be in order on this Resolution but I am prepared to try. The money for the sort of things which the hon. and learned Member has in mind will come in the next Army Estimates.

Mr. Paget: How do we then cover it in this Bill? Clause 5 provides for "Safeguards for civil employment and interests". How on earth does it provide the means to do that when these men will be paid for six months before we get to the next Army Act? How do we pay them? How do we pay them at the new increased rates? There is no provision in Clause 2 about when that comes into operation; about when recruiting of the "Ever-readies" is to start, or when they are coming into service; or what authority, without a Money Resolution, the Government have for pledging the credit of the country to these men whom they are proposing to engage and to whom, apparently, they are to pay capital sums each year for services which they might not, and which we all expect they will not, render. All this is being done without a Financial Resolution or any provision of money, so far as we can make out. At least we want an explanation of these oddest of odd arrangements. When can we learn? Do I have to continue until the Government are in a position to answer?

Mr. Green: Perhaps I can refer the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) to something I have already said. We have to have this Resolution, which is quite normal, to provide that the machinery of the Bill may be paid for. That is precisely what it seeks to do. It seeks to ensure that if and when, as I devoutly hope, the Bill becomes an Act provision has been made for the machinery of the Bill which is embodied in Clause 5. The cost of defence, the question now being raised by hon. Members, is a proper subject for the Army Estimates, or Defence Estimates.

Mr. Douglas Jay: No doubt all forms of expenditure have to be covered by Estimates. But we were told earlier that £3 a week was to be paid to these volunteers. Is that payment covered by this Resolution or not?

Mr. Green: I do not see how it could have been. It will be covered in the Army Estimates.

Mr. Paget: I could understand that argument if, for instance, Clause 3 did not come into operation until after the Army Estimates, but the power we are giving under it somes into operation immediately. Are these men to be told, "We are prepared to enter into a contract with you; we cannot pay you now and we are not certain we can pay later; it depends on what happens to the Army Estimates."? Is the Minister prepared to tell us that nobody whose discharge is due before the Army Estimates will be retained under Clause 1? Can he promise us that?

Mr. Profumo: I have already told the House that we will not be retaining anybody until after 1st April of next year. I have also explained that we will start recruiting the "Ever-readies" before then, but that this might have to be spaced over a longer period of time. The point my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour was trying to explain was that the cost, in so far as any cost arises out of this Bill, will either be paid for under existing Army Estimates already passed or will come under the Army Estimates for next year.
The point is that my hon. Friend is dealing with the Resolution as set down here and which he has explained, and that the money which is defence costs is borne on the Army Estimates.

Mr. G. W. Reynolds: We have a troika of Ministers present for this Money Resolution, but we still have not had a satisfactory answer to our questions. Nor have we the presence of the Minister of Defence. I hope someone at the top of this pyramid of Ministers knows the answers, or perhaps we can persuade the Leader of the House to help us out.
I understand that we have been told by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour that this Money Resolution simply deals with Clause 5 and nothing further. We were told a moment or two later that the matter of providing money for the "Ever-readies" and for meeting the wages of any National Service men retained or recalled


would be provided in the Estimates. But surely a Money Resolution, irrespective of whether Estimates are due shortly or some way ahead, usually makes general provision for the expenditure to be met from money provided by Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
Sometimes these Resolutions are tightly drawn. I am scared, in this case, because, apparently, this Money Resolution deals with Clause 5 but nothing deals with other Clauses. Does this mean twat it will be either almost impossible to amend the Bill because it will be out of conformity with a Money Resolution which does not exist, or that we will be much freer than usual to amend it because of the lack of a specific reference in the Resolution to anything other than Clause 5?
Even if that were so, I find it strange to have been told that it is necessary to have the Money Resolution for Clause 5 because certain administrative arrangements have to be made to get the machine ready. Later, the Secretary of State intervened to say that whilst the Army might start recruiting "Ever-readies" now, they will not be engaged until the Estimates next year. Surely, if it is necessary to get administration ready to deal with appeals, money is also needed to start the recruiting of "Ever-readies", which will begin before the Estimates.
We have had a mass of contradictions from the three Ministers who are trying to assist the Committee, but are merely succeeding in confusing it more. I hope that the Secretary of State will get his information from the Minister of Defence rather than from one of the Government's Law Officers.
The Secretary of State has been contradictory. On the one hand, he tells us the money will be in the Estimates; on the other, that the recruiting of the "Ever-readies" will start before the Estimates. That must involve the spending of some money—in advertising, in the employment of staff and other things of that nature. If it is necessary to have a Money Resolution to cover administrative arrangements for Clause 5, it is necessary to have one to cover the preliminary administrative arrangements for the other Clauses. I hope that, if we cannot get an answer from the three Ministers here, other Ministers will help us.

Mr. Paget: The Secretary of State has at least made one observation which, I think, will come as a considerable relief to a good many men, that is, those whose release date falls between now and April will not be retained. It seems rather an odd arrangement that because the Money Resolution is drawn in this way a number of people will arbitrarily get released, and another number of people will arbitrarily get recalled with reference to 1st April. That is what the right hon. Gentleman said. He said that nobody would be retained.

10.45 p.m.

Mr. Profumo: I do not want to prolong these proceedings. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are seeking to muddle the situation. It is perfectly clear. If the hon. and learned Gentleman had done me the courtesy of listening to my speech when moving the Second Reading of the Bill earlier today, he would have heard me make plain beyond doubt the position of those who may be retained. It is nothing to do with the Money Resolution, and he knows it.

Mr. Paget: I take it from that that nobody who is due to be released before April will be retained. He will be discharged under this Clause, and then pulled in again under Clause 2 as somebody who has a reserve liability and is wanted back again. This seems to be a rather curious way of going about it.
The "Ever-readies", referred to in Clause 3, are to be recruited, but not paid, until April. Why not have a Money Resolution which provides the money required to perform the obligations undertaken in this Bill? The Government say that they do not want this immediately, and nobody will appear before a tribunal within the next day or two because of matters arising under the Bill. Why do the Government not withdraw the Money Resolution and come back again when they have had another look at it? It is wrong. Plainly, it will not work. It is as ill-conceived as the contents of the Bill. Surely the Government could take the Money Resolution back and come back to the House when they had thought about it a little more?

Mr. Profumo: There is no need to do that. If any "Ever-readies" are recruited before the next Army Estimates,


or there is any expenditure, that is covered in Vote A. Any expenditure incurred before the next Army Estimates is covered in the present Army Estimates. It is clear that this is an Army Estimates matter and not a matter for the Money Resolution.

Mr. John Strachey: The right hon. Gentleman has now taken the Committee to a very strange position. He has explained that the Money Resolution provides specifically, if necessary, to pay for a trivial part of the expenditure under the Bill. On the other hand, apparently no Money Resolution is needed to pay for the main expenditure under the Bill, which is to be quite considerable.
The right hon. Gentleman at one moment explained this by saying that none of this expenditure would take place before April next and the next Army Estimates. Is this so? Can he say definitely that there will be no expenditure before next April, other than that trivial part covered by this Money Resolution? If that is so, it is remarkable, because it means that none of this augmenting of the forces which we are told is so urgent can possibly take place until next summer. If that is so, very little is left of the argument that this is connected with the Berlin crisis.
There is a further point. We are told that any expenditure which takes place before April will take place under Vote A of the Army Estimates of last year. I imagine that when he said this he was appealing to the doctrine of virement of which the Committee is very well seized. But this is stretching the doctrine of virement very much further than it has ever been stretched before. A Money Resolution was never meant to cover this point. We are now told that money voted under last year's Estimates should be used to finance the provisions in a Bill now being put through the House of Commons. This is stretching the old established doctrine of virement—which has been looked on somewhat jealously by Parliament—far too wide. We must have it explained to us.
Is there to be any expenditure before next April? If not, the whole effect of the Bill is postponed. If there is to be expenditure, under what legislation? Is it to be taken from the last Army Esti-

mates, as we have just been told? If so, does the Minister seriously suggest that this is a possible application of the doctrine of virement? If it is not, will he take this Money Resolution back and revise it and bring it into some relation to the Bill which he is asking the House to accept?

Hon. Members: Answer.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: This seems to be a most extraordinary example of muddle and confusion on the part of the Government. The Minister does not reply because the Government do not know the answer. The Minister of Defence has intervened twice—

Mr. Gordon Walker: Not the Minister of Defence.

Mr. Fletcher: I beg the Committee's pardon. The Secretary of State for War has intervened two or three times and on each occasion he has made the position worse.

Mr. Gordon Walker: We are getting deeper into the mire.

Mr. Fletcher: I hope that we shall have a proper and intelligent explanation from the Secretary of State for War, or at least from the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who, I imagine is primarily responsible—

Mr. Gordon Walker: Or the Leader of the House.

Mr. Fletcher: Or the Leader of the House or the Chancellor of the Exchequer who are primarily responsible for the finances of this country and for the due administration of the Constitution.
May we please have the position explained to us before we accept this Money Resolution? In terms it is most ambiguous. It seeks to provide that we should make further provision with respect to reserves for the Regular Army. We have been told by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour quite categorically—this is on record—that the only object of the Money Resolution is to authorise the payment by Parliament under Clause 5 of the Bill.
No one could possibly have understood that from reading the terms of the Resolution. If ordinary English means anything, it would appear from the terms


of the Resolution that it covers any expenditure. I am not referring now to the Bill, but to the Money Resolution. It is in the widest possible terms and could, presumably, without any explanation, have covered any expenditure under the Bill.
We have been told by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, and the Government are bound by this, that it is intended only to cover the expenditure under Clause 5. So we must have an explanation. Is any money to be expended because of this Bill under an earlier Measure either before April or after?
The Secretary of State for War stated that in so far as some money was to be spent before the next Army Estimates it could be properly paid because of the Vote passed earlier this year. With respect to the Secretary of State, that is quite wrong. It would be constitutionally impossible, legally impossible, contrary to parliamentary procedure—[Hon. Members: "And ultra vires"]—and ultra vires for the Government to spend money under the Bill out of funds voted earlier before the Bill was even contemplated.
If money is voted by this House for a specific purpose, it has to be applied to that purpose. Parliament is in control of the expenditure of money voted by this House and it is not for the Government, if money has been voted for one purpose, to apply it for another purpose. If they want to apply it to another purpose they should come to the House and say that they want to apply it to another purpose. This is another example of the deception which this Government are practising on this country, whether in respect of immigration, the Common Market, or anything else. They speak in the language of ambiguity. We can never get the truth from the Government.
On this occasion, Ministers have overstepped themselves, because they have indicated that they intend to act illegally and unconstitutionally. I advise them that we shall watch every penny of expenditure that they incur under this Measure. This is not the way to treat the House. If they want to spend money under Clause 1 they should say so. If

not, they have no right to produce this Measure and make speeches such as they have made today asking Parliament to pass the Bill into law urgently when they say that they do not intend to spend any money under it before April next year.

Mr. Austen Albu: Before the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour—and, following him, the Secretary of State for War—spoke, I was not quite certain what the case of my hon. Friends was. It seemed that the Money Resolution covered the expenditure involved. It was very strange, however, to be told by the Parliamentary Secretary that the Money Resolution meant nothing of the sort, but covered only a very small part of the Bill, Clause 5, which he himself said would involve only an expenditure of tens or hundreds of pounds.
It is not much good looking back to the past, when there were very different conditions. The patriotism of employers may not be as great as it was and resistance to carrying out the wishes of the Government in reinstating those called up under this disgraceful Measure may find them not so willing. There might be more expenditure than the Parliamentary Secretary thought. That, I admit, is a somewhat minor matter. Far more important is the point raised by my hon. Friends on the question of virement. As I understand, the practice which we have been told will be carried out in this case of applying funds voted by Parliament under one head of a Vote to another, has never been used to change a policy, but has merely been to adjust a balance of expenditure within a given policy which Parliament has approved in given statutes or Estimates.
Now we are told that there is to be a change in the way that the money voted by Parliament is to be used to bring into effect what is virtually a complete change of policy. Clauses 1, 2 and 3 provide for new Government policies which were never envisaged when the current year's Army Estimates were passed. It is quite monstrous that money voted in that way under different heads should now be used for quite different purposes. The use of virement covering changes in Government policy, extensions or new Government policy,


is quite scandalous and I am not surprised that my hon. Friends have raised a serious protest about this matter.

Mr. Mayhew: May we have further elucidation from the Secretary of State of the statement that the money would be forthcoming from Vote A? As I understand, Vote A provides for the maximum number of officers and other ranks to be maintained in the Army service. There is no reference to the pay of the Army on Vote A and no reference to bounties nor any of the other things to which the Secretary of State has referred. If this is an obvious mistake he has made, perhaps he would like a little time before we conclude this discussion, as, unfortunately, we must in due course. [An HON. MEMBER: "Why?"] Because the rules of order prevent us exploring this matter as exhaustively as it deserves. Will the Minister explain exactly what he meant by saying that he would find the money under Vote A when it is not concerned with money at all?

11.0 p.m.

Mr. Profumo: The position is that the Money Resolution covers everything which is new expenditure. There will not be any uncovered expenditure other than that which my hon. Friend was talking about. As the Committee knows, the legal basis for all Army pay is the Royal Warrant, which entitles us to make payment. What I was saying to the Committee was that there will be no expenditure in respect of raising the "Ever-readies" or of anything else which will not be covered by next year's Army Estimates. There will be things which cannot be covered by money already voted.
Perhaps I may give an example. Some months ago we started a different sort of bounty for a different sort of reserve—the Army Emergency Reserve, Category I. This was done after the Army Estimates last year, but we did not need a Money Resolution for it.

Mr. Gordon Walker: Was there a Bill?

Mr. Profumo: This part of the Bill which we are now discussing, the part which might attract a bounty for a different sort of reserve, will also not come under the Money Resolution but

will come under the Royal Warrant which takes regard of pay, and any funds which are needed for the next Army Estimates will be carried on existing Army Estimates.
That is the reason that my hon. Friend has moved the Money Resolution, which is for uncovered pay, and it is not for very much. The substantial part of subsequent expenditure of this Bill, if it becomes law, will come under Army Estimates voted next year. Anything which has to be paid in advance can be covered by the Army Estimates and is legalised by the Royal Warrant which will allow us to come forward, if we have to, with a supplementary estimate.

Mr. Mayhew: But surely the Secretary of State is under a misapprehension. The Royal Warrant lays down the rates of pay, but the actual raising of money comes in the Army Estimates. I was suggesting that the Royal Warrant lays down rates of pay. The raising of money is a matter for Parliament and for the Army Estimates, and therefore the money that he is to spend in advance of next year's Army Estimates will fall on this year's Army Estimates and not on Vote A.

Mr. Profumo: The reason that I mentioned Vote A is that Vote A gives us powers in connection with numbers of people. The Royal Warrant is the basis of all Army pay. The right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), I am sure, understands this very well.

Mr. Gordon Walker: Sir Gordon, would it be in order for me to move, "That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again," so that we can go into this extremely important constitutional matter at greater length?
The right hon. Gentleman is now telling us that the Government propose to spend out of the authorisation for last year money for something to which Parliament has not even yet agreed. Or else he is telling us that the Bill is not necessary at all and that he could have spent all this money and paid these bounties without having a Bill at all. He has altered the entire basis of his argument this afternoon. He has rushed this matter through because of a terrible crisis and because of things happening


in Berlin, so we understood. Now we are told that we cannot begin the major part until April.
Would it be in order to move that Motion, Sir Gordon?

The Chairman: I could not accept such a Motion.

Mr. Reynolds: The Secretary of State said, first, that he relied on Vote A, and then, a little later, he changed horses in midstream and relied on the Royal Warrant. I cannot work it out. Royal Warrant or not, we have Vote 1 of the Army Estimates, which is headed, "Pay, etc., of the Army," and this Vote provides for expenditure on the pay of officers, including non-Regular officers employed on full-time duties with the Territorial Army, the pay of warrant officers non-commissioned officers and men, the pay of Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps, of the Women's Royal Army Corps, and of Gurkha and certain Commonwealth, including colonial, and other troops. That is what we are told in the Explanatory Notes to Vote 1.
Vote 1 of the Estimates was presumably based on Vote A. First we discuss Vote A and make provision for a certain number of men, and then we go on to Votes 1, 2, 3, and so on. Presumably it was based on Vote A, and Vote 1, therefore, does not provide for anything other than the number of men provided for in Vote A, and there is no provision made for any other kind of expenditure, either for "Ever-readies" or anything else.

Mr. Michael Stewart: There might be some expenditure on the "Ever-readies" which might fall due before the next Army Estimates. Royal Warrant or no Royal Warrant, that money has to be provided out of money already voted by Parliament. That means that it has to come out of some Vote. I think that must be right. The Secretary of State himself had a shot at it. He said that it had to come out of Vote A; but, of course, it cannot come out of Vote A because there is no money in Vote A. Presumably it would either come out of Vote 1, which is pay, or out of Vote 2, which is the Reserve Forces, Territorial Army and Cadet Forces. The right hon. Gentleman ought to be able to tell us which.
It may be that the addition is so small that it could simply be paid out of that Vote, and that would be that. On the other hand, it might exhaust the Vote, in which case, as the right hon. Gentleman suggested, he might have to come to the House for a Supplementary Estimate. Alternatively, he could meet any shortage on that Vote by applying the surpluses from another Vote, the process referred to as virement. He would have to get, as it were, the posthumous approval of the House for doing that. What we want to know is this. The Royal Warrant gives authority to make payments. Out of what fund of money already voted by Parliament will the money be provided?

It being eight minutes past Eleven o'clock, three quarters of an hour after the House had resolved itself into the Committee, The CHAIRMAN put the Question pursuant to Standing Order No. 1 A (Exemptions from Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House)).

Question agreed to.

Resolution to be reported.

Report to be received Tomorrow.

Orders of the Day — DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF (PAKISTAN)

Resolved,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Pakistan) Order, 1961, be made in the form of the draft laid before this House on 2nd November.—[Mr. Barber.]

To be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of Her Majesty's Household.

Orders of the Day — DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF (PORTUGAL)

Motion made, and Question proposed,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that, on the ratification by the Government of the Portuguese Republic of the Agreement set out in the Schedule to an Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Shipping and Air Transport Profits) (Portugal) Order, 1961, a draft of which was laid before the House on 2nd November, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.—[Mr. Barber.]

11.4 p.m.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: I am sure that the House would not wish to approve an Order of this kind without


a detailed explanation from the Minister. On the face of it, it seems to be a most extraordinary Order calling for a good deal of explanation, and I have no doubt that some of my hon. Friends will want to debate the matter. I think that it would be in accordance with precedent if, before we debated it, we had an explanation from the Economic Secretary about it.
May I indicate one or two of the more obvious points of criticism that appear on the most casual and superficial reading of the Order? For example, why is it that we are only now to have a Double Taxation Relief Order with Portugal? Is not Portugal our oldest ally? We have had Double Taxation Relief Orders with a number of other countries for a long time. Why has our oldest ally been postponed to this date?
Secondly, when we are now to have a Double Taxation Relief Order with Portugal, why is it limited to shipping and air transport profits? There has been a good deal of discussion in the House recently about air transport, civil aviation and subsidies of one kind and another. What is particularly meritorious about shipping and air transport profits that justifies a Double Taxation Relief Order being applied to those operating concerns alone to the exclusion of all other commercial undertakings trading with Portugal, of which there must be a large number?
Thirdly, we are entitled to know to exactly what kind of undertakings the Order relates. I notice from the Explanatory Note that arrangements have been made which enable the Portuguese Government, I understand of their own volition, to apply the Order to "any Portuguese Overseas Province". May I take it that that includes Angola? Are we to understand that the benefit of this Order can be applied at will by the Portuguese Government to companies of that nature trading with Angola?
Next, I should like to know exactly what is meant by the reference to Portuguese undertakings dealing with ships and aircraft. It is notorious that a great deal of the international carriage by sea and shipping undertakings takes place through ships which have, to say the least, a nebulous international residence—sometimes it is Panama, sometimes elsewhere—where there are differ-

ent fiscal arrangements. We should want to be sure that there is nothing in this Double Taxation Order that could possibly operate to the disadvantage of genuine British companies trading either in shipping navigation or air transport navigation. These appear to me, on a mere reading of the Order, to be some of the more obvious points on which explanation is desirable before we can usefully debate the merits of the Order.

11.14 p.m.

The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Anthony Barber): Perhaps I might take the points raised by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. Fletcher) in the order in which he made them. He asked, first, why it is only now that we have a Double Taxation Relief Agreement with Portugal. The reason is that this has taken some years to negotiate, even though it is, as the hon. Member has observed, operative over only a limited field.
It is the general policy of Her Majesty's Government to negotiate double taxation agreements wherever possible as long as they are satisfactory to ourselves and, of course, to the other country concerned. Indeed, if it had been possible to negotiate with the Portuguese a reasonable double taxation agreement covering a wider field, we would certainly have done so. This answer probably covers the second question raised by the hon. Member as to why the Order is limited to shipping and air transport. So far, we have not been able to reach with the Portuguese any agreement going beyond the categories referred to in the draft.
The hon. Gentleman next referred to the kinds of undertakings which this agreement relates to and referred to the particular Article—Article III—about the possible extension of the agreement to Portugal's overseas provinces or to any territory for whose international relations the United Kingdom Government are responsible. I think that he is right in saying that this Order could be extended to cover Angola, but I would point out to him that that could only be done with the concurrence of the United Kingdom, but, here again, I think that I ought to point out to the House that this provision is common form in most double


taxation agreements and, of course, works to the advantage of both contracting parties.
The hon. Gentleman posed a question on the expression "United Kingdom undertakings". He is a lawyer, and I hope he will agree, with reference to Article II (e), that it is very difficult to envisage an explanation further to what is already in that paragraph; the expression is there clearly defined; and in frankness with the House, I really could not add to that without being asked to give an opinion on a specific case if the hon. Gentleman has a case in mind I will do my best to answer "off the cuff", but I would much rather give him a considered answer.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that, on the ratification by the Government of the Portuguese Republic of the Agreement set out in the Schedule to an Order entitled the Double Taxation Relief (Shipping and Air Transport Profits) (Portugal) Order, 1961, a draft of which was laid before this House on 2nd November, an Order may be made in the form of that draft.

To be presented by Privy Councillors or Members of Her Majesty's Household.

Orders of the Day — WELSH GRAND COMMITTEE

Ordered,
That for the remainder of the present Session the following paragraphs shall have effect:—

(1) There shall be a Standing Committee to be known as the Welsh Grand Committee to consider such specified matters relating exclusively to Wales and Monmouthshire as may be referred to them and to consist of all Members sitting for constituencies in Wales and Monmouthshire, together with not more than twenty-five other Members to be nominated in respect of each such matter by the Committee of Selection, who shall have regard in such nomination to the approximation of the balance of parties in the committee to that in the whole House, and shall have power from time to time to discharge the Members so nominated by them and to appoint others in substitution for those discharged.
(2) A Motion may be made by a Minister of the Crown at the commencement of public Business, to be decided without amendment or debate, to the effect that a specified matter or matters relating exclusively to Wales and Monmouthshire be referred to the Welsh Grand Committee for their consideration, and if, on the question thereupon being put, not less than ten Members rise

in their places and signify their objection thereto, Mr. Speaker shall declare that the noes have it.
(3) If such a motion be agreed to, the Welsh Grand Committee shall consider the matter or matters to them referred on not more than four days in a Session, and shall report only that they have considered the said matter or matters.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]

Orders of the Day — HOMELESS FAMILIES, MIDDLESEX

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]

11.18 p.m.

Mrs. Joyce Butler: In the discussions which have taken place about homeless families in recent weeks the problem has been mainly concentrated on the problem in the London County Council area. In speaking about Middlesex tonight I want to draw attention to a problem which, although less acute than that in the L.C.C. area, nevertheless is a real one, and has some peculiar difficulties due to the arrangement of local authorities in Middlesex.
The problem is illustrated by the fact that in a 22-week period ended about the middle of November there were applications to the Middlesex County Council from 302 homeless families; 168 of those families—more than half of them—were told by the Council that it could do nothing for them. Among those families there were 235 children, and 137 of those children, having already lost their homes, had to be taken away from their parents and put into the care of the County Council because there was nowhere else for them to go.
These were children of ordinary, decent, hard-working parents, not problem parents, who were forced to take this action simply because of the lack of accommodation in Middlesex. No one can estimate, I suggest, what the effect of this separation will be on those children. It is a problem for the future.
But this does not give the whole of the picture, because since the County Council is not a housing authority, many families only go to it when they cannot do anything for themselves, or when their borough council cannot house them, and we have to add those cases which go to the district councils to those which go to the County Council.
A great deal has been done by the district councils. Boroughs like Wood Green and Tottenham, in my own constituency, have worked to the limit of their resources to help homeless families. In some cases they have bought the properties from which the families were due to be evicted. They have made mortgage arrangements on special terms to help them or have put them in temporary accommodation. Acton and Willesden in a very imaginative and helpful way have helped to finance co-operative housing schemes for tenants about to be evicted.

Mr. T. H. H. Skeet: Does the hon. Lady not agree that Willesden Borough Council could do a great deal more for homeless families?

Mrs. Butler: I am not in a position to criticise what local authorities have done, nor is any hon. Member, because we are all well aware how hard-pressed district councils are by their housing problems and the great difficulties there are in taking action to help homeless families.
In many cases nothing can be done. The property from which the tenants are due to be evicted is in too poor a condition for councils to consider buying it. Sometimes tenants are in a flat in a large block where other flats are controlled and it is impossible for the council to do anything. Sometimes—and this is a growing problem in Middlesex and, I believe, in London—landlords take summary action without reference to the county court and tenants are out before anybody can do anything for them.
The Minister advocates compulsory purchase orders but he must know that, in addition to other disadvantages, his predecessor refused to confirm orders where the rents were exorbitant in the view of the local authority or where tenants had taken over tenancies since the Rent Act came into operation in 1957. There have been a great many cases of that kind.
An analysis made of 60 cases at present before Tottenham Borough Council shows that 16 are homeless families because of the operation of the Rent Act. Nine are cases where the owner could prove greater need. Ten are unauthorised occupants, mainly people

who take on illegal subtenancies in an effort to prevent themselves being homeless. Five are cases of expiry of lease, four of expiry of service tenancies and four only of arrears of rent, two only of nuisance and annoyance. Four were premises over shops and six were cases where the owner was selling the property.
I do not know how far these are typical of other authorities in Middlesex, but of the 60 cases in Tottenham those threatened with eviction under the Rent Act are clearly in the majority. It would seem that in trying to consider this problem it is like performing "Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark if we consider it without reference to the Rent Act. Clearly, some limit on rents and provision for security of tenure are main considerations in dealing with this problem. In this respect the Minister has a major responsibility for the tragedy facing these families.
The Minister has also refused to consider requisitioning, but I continually receive letters from constituents who are well housed and who are unable to understand why properties can remain empty for months and even more than a year and the council has no power to requisition. Another but similar difficulty is that though local authorities can refuse to give permission to shop owners to change the use of flats above shops from residential to commercial purposes, they have no power to ensure that these empty rooms are used for residential purposes and, therefore, they remain empty. This is something else which the public finds very difficult to understand.
I assume that the Minister is remaining adamant on these two points—the Rent Act and requisitioning—but there is another suggestion which, I think, he has not considered as fully as he might. I have a number of schemes of private redevelopment pending in my constituency, and in these cases there are several families who will be evicted when the redevelopment starts. It seems quite unfair that under the Housing Act, 1957, not only local authorities but other undertakers carrying out redevelopment have to provide alternative accommodation for displaced families, while there is no such obligation on owners undertaking private redevelopment.
This is an increasing problem and these are some of the homeless families of the future. I ask the Minister to look at this very carefully and to see what suggestions he can make for dealing with it, because redevelopment is often carried out by private speculators who have no interest whatsoever in the families they displace and who add to the total of homeless families. As one of my constituents wrote to me the other day very feelingly, it is high time it was recognised that human beings are involved in housing. People, and not lumps of tin, lead and copper, are the stocks being sold, and that is not fully appreciated by many of the people who are carrying out, or seeking to carry out, redevelopment.
A point which the Government have made many times and which they made again recently in a letter which was passed to me was that they hoped that following the Rent Act there would be an increase in houses to let. They believed, and this is what the representative of the Ministry said in the letter, that a free market in housing would result in a greater variety of properties to let. The Minister must know that that is completely the opposite of what is happening and that since the Rent Act there has been a steady decline in properties to let as creeping decontrol has advanced and as properties which were formerly to let have been sold. If the Minister really means what he says about increasing the number of properties to let, I suggest that he tells all the local authorities in Middlesex that he is revoking his Circular 37/61, which, in effect, asks them to reduce their housing programmes. That is the first thing he should do.
In Middlesex, there is only a small amount of residential land left, land for about 15,000 dwellings. As things are, those acres are likely to be developed for houses for sale. I wonder whether the Minister has thought of looking at this problem of the small amount of residential land left in Middlesex. If he were to give it some such designation as residential land for building to let—rather slumsy wording, but I think that he will understand what I mean—that would enable the planning authority to designate suitable portions of that residential land as available only to appli-

cants who were prepared to build houses and flats to let, and it would do a little to offset the progressive decontrol of rented properties under the Rent Act.
Some of it might be taken up by the local authority, which would be most satisfactory because the local authority allocates properties only to people already living in the county and, therefore, does not attract in any population from outside. Some of it might be available to housing associations, non-profit making, which would help a section of the community which is threatened with homelessness and cannot buy its own property. This is something which I think he should consider when there is such a small amount of residential land left in the country.
The South-East region, of which Middlesex is an integral part, attracted about 45 per cent. of the new jobs available between 1952 and 1959, although it has only 27 per cent. of the population. This involves the whole question of office location. Middlesex has for some years now pursued a policy of trying to decentralise office accommodation by approving office development on the periphery of the county, and hoping that firms in the centre of London would move out to the outskirts of Middlesex.
This policy has not been as effective as it should be for two reasons. First, the London area is not considered for planning purposes as a whole, and the Minister's rather belated attempts now to discuss with the planning authorities of the Home Counties area how this problem should be solved are too little and too late.
The second reason is that there is no control over the allocating of office premises in the centre of London, and, therefore, any policy pursued by the local planning authorities—London, Middlesex, or any other Home County—is vitiated by lack of control by the Minister, who has turned down office or commercial development certification. This is something which the Minister must tackle if we are to stop the pressure of families coming in from outside to find employment in the area and adding to the problems of homelessness.
We have to add to that the fact that the population of Middlesex is increasing much more rapidly than it was a


few years ago. Last year, there were 12,000 more births than deaths, compared with 8,000 to 9,000 in previous years, and this is also making for great pressure, and will continue to do so, on the available housing accommodation.
The last point I wish to make is that without adequate overspill arrangements it is impossible for the authorities of Middlesex to solve their housing problems, both concerning families in need of better accommodation and those becoming homeless for the various reasons I have outlined. With the running down or completion of the schemes for Hatfield, Welwyn, Crawley and Hemel Hempstead, and even with the increase in accommodation at Bracknell, in the next ten years, on present estimates, the existing new towns will only provide for something like the overspill of Middlesex. I ask the Minister what progress he is making with providing a new town for the overspill.
In all these points, I have attempted to be constructive and to see some solution to the problem of homelessness. We are all in the Minister's hands. He has attempted to deal with the London problem by throwing the responsibility back on the London County Council. I assure him that in Middlesex he cannot, in fairness, throw it back on the Middlesex County Council, on the borough councils, whose hostels are already overcrowded, or on the district councils, who have done their utmost to deal with the problem. The Minister must take action on all these matters. I ask him what he intends to do about it, because, acute as it is at the moment, it is getting worse and not better.

11.35 p.m.

The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Geoffrey Rippon): We all understand the motives of the hon. Lady the Member for Wood Green (Mrs. Butler) in raising this matter. It is an important one for all the people affected. For any family to be without a home of its own for any purposes is a tragic matter.
The causes of homelessness, as the hon. Lady indicated when she referred to the sample taken in Tottenham, can be many and varied. They can arise from evictions through rent arrears, lack

of a legal tenancy, lost service tenancies, quarrels with landladies, or even at times with relatives, people moving in from other parts of the country, and so on. I suggest to the hon. Lady that there is no firm evidence on which to base her assertion that this is primarily due to the operation of the Rent Act, 1957.
Another factor is eviction from furnished accommodation. Some people say that this is increasing, but it is not affected one way or other by the Rent Act, 1957. It is very difficult to be dogmatic about this. I notice that in the short debate we had the other night on the subject of furnished accommodation the hon. Member for Fulham (Mr. M. Stewart) said:
… increasingly, landlords letting rooms furnished are deciding that it is a better bet for them to let the rooms unfurnished instead.
The hon. Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) said:
… there is far more furnished accommodation than we have ever had before."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th November, 1961, Vol. 649, cc. 486–504.]
As we know, the London County Council is dealing with this matter by having a survey into the causes. It may be that the Middlesex County Council would consider a similar survey in conjunction with the housing authorities. Rather than try to make a political case for an attack on the Rent Act, which cannot be sustained by the facts, it is better to regard this as a practical human problem which can be, and is being, dealt with by welfare and housing authorities in Middlesex as elsewhere.
The provision of temporary accommodation for families in urgent need, in circumstances which cannot be foreseen, is the duty of the welfare authority, and that is the Middlesex County Council. The number of homeless persons in the care of the Middlesex County Council has risen by 50 during the year. As the hon. Lady pointed out, the number of applications has risen considerably. I understand that in the six months ended 28th October, 1960, the number of applications was 364, and that in the corresponding period this year it was 545. In terms of families, there were 142 in the care of the Middlesex County Council at the end of 1959, 142 at the end of 1960, and 160 at 4th November, 1961. In the light of these


figures, it is not surprising that the Middlesex County Council has made no representation that it is unable to deal with this increase.
As the hon. Lady pointed out, the housing authorities are also closely concerned with this matter. In this connection, she will no doubt recall that in March, 1959, a joint Circular No. 17 of 1959, was issued by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Health. This stressed the importance of the welfare authorities and the housing authorities co-operating closely in providing for homeless families, and made the point which the hon. Lady made, that the overriding consideration must be to make every effort to keep the family together.
The form of this co-operation must be governed by local circumstances, and I think that the arrangements in Middlesex between the County Council and the housing authorities seem to be working reasonably satisfactorily. It is important that they should, because, as the hon. Lady appreciates, admittance to Part III accommodation provided by the County Council should be as a last resort.
There is general agreement that older houses, suitably converted, provided by the housing authorities can contribute to much cheaper and more speedily available accommodation of an intermediate character. I think that those arrangements are being made between the county councils and district councils, bearing in mind that under the Local Government Act, 1958, the county council has power to contribute towards the expenses incurred by district councils in providing that intermediate accommodation.
Again, as the hon. Lady knows, 15 of the Middlesex district authorities have agreed to allocate one vacancy a year to the welfare authority. It is not very much, and perhaps some of them could do more. I am informed that in many ways co-operation has been improved. The county districts, under that scheme, do, I understand, accept families on an ad hoc basis for rehousing where there is an association with their own district. Some authorities with the worst housing problems seem to me, after study, to be making the best efforts to accommodate the homeless

but I agree with the hon. Lady that it is invidious to single out particular authorities.
The Council Council can give help and does so by rehousing some families in its own properties. Although not a housing authority the Council acquires a considerable amount of house property for various purposes and before redevelopment it uses it for rehousing. After redevelopment, the district councils take over the responsibility.
On the immediate problem of homelessness, I wish to make two points. First, action to deal with homelessness must be regarded as the primary responsibility of the housing or welfare authorities, or both. Although, as my right hon. Friend has said, he is only too anxious to give all the help he can to both these types of authority within his existing powers, I do not think that it is correct for the hon. Lady to assert that particular compulsory purchase orders were not approved although the rent was exorbitant. I suggest that possibly the reverse was the fact. It is impossible to argue these cases in detail. We know that the existence of these powers has proved very helpful. Secondly, the housing and welfare authorities have power to tackle this problem in a variety of ways. They can purchase or adapt existing buildings, or, as the hon. Lady says they could get property for letting purposes, and there might be an opportunity for acquisition by agreement or by compulsory purchase. They could build some extra large houses for the families with a lot of children which provide the greatest problem. They could provide more temporary welfare accommodation. But whatever they do they should work together, using all the methods that they think suitable for their own areas.
On the question of private house accommodation I am sure that there are some authorities which can encourage the better off council tenants to make their own arrangements by having a differential rent scheme. On the other hand, there are some authorities who could do more to overcome under-occupation of their houses by arranging transfers to smaller units. But, of course, these are essentially local matters and must be dealt with in the way which is considered fitting.
The hon. Lady was right in saying that we must also consider the problem of homelessness in the wider context of the provision of better housing for all who need it. Comparing 1951 with 1961, the population of Middlesex has fallen by 1·7 per cent. The number of households has risen by 3·4 per cent. and the number of dwellings provided has risen by 11·9 per cent. These are the sort of figures that we see in the Greater London area. In Middlesex, the number of dwellings in the last ten years has increased by only 11·9 per cent. compared with 15 per cent. for the London area and 18 per cent. for the country as a whole. That may be partly attributed to the lack of land. It is also due in part to the effect of this relatively low density prevailing in Middlesex.
My right hon. Friend who is now the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, in Circular No. 37/60, urged local planning authorities to seek out all the available housing land to ensure its most intensive use. Something is being done in that direction in Middlesex. There is the Willesden—Stonebridge redevelopment scheme, which is planned for a higher density than was originally considered, and probably more could be done in that direction.
I agree with the hon. Lady, that the main solution lies in the direction of overspill. There are several new towns with which the Middlesex local authorities have a close connection which still have room for 30,000 more families. The London County Council has firm agreements on overspill under the Town Development Act, 1948, for housing a further 48,000 and a further 20,000 is in prospect. Some of the latter will be available for Middlesex. Middlesex authorities, the hon. Lady's constituency of Wood Green, Heston and Isleworth Borough Council and Ruislip and Northwood, have joined in a town development scheme at St. Neots which will provide 1,000 dwellings. Moreover, by the provision of Section 34 (2) of the Housing Act, 1961, a county council is entitled to contribute to development schemes both by financial contribution and by lending staff.
As to housing for letting, I hope that Section 7 of the 1961 Act will help in the provision which it makes. Other

provisions of the 1961 Act relating to subsidies for town development and multiple occupation will, I hope, also help. As to private development schemes, I think the hon. Lady had in mind schemes when leases run out and the landlord wants to develop the property as a whole. Of course, then there is a great deal of time before the development takes place. Tenants know what is happening and the great majority are able to make provision for themselves. The control of vacated office premises raises a wide issue into which I can hardly be expected to go tonight. This is a planning issue. If action of that kind were taken it would involve considerable sums payable in compensation.
On the subject of homelessness generally, which is the main purpose of the debate this evening local authorities which are housing and welfare authorities have been given this responsibility by Parliament. My right hon. Friend has indicated that he is anxious to give them all the help he can in fulfilling this responsibility but there is really no evidence that local authorities in Middlesex—the County Council as a welfare authority or the borough and district councils as housing authorities—are unable to cope with these problems as a specific part of their functions.

Mr. Skeet: May I ask about the Stonebridge scheme which my hon. Friend mentioned? What is the position today?

Mr. Rippon: I cannot give my hon. Friend the exact details of that scheme.

Mr. Michael Stewart: There may be different opinions about why people are rendered homeless, but there is this further question. When a family finds that for some reason or other it has lost its home, why is it so very difficult—particularly in the Metropolitan region—to find any other home? That is where the Rent Act is relevant. It is because of high rents that it is impossible for people to find homes elsewhere.

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at twelve minutes to Twelve o'clock.